Zambia’s civil society had no kind words for the new Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai saying he was inflexible, self-serving, and arrogant, and lacking in judgment and integrity.
Their displeasure with Mugabe was matched — if not surpassed — by their disdain for Tsvangirai.
They thought Tsvangirai should have already entered into a government of national unity that would allow the Zimbabwean government to begin restoring stability to the country.
They were not overly concerned about ZANU-PF’s record of human rights abuse as they felt that MDC had also committed injustices.
The civil society leaders heaped additional criticism on Tsvangirai for his profuse international travel, which they thought signalled a stronger allegiance to foreign governments than to the Zimbabwean electorate.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09LUSAKA115, ZAM ON ZIM: RESIGNED BUT REALISTIC
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO6955
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0115 0501443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191443Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6747
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000115
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2019
SUBJECT: ZAM ON ZIM: RESIGNED BUT REALISTIC
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Booth for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. Zambian Government (GRZ) officials and
civil society representatives are supportive of the new
Zimbabwean government of national unity, although they have
shared concerns about its prospects for success. Their
disapproval of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s
undemocratic conduct appears to be counterbalanced by an
equal lack of confidence in Prime Minister Morgan
Tsvangirai’s leadership ability. Numerous Embassy
interlocutors believe that the Zimbabwean power-sharing
arrangement allows Mugabe the opportunity to step down from
office while saving face, something that they consider likely
within the next twelve months. End Summary.
¶2. (C) On February 12, Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary
Tens Kapoma and Zambia’s Permanent Representative to the
United Nations Lazarous Kapambwe sardonically described the
agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai as a “forced
marriage,” with former South African President Thabo Mbeki
acting as “the bridesmaid,” and with uncertain prospects for
success. Their misgivings aside, they appeared content —
even relieved — with the arrangement, particularly as this
would allow SADC to begin focusing on other issues. The DCM
acknowledged the GRZ’s contribution in SADC fora and
encouraged SADC to continue monitoring the implementation of
the agreement to ensure its success. The GRZ officials in
turn thanked the U.S. Embassy for abiding by former President
Mwanwasa’s appeal to avoid making pointed public statements
on Zimbabwe in the Zambian press, something they felt would
have played into Mugabe’s hands by making Mwanawasa appear to
be a pawn of western governments.
¶3. (C) Kapoma conceded that the power-sharing arrangement
provides Mugabe with an opportunity to retire from politics
on his own accord and not at the bequest of the international
community, a course of action that Mugabe might easily take
within the next 12 months. In a separate meeting, COMESA
Secretary General also made this point to the Ambassador,
relaying that Mugabe was interested in an exit strategy that
might be made complete with assurances of prosecutorial
immunity from the United Kingdom and United States. An
Indo-Kenyan business mogul with alleged ties to Mugabe also
conveyed to the DCM that Mugabe would like to step down from
office within the next six to nine months. He opined that
Tsvangirai’s political career — despite Tsvangirai’s
political ambitions — may also be in its final stages and
that it was highly improbably that Tsvangirai would head the
next Zimbabwean government.
¶4. (C) Zambian civil society representatives appear to be
similarly supportive of the new Zimbabwean government, but
equally doubtful about its chances for success. In the
lead-up to the power-sharing agreement, numerous civil
society leaders expressed to the DCM their exasperation with
Tsvangirai, whom they considered inflexible, self-serving,
and arrogant, and lacking in judgment and integrity. Their
displeasure with Mugabe was matched — if not surpassed — by
their disdain for Tsvangirai. They thought Tsvangirai should
have already entered into a government of national unity that
would allow the Zimbabwean government to begin restoring
stability to the country. Surprisingly, they were not overly
concerned about ZANU-PF’s record of human rights abuse as
they felt that MDC had also committed injustices. The civil
society leaders heaped additional criticism on Tsvangirai for
his profuse international travel, which they thought signaled
a stronger allegiance to foreign governments than to the
Zimbabwean electorate.
¶5. (C) Comment. In the course of one year, Zambian public
opinion appears to have swayed from umbrage (at Mugabe) to
scorn (for Tsvangirai). Zambian insistence that any
agreement is better than no agreement at all conveys a
realpolitik defined by “African” norms and realities that
cast a more forgiving light on Mugabe’s tyranny than on
Tsvangirai’s apparent futility. A regrettably large number
of Zambians appear to believe that the USG has extended
widespread economic sanctions on Zimbabwe and therefore has
played a role in Zimbabwe’s economic collapse. Consequently,
there seems to be an unfound optimism that the power-sharing
agreement will result in economic recovery directly following
the revocation of these non-existent sanctions. Despite our
public diplomacy efforts, they are also woefully unaware of
U.S. humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean people.
Either way, the GRZ appears well-disposed to the softening of
rhetoric in Washington and USG’s willingness to give the
power-sharing agreement (that Zambians themselves have little
confidence in) a chance.
BOOTH
(30 VIEWS)
