Gandi Mudzingwa, the special assistant to Movement for Democratic Change president Morgan Tsvangirai, told United States embassy officials that mediation talks that three bishops from Manicaland wanted to initiate were not likely to get anywhere because there was no commitment from the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front.
He said an unnamed nephew of Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was still the favoured successor at the time, had phoned him to urge him to get the bishop’s initiative terminated because Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and Information Minister Jonathan Moyo had convinced the party that the bishops were not impartial.
Mudzingwa also said Mnangagwa himself could be an obstacle because he was not involved in any of the intra-party initiatives to communicate with the MDC.
Chinamasa and Information Secretary Nathan Shamuyarira were seeking to discredit each other’s efforts in an effort maximise each’s own influence.
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Viewing cable 03HARARE1594, MDC OFFICIAL OFFERS MIXED ASSESSMENT ON CHURCHES’
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081010Z Aug 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001594
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2013
SUBJECT: MDC OFFICIAL OFFERS MIXED ASSESSMENT ON CHURCHES’
INITIATIVE, SEEKS APPROACH TO MILITARY
REF: (A) HARARE 1571 (B) HARARE 1532
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER WIN DAYTON; REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Gandhi Mudzingwa, MDC’s Director of
Presidential Affairs, on August 7 told poloff that mixed
signals from ZANU-PF underscored the uncertainty surrounding
the ongoing bishops’ attempt to jump start talks. He
reported that a ZANU-PF source had approached him about
derailing the effort but that Mugabe’s attitude on the talks
remained unclear. Emphasizing the potential importance of
the military in any resolution of Zimbabwe’s political
impasse, he signalled that the MDC would embark on a discreet
effort to engage key military figures. He urged the USG to
engage moderate ZANU-PF elements and to maintain pressure on
South Africa to push Mugabe to the table. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) Mudzingwa opened by expressing dismay over ZANU-PF’s
failure to demonstrate clear commitment to the process
undertaken by the bishops (ref B), which he attributed to a
clash of “personal interests” among key insiders. A nephew
of Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa called Mudzingwa
on August 6 to urge that the bishops’ initiative be
terminated, noting that Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa
and Information Minister Jonathan Moyo had convinced the
party that the bishops were not impartial. Mudzingwa
observed that Mnangagwa, who remains Mugabe’s favored
successor, was not involved in any of the intra-party
initiatives to communicate with the MDC and was likely to be
an obstacle to all such initiatives. Others posturing in the
run-up to potential negotiations, such as Chinamasa and
Information Secretary Nathan Shamuyarira, were seeking to
discredit each others’ efforts in an effort maximize each’s
own influence. He concluded that most accepted the need for
dialogue and change but ego clashes and mutual suspicion
thwarted their ability to pursue an obvious shared interest
in meaningful engagement.
¶3. (C) Tempering his pessimism, Mudzingwa opined that Mugabe
himself may yet be open to the bishops’ process
notwithstanding the squabbling and lack of consensus among
his subordinates. Mugabe repeatedly had made clear through
public signals and private communications that he wanted to
step down; if he believed that the bishops’s process could
produce the conditions he required to step down, the
initiative could still bear fruit. Mudzingwa detected signs
that Mugabe remained open to some kind of constructive
engagement with the MDC. ZANU-PF public characterizations of
the MDC were becoming more restrained. The cabinet (read:
Mugabe) reportedly had required Local Government Minister
Chombo to suspend his effort to have the MDC-dominated Harare
City Council dismissed. The country’s downward economic
spiral, buttressed by international pressure, had convinced
most ZANU-PF members from top to bottom that significant
change was necessary. Prominent members’ posturing, while
disruptive, evidenced their conviction that change would come
and that they wanted to shape it. Nonetheless, the talks, if
undertaken, were unlikely to go anywhere without the thorny
issue of Mugabe’s succession within ZANU-PF first being
resolved.
¶4. (C) Mudzingwa confided that the MDC had no contingency
plans to pursue in the event that efforts to get ZANU-PF to
the table failed. The MDC had yet to become very proficient
at planning, something at which ZANU-PF always had excelled,
he conceded. The MDC remained highly vulnerable on the
breadth of their leadership. Although the MDC had wide
popular support, Mudzingwa asserted, it lacked anybody beyond
Morgan Tsvangirai who had the stature to command a national
following. Like ZANU-PF, the MDC had no clear succession
mechanism.
¶5. (C) Characterizing the military as Mugabe’s “final
reliable pillar of support”, Mudzingwa emphasized its
potential importance in any political solution to the
country’s crisis. The MDC had yet to establish rapport with
any key military leaders, even though many were deeply
dissatisfied with the current situation and supported change.
Mudzingwa said he intended discreetly to reach out to some,
more to reassure them about the MDC’s posture toward the
military than to seek their support. He urged the USG
quietly to get the military to understand the need for
national political dialogue and to reassure key officials
about potential MDC governance. He said he intended to seek
similar engagement by South African officials but thought the
USG might offer “more muscle”.
¶6. (C) In closing, Mudzingwa conveyed gratitude for the many
facets of USG support for potential change in Zimbabwe. He
urged the USG to maintain pressure on South Africa to push
Mugabe to the table. The USG should “recognize” the bishops
effort discreetly, being careful not to so in a way that
might give ZANU-PF elements more fodder with which to
discredit them. Finally, Mudzingwa advised the USG to engage
with moderate ZANU-PF elements such as Shamuyarira and
Chairman John Nkomo, and those with strong ties to the
business community, such as Matumwa Mawere and Saviour
Kasukawire.
¶7. (C) COMMENT: The bishops’ initiative continues to
proceed on shaky ground. The timing and substance of
ZANU-PF’s overdue contribution to the talks’ agenda may be a
significant indicator of Mugabe’s interest, the decisive
factor in whether talks begin. Regarding its interest in
reassuring the military, the MDC does not appear to have a
policy for dealing with top military figures; an MDC approach
to the military could alarm ZANU-PF elements and further
disrupt nascent progress toward talks. Bishop Evangelical
Fellowship of Zimbabwe President Trevor Manhanga’s meeting
with the Charge on August 8 is reported septel.
WHITEHEAD
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