Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, who at the time was Speaker of Parliament, said although the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the Movement for Democratic Change were having amicable discussion on constitutional reform, the MDC had a history of agreeing on issues until the 11th hour, when they would hold things up with additional demands.
He told a United States embassy official that a constitutional amendment to establish an independent electoral commission was desirable and would require discussions with the MDC.
Discussions already underway were “amicable,” although the issues were numerous and many were technically difficult.
Mnangagwa said that the parties were vexed by election representation formulas.
ZANU-PF favoured having 100 seats awarded to parties on the basis of proportional representation and 100 based on constituency elections so that geographic constituencies would have advocates in the legislature.
The MDC favoured proportional representation for all seats.
Mnangagwa asserted that the MDC had a history of agreeing on issues until “the 11th hour,” when they would hold things up with additional demands.
If they did that this time, he said, ZANU-PF would use using its parliamentary majority to undertake as many reforms as possible through legislation rather than a constitutional amendment.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE1335, REGIONAL ELECTION CONFERENCE CHALLENGES GOZ
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001335
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2009
SUBJECT: REGIONAL ELECTION CONFERENCE CHALLENGES GOZ
REF: (A) HARARE 1313 (B) HARARE 1250 (C) HARARE 1157
(D) HARARE 1067
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At an NGO-sponsored conference on regional
electoral reforms, senior ruling party officials sounded
familiar election-related themes to a critical audience of
domestic and regional parliamentarians, regional election
commissioners and administrators, and NGO representatives.
They reiterated GOZ plans for electoral reforms and urged the
opposition, NGOs and media to play “appropriate” roles.
Comments on the conference’s margins offer further evidence
of rifts in the ruling party over proposed electoral reforms,
but hard-liners resistant to meaningful reforms so far appear
to enjoy Mugabe’s backing. Pressure from SADC member states
appears to have been a key stimulus to the GOZ electoral
reform initiative thus far and could be decisive in
influencing how far reform efforts go. END SUMMARY.
Plane Chat with the Speaker
—————————
¶2. (C) On the flight to Victoria Falls August 1, poloff was
seated fortuitously next to the conference’s keynote speaker,
Speaker of the Parliament and ZANU-PF Secretary of
Administration (and presidential aspirant) Emmerson
Mnangagwa. Upon inquiry about progress on the party’s
proposed electoral reforms, the Speaker went into exhausting
detail on well-reported technical aspects of the reforms (use
of indelible marking ink, translucent boxes, one-day voting,
etc.). He explained the contextual difference between the
SADC-PF norms and standards and the principles expected to be
adopted by SADC heads of state in Mauritius later this month.
The states were consulting on technical distinctions in
their various election laws; the principles to be adopted
would be guidelines that reflected common denominators but
would not necessarily require states to change their laws.
Sovereignty would not be impinged upon and state
constitutions and laws would prevail over any competing
interpretations under the SADC principles.
¶3. (C) Mnangagwa acknowledged that a constitutional
amendment to establish an independent electoral commission
was desireable and would require discussions with the MDC.
Discussions already underway were “amicable,” although the
issues were numerous and many were technically difficult.
For example, the parties were vexed by election
representation formulas: ZANU-PF favored having 100 seats
awarded to parties on the basis of proportional
representation and 100 based on constituency elections so
that geographic constituencies would have advocates in the
legislature; the MDC favored proportional representation for
all seats. Mnangagwa asserted that the MDC had a history of
agreeing on issues until “the 11th hour,” when they would
hold things up with additional demands. If they did that
this time, he maintained, the ruling party would content
itself with using its parliamentary majority to undertake as
many reforms as possible through legislation rather than a
constitutional amendment.
¶4. (C) Mnangagwa raised the Senate confirmation hearing
remarks of Ambassador-designate Dell. He asserted that
Dell’s remarks would make it difficult for many to deal with
him. On reading the text of the remarks provided by poloff,
Mnangagwa said only that “he does not appear to have been
misquoted.” He did not suggest that the
Ambassador-designate’s credentials might not be accepted.
(Note: In discussions with poloff at the conference, ZANU-PF
parliamentary back-benchers appeared to assume the
Ambassador-designate’s credentials would be accepted. End
note.)
ZANU-PF at the Podium
———————
¶5. (U) In opening the conference August 2, Mnanagwa
emphasized the importance of free, fair, transparent, and
peaceful elections for stability and legitimacy. He
complimented the region on being at the forefront of the
continent in its pursuit of democratization, which was an
ongoing process. In a familiar refrain, he stressed that
African and Western values differed, and noted that SADC,
cooperative experiences and efforts were “subservient” to
each nation’s distinct history and culture. He maintained
that SADC recognized the sovereignty and supremacy of
national law and constitutions; SADC structures to support
free and fair elections would be welcome but “must pay
obeisance” to local history, culture and law.
¶6. (U) The Speaker urged NGOs and civil society to avoid
partisan politics. Adding that the media should go beyond
partisan messages, he appealed to the media to desist from
inflammatory stories and to promote voter registration and
voting. Regarding election observers, Mnangagwa suggested
that observers of elections in SADC countries should be
welcomed from SADC, the AU, and developing countries without
preconditions. He urged resistance to observing, monitoring,
and funding by Western countries, which tended to be biased
and make unreasonable demands. He decried the “arrogant and
patronizing manner” of Americans and British and
“machinations” by outsiders to have Zimbabwe excluded from
SADC activities.
¶7. (U) Mnangagwa then rehearsed a familiar sketch of the
GOZ’s proposed electoral reforms, which he cast as
“far-reaching” and designed to move away from government
administration of elections. Echoing the President’s remarks
at the opening of Parliament, he emphasized that the changes
followed consultations with SADC. He asserted that the
SADC-PF norms and standards, which had not been adopted by
the SADC governments, would be integrated with the principles
expected to be adopted in Mauritius. (Comment: Mnangagwa’s
rather respectful references to the SADC-PF norms and
standards reflect his status as Speaker and Zimbabwe’s
signatory to the instrument and are at odds with the Jonathan
Moyo-dominated state media’s vilification of SADC-PF as a
body of western puppets. End comment.)
¶8. (U) Princeton-educated ZANU-PF Secretary for Information
Nathan Shamuyarira at the August 3 session further elaborated
on elements of GOZ/ZANU-PF electoral reform proposals. A
notable addition was that current plans would leave the
Registrar-General’s office with responsibility for
registering voters but would transfer voter roll maintenance
duties to the independent election commission. (Comment:
Eliminating a meaningful role for the overtly partisan
Registrar-General is a central objective of the opposition
and civil society critics. The change cited by Shamuyarira
appears not to satisfy the objective. End comment.)
Shamuyarira recounted Zimbabwe’s experience in five previous
national parliamentary elections in positive terms, giving
due credit to the MDC’s genuine strength in the most recent
one. He acknowledged the important role of an opposition in
a democracy and urged Zimbabwe’s opposition to behave
constructively. Shamuyarira expressed disappointment that
there was “so much outside interference” in Zimbabwe and
blasted George Bush and Tony Blair for “blatantly supporting
the opposition” and pushing regime change. He twice stressed
the government’s and his personal interest in receiving
public comments and suggestions about GOZ electoral reform.
In response to a question from the audience, he asserted
that, as a former journalist, he “personally” did not support
media restrictions — as long as media remained balanced.
¶9. (C) In a brief exchange with poloff at the airport later,
Shamuyarira was cordial and said he “learned a lot” at the
conference. He cryptically singled out Justice Kriegler as a
particularly insightful panelist. (Comment: Kriegler was
notable in two respects — he stressed the primacy of
attitude and willingness to give a real voice to the people
over the letter of law in producing a legitimizing election,
and he brought the house down with a barely oblique equating
of Africa’s few remaining despots to the emperor who wore no
clothes. End comment.)
Panelists, Participants Critical
——————————–
¶10. (SBU) Mnangagwa and Shamuyarira were playing before a
skeptical crowd. Their more provocative comments about NGOs,
the media, and the opposition elicited audible chortles,
jeering, and derisive comments from the audience. NGO
representatives, including those based outside Zimbabwe,
attacked reported GOZ plans to implement a restrictive NGO
bill. MDC MPs repeatedly underscored to the ZANU-PF speakers
and other panelists the importance of addressing election
environment issues, such as media access, freedom of
assembly, and political violence. Other panelists, including
Namibian Election Commissioner Shafimana F.I. Ueitele and
former South African Constitutional Court Justice and
Electoral Commission Chairperson Johann Kriegler, took thinly
veiled swipes at Zimbabwe’s election climate and GOZ
posturing. MPs and election officials from the region
generally avoided commenting directly on Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa
sat dispassionately through the barrage of critical comments
that followed his address through the remainder of the
morning of the first day, while Shamuyarira busily took notes
throughout the entire two days.
Opposition’s Scathing Critique
——————————
¶11. (U) Following Shamuyarira at the podium on the second
day, MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube delivered a
blistering and comprehensive attack on the GOZ’s past
election practices and questioned the ruling party’s
sincerity in its electoral reform proposals. Decrying
Zimbabwe’s long “culture of unilateralism”, Ncube recounted a
familiar litany of election abuses, centering principally on
ruling party deployment of the full weight of state
machinery, the inadequacy of law enforcement efforts and
legal processes, a pervasive climate of intimidation, and
abuses under restrictive laws such as POSA and AIPPA. He
also stressed the importance of international observers and
an impartial constituency delimitation exercise. Ncube
emphasized the MDC’s desire for genuine dialogue but asserted
that the ZANU-PF Central Committee had “tied the Justice
Minister’s hands” from engaging in meangingful negotiation.
ZANU-PF Rift on Election Strategy
———————————
¶12. (C) On the flight back to Harare August 3, Ncube told
poloff that his principal ZANU-PF interlocutor Justice
Minister Patrick Chinamasa had confided that he was losing
confidence in the ZANU-PF intra-party debate. Chinamasa
confirmed to Ncube that Mugabe was opposed to any compromise
on election reforms but implied that factions were
energetically debating the issue. Factions were shifting
curiously; Chinamasa reported that figures he thought were
with him on reforms (e.g. Minister for Security Goche and
elder statesman Solomon Mujuru) appeared opposed during the
last politburo meeting while others traditionally opposed
(e.g. Local Government Minister Chombo) were supportive. He
identified Mnangagwa, Shamuyarira, and business/young turks
like Savior Kasukuwere as being generally supportive of
reforms. In any event, Chinamasa personally was feeling more
exposed and anxious that he would be the fall guy if the
situation went awry.
¶13. (C) Namibian Ambassador Kamati reported to the
Ambassador August 4 that the ruling party remained very much
undecided about whether to reform elections and, if so, how
deeply. He said that the hard-liners wanted only those
reforms agreed by the ZANU-PF politburo and were prepared to
pass the minimum without MDC cooperation. In that case, the
ZANU-PF Congress scheduled for December would be a non-event.
He said that others, including Mnangagwa, wanted
far-reaching reforms, including constitutional changes, that
would create a position of Prime Minister, involve
simultaneous election of the President and Parliament, and
delay elections three months or more in order to enact such
changes. (Note: Like the independent election commission, a
delay of more than three months in the conduct of the
parliamentary election would require a constitutional
amendment.) Kamati said also that hard-line Information
Minister Jonathan Moyo and several others were close to being
punished severely for their land abuses.
Tidbits on the Margin
———————
¶14. (C) NGO representatives told poloff on the conference
margins that Mnangagwa had told them that the President’s
office had added the more provocative references to NGOs and
the West to his speech. They also reported that Jonathan
Moyo had tried hard but unsuccessfully to forestall any
official GOZ/ZANU-PF representation at the event. One
indicated further that the SADC election principles
instrument under consideration for adoption in Mauritius now
included an annex that offered specific prescriptions for
effecting free and fair elections beyond the general
principles laid out in the earlier draft (ref A). We are
seeking a copy.
Comment:
——–
¶15. (C) The likely impact of intense audience reaction,
including from regional interlocutors, on the two ZANU-PF
principals is difficult to assess. Official media coverage
of the conference was uncharacteristically straightforward,
albeit omitting key details and downplaying criticism. The
ferocity of reaction may play into the hands of party
hard-liners, but we suspect that the posture of SADC member
states will remain a key variable in the ruling party’s
calculations.
¶16. (C) Although the NGOs and opposition parliamentarians
present were heartened by supportive comments from regional
participants, it is significant that participants from SADC
countries included only NGOs, MPs, and election officials,
and not senior members of the executive branch who could
speak for their governments. In meetings on the conference’s
margins, MPs and election officials from South Africa,
Namibia, and Lesotho promised to express their concerns
strongly about Zimbabwe’s electoral environment to senior
officials in their government. We will have to see if their
views carry any significant weight.
¶17. (C) In that vein and as follow-up to prior instructions
from the Department, we urge engagement in Washington and
SADC capitals to stimulate regional pressure on the GOZ with
respect to electoral reforms and NGO regulation. We would
note that the USG’s repeatedly expressed posture on
Zimbabwean elections is entirely consistent with regional
instruments (i.e. African Union Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections in Africa; SADC-PF Norms and Standards
for Elections in the SADC Region; and the Electoral
Commissions Forum/Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and
Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO)). Specifically, we
have called for the GOZ (1) to establish an independent
election commission that has meaningful authority; (2) not to
restrict freedom of assembly/association unreasonably; (3) to
lift unreasonable media restrictions; (4) to suppress
political violence; and (5) to permit political campaigning
by all parties without unreasonable obstruction.
SULLIVAN
(67 VIEWS)
