As many as 100 000 voters were turned away during the 2005 elections which the Movement for Democratic Change claimed the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front had rigged but failed to produce any semblance of a parallel vote count, undercutting its claims of fraud.
There were gross discrepancies between figures initially released by Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and the final results in six of the ten provinces.
Of the 19 constituencies where there were gross discrepancies, 18 were won by ZANU-PF.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE563, ZIMBABWE’S FLAWED ELECTION – WHAT THE NUMBERS SAY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000563
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE’S FLAWED ELECTION – WHAT THE NUMBERS SAY
REF: (A) HARARE 508 (B) HARARE 502 (C) HARARE 501
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Inexplicably high voting totals, high
voter turn-away rates, and manipulation of voter registration
rolls appear to have been used in combination by the ruling
ZANU-PF party in a large number of constituencies to ensure
its &victory8 in Zimbabwe,s March 31 parliamentary
elections. The discrepancies in vote totals released by the
Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) early Friday morning and
the &final8 results remain unexplained. ZEC has suggested
that the announced totals were &preliminary8 but has yet to
provide hard data, such as tallies for polling stations, that
could put suspicions of rigging to rest. Preliminary figures
developed by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)
suggest an additional tactic — that accredited observers
were systematically excluded from certain polling stations
that then returned results heavily skewed in ZANU-PF,s favor
and that were enough to swing highly contested
constituencies. The MDC has, however, so far has failed to
produce any semblance of a parallel vote count, undercutting
its claims of fraud. END SUMMARY.
————————————–
Discrepancies in Announced Vote Counts
————————————–
¶2. (U) Public charges by the MDC and others of GOZ
vote-rigging revolve in part around gross discrepancies
between figures released by ZEC at about 2 a.m. April 1 for
the total number of ballots cast in constituencies from six
out of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces and the subsequently released
final results for all constituencies. As noted in ref B, the
first red-flag went up when ZEC inexplicably failed to
announce total ballots cast for the four remaining provinces
in its 2 a.m. announcement. Then, when total vote tallies
for the candidates were released later in the next two days,
the totals differed drastically from those first released.
¶3. (U) Some discrepancies in a national election might be
expected, but the pattern in this election, which heavily
favors the ruling party, as well as the high percentages
involved, suggests rigging. Of the 19 constituencies where
the discrepancy exceeded 5,000, 18 were won by ZANU-PF.
ZANU-PF won 15 of the 17 constituencies where the discrepancy
alone exceeded the winning candidate’s margin. All but two
of the constituencies in which the discrepancy exceeded
either 5,000 or the margin were regarded by the MDC before
the election as seats that were safely theirs or closely
contested. The fact that ZEC never released the total vote
counts for the other four provinces and never explained why
the announcement abruptly stopped has fueled additional
suspicion.
———-
Turn-Aways
———-
¶4. (U) The high rate of voter turn-away in other key
constituencies is another likely indicator of ruling party
manipulation. The national turn-away rate was about 10
percent, alarmingly high compared with typical figures of 2-3
percent in other developing country nations. In all more
than 100,000 voters appear to have been turned away.
Moreover, as reported in ref B, the figures varied
significantly by constituency, tending to be higher in more
contested areas. Our embassy observers, for example, noted
that turn-aways in the safe ZANU-PF constituency of Gokwe
Central never exceeded ten at any polling station; in
contested Gokwe South, some polling stations turned away more
than 100.
¶5. (U) ZEC has yet to release a final tally of turn-aways at
49 constituencies, including the Gokwe constituencies.
However, at the constituencies for which ZEC has released
turn-away figures, turn-away totals exceeded the candidate’s
margin of victory in five constituencies, three of which were
won by the ruling party. More telling is that the turn-away
figures combined with the discrepancies in ZEC’s announced
tallies exceed the candidates’ margin of victory in 24
constituencies ) 20 of them won by ZANU-PF.
————————————
Vote Totals Indicate Imported Voters
————————————
¶6. (SBU) Voter turnout across the country generally was
lower than in the 2000 parliamentary elections. The few
constituencies that saw an increase in ballots cast were
typically heavily contested rural seats, all taken by
ZANU-PF. In each of the two urban Manicaland constituencies
retained by the MDC, for example, vote totals declined since
2000 (despite reports of net urban inflow from drought-ridden
rural areas). By contrast, vote counts increased in all
three of the rural seats in the region that shifted to
ZANU-PF control, highlighting the importance of “new voters”
in the ruling party victory.
¶7. (SBU) By way of illustration, Chimanimani had 19,842
ballots cast in 2000 with a 3338 MDC margin of victory. In
2005, 26,848 ballots were cast (or 23,896 per ZEC’s 2 a.m.
announcement) in the constituency with a 4,786 margin in
ZANU-PF’s favor. Principally responsible for the anomalous
increase and shift to the ruling party was the reported
resettling of thousands of soldiers, police, war veterans,
and ruling party supporters in the constituency over the past
year, much of it associated with the violent seizure of MDC
MP Roy Bennett’s large farm there.
¶8. (SBU) Harare South presents an urban example. In 2000,
the MDC won the seat by a margin of 7,700 votes with a total
of 17,160 votes cast. This year, the total jumped to 22,261
(22,403 per ZEC’s early announcement) and yielded the seat to
the ruling party by a margin of just 829 votes. Largely
responsible for the boost in totals and the shift in control
was a gerrymandering that reportedly brought police barracks
and recently resettled populations ) all largely pro-ZANU-PF
– into the constituency.
—————————–
ZEC: The Dog That Didn’t Bark
—————————–
¶9. (SBU) At a press conference April 7, ZEC Chairperson
Justice George Chiweshe asserted that the initially announced
figures were preliminary and not authoritative (not something
mentioned when the figures were originally released), but did
not explain why they differed so significantly from final
figures or why figures were not originally announced for four
of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces. He said the ZEC had remained
silent on the issue for so long because it had not received
any formal complaint until the MDC filed its complaint on
April 6. ZEC has also continued to withhold the polling
station-by-polling station results necessary to analyze the
integrity of the polling station and constituency-wide
tabulations and has given no indication it ever intends to
release the data.
————————-
Preliminary ZESN Figures
————————-
¶10. (SBU) Preliminary data collected by ZESN is still being
collated and analyzed. ZESN observers numbered more than
6,000 and covered most polling stations in the country.
Nonetheless, they were barred from selected polling stations,
which suggests that the ruling party may have had a number of
polling stations to which it controlled access and therefore
the results. Indeed, figures for polling stations ZESN
observed sometimes yielded anomalous results suggestive of
ruling party control of voters for that station, if not the
results. For example, in Chipinge North, a seat ZANU-PF took
from an MDC incumbent, most polling stations reportedly went
for the MDC by fairly close margins, with ZANU-PF winning the
few polling stations it took by margins as high as six to
one.
¶11. (SBU) ZESN data for at least one constituency also tips
possible rigging at the constituency tabulation level. Nine
out of ten representative polling stations it reported
results for in Mutasa South, another heavily contested rural
constituency reclaimed by ZANU-PF, went for the MDC often by
wide margins. Only one small polling station went for
ZANU-PF, suggesting that the aggregate figure that gave a
narrow election to the ZANU-PF candidate was fabricated at
the constituency tabulating level.
——————–
Waiting for MDC Data
——————–
¶12. (C) The MDC has put out several press releases
highlighting doubts raised by discrepancies in ZEC’s
conflicting reports but has yet to release its own polling
data for any constituency. MDC contacts tell us they are
getting close to releasing data. However, some have confided
to us that the quality of MDC polling agents has been a
considerable handicap and it remains unclear when the party
will be able to release comprehensive data for any
constituency. Meanwhile every day that passes lessens the
impact when and if MDC ever does release a parallel count.
—————————–
Distorting Pre-Election Flaws
—————————–
¶13. (SBU) The reported numbers suggest rigging at both the
polling center and constituency center tabulations. However,
myriad fundamental flaws in Zimbabwe’s pre-election
environment also contributed to the skewed results and may
have played a direct role in ZANU-PF’s ability to generate
the numbers it needed to win contested seats. For example,
the GOZ undertook vigorous voter registration drives
targeting likely ruling party supporters in the months before
voter registration closed, while much of the country remained
a no-go area for opposition until after registration closed.
The GOZ’s flagrantly partisan disbursement of food and other
largesse to perpetuate public dependence on the ruling party
further bolstered “support” for ZANU-PF, especially in rural
areas. Subtle and not-so-subtle intimidation and the
influence of co-opted chiefs further explain the high
turn-out for ZANU-PF in key polling stations. By contrast, a
legacy of fear and apathy built on the experience of two
previous elections may have suppressed opposition turn-out,
notwithstanding the encouraging attendance at campaign
rallies in the final weeks. Emigration has also decimated
urban, educated, and professional population segments that
figure largely in the MDC’s base.
——-
Comment
——-
¶14. (C) None of this yet amounts to definitive “proof” of
massive fraud, but the preponderance of evidence shows a
clear pattern. ZEC’s continuing refusal to release polling
station data lends credence to those who assume the worst —
that the most suspicious numbers and discrepancies indicate
electoral fraud on the part of the GOZ. However, until the
MDC and ZESN tally up and release their own data to
contradict ZEC’s announced results it will be difficult to
fully determine now how and how much the GOZ rigged this
election. The inability to prove fraud in a court of law is
one issued, but the failure of ZESN and MDC to make strong
public cases demonstrating detectable patterns is hurting
their ability to make the case in the only venue that really
counts: the court of public opinion.
¶15. (C) If there is a silver lining in Zimbabwe’s clouded
election results, it is that international and domestic
pressure have pushed the ruling party to more remote redoubts
of cheating. This may make it easier to help the MDC and
others prepare to counter the cheating in the next election,
but that will require international, and most importantly,
regional pressure on the GOZ and ZANU-PF to shine more light
on the deliberately opaque vote-counting process.
Dell
(21 VIEWS)
