In contrast, there was acute concern among opposition MPs and civil society actors that by rushing through re-engagement, the Commonwealth would be endorsing the unconstitutional change of leadership in November 2017, raising the likelihood of this happening again in Zimbabwe.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth thereby risked debasing its own moral currency as a values-based association committed to democracy, the rule of law and human rights.
The proponents of this view were kicking as hard as they could against the ‘stability’ narrative of accepting the ‘soft’ or ‘non-coup’ and concentrating exclusively on economic revitalisation.
Directly associated to this profound anxiety, was the expressed fear that the Commonwealth, by reengaging too quickly would simply solidify ZANU-PF’s authoritarian practices, and undercut any impetus for reform.
Leading opposition MP Tendai Biti, in particular, was emphatic that the Commonwealth should negotiate from a standpoint of distrust, not trust. (Ed: Biti is not an MP)
This made me wonder whether this was symptomatic of fundamental opposition weakness and division (there are currently 99 registered political parties in the country (Ed: they have since risen to 127)), and redolent of a hope that the international community could oblige ZANU-PF to introduce meaningful change, which the opposition cannot.
The current government certainly faces huge challenges in trying to manage its narrative of change, without allowing licence for vocal criticism and calls for retribution beyond a narrow few. The Mnangagwa government’s handling of the Gukurahundi issue is going to be a test case.
I then watched as the public narrative of rapid re-connectivity gathered momentum.
On 2 February, on her first overseas visit, the new UK Minister for Africa, Harriet Baldwin was assured by the Zimbabwean head of state that his country would re-join the Commonwealth ‘this year’.
This was followed shortly afterwards by Foreign Minister SB Moyo’s statement to the Zimbabwean parliament in mid-March that discussions were underway, culminating in his visit to London during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting from 16-20 April 2018.
What to make of all this?
Care is certainly needed not to conflate improved British-Zimbabwean bilateral relations with Zimbabwe’s rapid readmission back into the Commonwealth, but the two are firmly connected.
The UK, evidently driven by the energy and particular input of the British Ambassador in Harare, has indeed been a leading supporter of Zimbabwe’s return.
However, although the UK has just hosted the 2018 Commonwealth summit and consequently was a crucial player in setting the agenda of the heads of government meeting, and will occupy the ‘chair-in-office’ role until the next Commonwealth summit in two years’ time, Britain does not enjoy special privileges within the association.
There are Commonwealth established processes for joining the Commonwealth and yardsticks of assessment, which have evolved since President Mugabe flounced out of the Commonwealth in December 2003, just before Zimbabwe’s continued suspension for human rights violations around the 2002 elections.
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