A poll by the Mass Public Opinion Institute, three weeks before the March 2008 elections, showed that Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai had surged ahead of President Robert Mugabe reversing the tables from a month before.
The poll of 1 200 people carried out between 3 and10 March showed that 29.5 percent supported Tsvangirai while 20.3 percent were behind Mugabe and 8.6 percent preferred Simba Makoni.
A staggering 31 percent declined to state their preference. Four percent said they did not know who they would vote for and five percent said they would not vote.
An earlier poll conducted in February had put Mugabe ahead with 30 percent of the poll, followed by Tsvangirai with 28 percent and Makoni with 12 percent.
Thirty percent declined to state their preference.
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Reference ID |
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VZCZCXRO1300
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0227/01 0811129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211129Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2617
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1829
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1953
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0532
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1230
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1587
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2009
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4440
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1080
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 000227
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL,
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
SUBJECT: ELECTION UPDATE
REF: A) HARARE 206 B) PRETORIA 604 C) PRETORIA 348 D)
HARARE 175
Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)
——
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) A recent poll conducted by the Mass Public Opinion
Institute (MPOI) as well as observations by Embassy
pre-election teams from throughout the country indicate
strong and growing support for the MDC and its president,
Morgan Tsvangirai. This is due in large part to increased
antipathy toward Mugabe driven by a desperate economic
situation, and a political environment which is significantly
more open than in 2002 or 2005. President Robert Mugabe
still enjoys substantial support, buttressed by the
government machinery and government handouts, in rural areas.
Simba Makoni, despite early enthusiasm for his candidacy,
has failed to develop significant support, except in Bulawayo
and parts of Matabeleland. A runoff between Tsvangirai and
Mugabe appears a real possibility. But with ZANU-PF rigging,
including a manipulated registration process, potentially
fraudulent postal voting, and a potentially flawed vote
counting, tabulation and announcement process, Mugabe may be
able to claim an outright victory on the first ballot. In
the event he receives a plurality of the vote, Mugabe may
claim that a runoff is not legally mandated. The atmosphere
remains calm and we do not anticipate violence. END SUMMARY.
————————————-
The MDC and the Political Environment
————————————-
¶2. (SBU) A poll conducted by the Mass Public Opinion
Institute of Zimbabwe (MPOI) from March 3 to March 10 showed
Tsvangirai supported by 29.5 percent of the sample of 1,200,
SIPDIS
Mugabe supported by 20.3 percent, and Makoni supported by 8.6
percent. 31 percent declined to state a preference, 4
percent said they didn’t know who they would vote for, and 5
percent said they wouldn’t vote. In an earlier poll
conducted between February 22 and February 26, Mugabe led
with 30 percent, followed by Tsvangirai with 28 percent, and
Makoni with 12 percent. 30 percent declined to state a
preference.
¶3. (C) Embassy officials, in pre-election trips throughout
the country over the past two weeks, noted enthusiastic
support for Tsvangirai. MDC candidates and officials with
whom we talked universally attributed this to a calm and
relaxed political atmosphere which stood in marked contrast
to the environment in 2002 and 2005. Police for the most
part were allowing the MDC to hold rallies and some had even
confided to MDC activists that they hoped the MDC succeeded.
We saw MDC posters in both rural and urban areas, and MDC
officials told us ZANU-PF partisans were generally allowing
them to stand, in part because the police were discouraging
unlawful activities. We frequently saw MDC supporters
wearing yellow T-shirts of the party and in some locals saw
MDC and ZANU-PF supporters greeting each other as they
marched past each other in opposite directions.
¶4. (SBU) Historically, many of the rural areas have been
no-go destinations for the MDC. The MDC this time around has
held relatively large rallies in a number of these areas,
including the ZANU-PF heartland of Mashonaland. MDC
officials told us that a number of traditional leaders in
these areas, in recent times tools of ZANU-PF, were now
supporting the MDC. The MDC attributes this support, and in
general support throughout the country, to a desperate
economic situation and the belief that ZANU-PF will do
HARARE 00000227 002 OF 005
nothing to turn the economy around. The need for change is a
refrain heard more and more.
¶5. (C) An example of the dynamic which is building support
for the MDC comes from a trip we made to Mt. Darwin in
Mashonaland East. Mt. Darwin West is the constituency of
vice-president Joice Mujuru. The area has not benefited from
the position of its important representative. We observed
conditions as bad as anywhere in the country: a dilapidated
infrastructure, including terrible roads, almost non-existent
public transportation, absence of adequate food supplies, and
malnourished children,
¶6. (C) While the atmosphere has improved, and support for
the MDC is growing, significant problems continue. We have
received occasional reports of kidnappings of MDC supporters
and arrests of officials. In some areas, ZANU-PF has
threatened small-plot farmers, resettled as part of the land
reform program, with repossession of their land if ZANU-PF
loses in their areas. Perhaps of most concern is food
manipulation. With food stocks running low in many areas of
the country and NGOs having suspended food deliveries during
the election period, many people are dependent on the Grain
Marketing Board (GMB) which has maize available at low
prices. We have heard a number of reports that the GMB was
selling maize only to traditional leaders loyal to ZANU-PF
who were in turn expected to distribute it only to ZANU-PF
followers. In addition to food, ZANU-PF has also distributed
farm equipment such as ploughs and carts, in many rural areas
as inducements for support
¶7. (C) Bulawayo and surrounding Matabeleland have been
traditional strongholds of the MDC, but Tsvangirai appears
weak in these areas. Tsvangirai held a rally in Bulawayo two
weeks ago and reportedly drew upwards of 20,000 people, but
our pre-election teams observed a lack of support for
Tsvangirai. A recent MPOI focus group in Bulawayo found
SIPDIS
similar weakness. This is in part due to the MDC split.
Several prominent Matabeleland politicians, who would have
supported Tsvangirai had the MDC reunited, are now supporting
Simba Makoni. Additionally, Dumiso Dabengwa, one of the
principal Ndebeles in ZANU-PF, has broken with Mugabe and is
publicly supporting Makoni.
—————————————
A Note on MDC Finances and Organization
—————————————
¶8. (C) We have received a number of reports that the MDC is
receiving substantial support from South Africa.
Specifically, MDC treasurer Roy Bennett told Embassy Pretoria
(Ref C) that he had raised “significant” funds from
Zimbabwean businessmen living in the diaspora and that he
would provide US$1000 for each MDC parliamentary candidate.
Zimbabwean business magnate Strive Masiyiwa told Embassy
Pretoria (Ref B) that he had provide substantial financial
support to the MDC.
¶9. (C) In contrast to the representations of Bennett and
Masiyiwa, Tsvangirai has told the Ambassador in recent
conversations that the MDC is strapped for cash. And in our
pre-election visits, virtually every MDC candidate with whom
we talked told us they had received little or no financial
support from the MDC. For example, in Mt. Darwin North, MDC
candidate Timothy Mukwenge failed to meet our pre-election
team at the agreed-upon time and place. They subsequently
spotted him on the side of a road two hours later waiting for
public transport. Without money, he had slept on the side of
the road the night before and had not eaten. In Chipingi,
MDC candidate Samson Sithole said the only support he had
received from the MDC was less than US$100. Campaign
materials such as shirts and posters had not been sent from
HARARE 00000227 003 OF 005
MDC headquarters in Harare. A small businessman, he told us
he had been selling some of his business assets to finance
his campaign. Sithole speculated that whatever money the MDC
had it Harare it was using to finance the campaigns of MDC
bigwigs. He had raised the issue of campaign support with
MDC headquarters but found the central MDC disorganized and
unresponsive.
—————————-
ZANU-PF Machine in High Gear
—————————-
¶10. (C) While there may be growing disenchantment with
ZANU-PF, it continues to mobilize its rural base. Our
pre-election teams observed numerous rallies around the
country. Mugabe has been using helicopters, obviously
unavailable to his opponents, to hopscotch the country and
attend many of these rallies. At a rally in Lupane, a
constituency in Matabeleland now held by the MDC, our
observer estimated that over 20,000 people attended. We have
received reports of large rallies elsewhere.
¶11. (C) ZANU-PF has committed considerable government
resources to the campaign. The party has handed out food and
agricultural equipment in the rural areas. Many ZANU-PF
candidates are business people with independent resources
that they have been using to gain support. The government
mouthpiece The Herald touts on a daily basis Mugabe’s efforts
to develop the country. Front page articles this week
described government housing construction and rehabilitation
of a power station. Inside on a daily basis are several full
page advertisements for Mugabe. Television and radio are
similarly supportive. And of course most of the media
coverage of the opposition is partisan rather than objective.
——————
Simba’s Star Fades
——————
¶12. (C) Makoni’s entry into the presidential race generated
excitement, but he has failed to build support. This is in
part because, with the exception of Dumiso Dabengwa, no
ZANU-PF heavyweights are publicly supporting him; and because
he is relatively unknown outside of Harare, Bulawayo and his
homebase of Manicaland. He is now viewed as the candidate of
the intelligentsia and the shrinking middle class.
Interlocutors in the rural areas who were aware of him and
who were anti-Mugabe were suspicious of the fact that his
roots were in ZANU-PF and that he had not disavowed the
party. Some thought he might be a ZANU-PF plant to confuse
the race. He is widely seen as arrogant and aloof; one of
our pre-election observers was told that after a rally Makoni
and his people refused to offer transport to attendees to the
nearby town.
¶13. (C) Makoni’s principal role in the election may be as a
spoiler. As noted, he has strength among the middle class
and intelligentsia, both centered in Harare, and he can be
expected to pull support from the MDC and Tsvangirai in the
capital. With the support of MDC Mutambara faction
candidates in Bulawayo and Matabeleland, he has demonstrated
some strength in these areas, primarily at the expense of
Tsvangirai.
SIPDIS
¶14. (C) Although ZANU-PF heavyweights such as Solomon Mujuru
who support Makoni have not come out publicly, they are
working for him behind the scenes. It is likely that in
Mashonaland and, to a lesser extent in Midlands and Masvingo,
Makoni will draw support from Mugabe.
—————————-
The Great Equalizer–Rigging
HARARE 00000227 004 OF 005
—————————-
¶15. (C) The potential for election rigging continues to be a
concern. Focus is now on the registration process, polling
stations, and the counting and tabulation of votes. In 2005,
there were 5.6 million registered voters. For this election,
there are over 5.9 million, despite a continuing exodus of
Zimbabweans. In a diplomatic briefing on March 20 attended
by the Ambassador, Tsvangirai said the MDC had conducted an
audit of the voter rolls in 28 rural constituencies that
revealed 90,000 ghost voters. Tsvangirai alleged that
600,000 ballots had been printed for postal voting (military,
police, election officials, overseas diplomats are eligible)
when the maximum number of postal votes would be under
200,000.
¶16. (C) This week, Mubabe amended the Electoral Laws
Amendment Act passed as part of the SADC mediation process,
which eliminated police as persons who could be present in
polling stations. The new amendment allows them to be
present and requires their presence when electoral officials
are assisting illiterate of physically disabled voters. The
Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) and the MDC have
protested–so far to no avail.
¶17. (C) ZESN expects to have observers at all the country’s
polling stations. Votes for president will be counted at
each polling station and then will be tabulated at
constituency and provincial centers. From the provincial
centers, totals will be sent to a central command center in
Harare. To date, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)
officials have made no provision for observers at the
tabulation center or at the command center.
——————————-
Legal Complications of a Runoff
——————————-
¶18. (C) The Electoral Act requires a runoff when there are
two or more candidates and no candidate for president
receives over 50 percent of the vote. The Second Schedule to
the Act which expands and amplifies on the Act, states that
where there are two or more candidates for president, the
candidates with the greatest number of votes is elected.
Since there has never been a presidential election where a
runoff was a possibility, nobody realized that the Electoral
Act contained this apparent contradiction. When queried
about this, the ZEC has deferred to the courts. It is not
unrealistic to believe that if Mugabe emerged from the
election with a plurality of the votes, he would argue that
the Second Schedule is controlling.
——-
Comment
——-
¶19. (C) Because polling is difficult in Zimbabwe, and
because in the MPOI poll a high percentage of the sample
declined to respond, we believe it should be read for trends
rather than accuracy. It does comport with our on the ground
observations that Tsvangirai and the MDC have widespread
support, that Mugabe continues to have significant support,
and that Makoni significantly trails the other two. Even in
a non-rigged election it would be foolish to write Mugabe
off; his liberation credentials and his skillful use of the
ZANU-PF machinery to manipulate voters continues to result in
considerable backing. If rigging can be limited, a runoff is
likely. With a significant amount of rigging, Mugabe may
manage to claim more than 50 percent of the vote.
¶20. (C) The atmosphere continues to be remarkably tranquil.
While this could be the calm before the storm, we see nothing
HARARE 00000227 005 OF 005
to indicate that the election will result in widespread
violence, although isolated incidents are always a
possibility. The most likely scenario for violence would be
a Mugabe defeat. Notwithstanding the inflammatory statements
of Zimbabwe Defense Forces Commander Constantine Chiwenga,
Police Commission Augustine Chihuri, and the head of the
Zimbabwe Prisons Services, Paradzayi Zimondi, that they would
not respect a result in which Mugabe was not reelected, we do
not believe that a Mugabe defeat would produce violence. The
aforementioned individuals do not enjoy great support among
the rank and file, and a significant number of ZANU-PF
officials, including Solomon Mujuru, Air Force Marshal
Perence Shiri, and Army Commander Philip Sibanda, would like
to see Mugabe go, even if he is replaced by Tsvangirai.
MCGEE
(43 VIEWS)
