President Robert Mugabe’s top lieutenants, Nicholas Goche, Patrick Chinamasa and Emmerson Mnangagwa were at one time interested in a government of national unity with an interim leader who was not Mugabe, according to a cable released by Wikileaks.
It was, however, not very clear whether the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front was serious about a government of national unity or not.
Goche, Chinamasa and Mnangagwa represented one power centre. Central bank governor Gideon Gono represented another while the military, particularly defence forces chief Constantine Chiwenga, represented a third.
However, no deal could be negotiated without the agreement of Mugabe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08HARARE367, ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY–NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE
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VZCZCXRO0304
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0367/01 1151230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241230Z APR 08 ZDK NUM SVC
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2831
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1952
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2074
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0629
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1351
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1708
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2130
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4561
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1209
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000367
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ZDK NUM SVC)
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY--NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE
TUNNEL
REF: HARARE 337 AND PREV.
HARARE 00000367 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4
(d)
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) The exuberance that greeted election returns over
three weeks ago has given way to despair and fear among many
in the wake of a seemingly interminable delay in announcement
of election results and ZANU-PF orchestrated and pervasive
violence. While regional and international focus has been on
recounting in 23 constituencies and the announcement of
results, most important now is an end to violence. Without
this, there is no clear path to either of the two most likely
scenarios: a runoff election or a government of national
unity (GNU). The MDC has indicated it will not contest
elections when its supporters are being beaten and worse by
ruling party gangs; neither can it be expected to negotiate a
GNU with ZANU-PF while that party is orchestrating mayhem.
While the idea of a GNU has been floated by ZANU-PF,
negotiation of such an agreement would not be easy. ZANU-PF
and Mugabe would want a GNU on their terms, maintaining power
as the dominant partner. The MDC, having won the election,
would understandably be adverse to allow Mugabe to remain in
power and for ZANU-PF to play the dominant role in
government.
¶2. (C) The fact that ZANU-PF is even discussing a GNU is a
reflection that many in the party do not see a way out of the
current crisis; it is also due to increasing pressure from
the region. It is crucial that the international community
in general and the region in particular, continue to apply
pressure for an end to violence and an adherence to
constitutional processes. It is also important that MDC
leaders, who have been outside of Zimbabwe for a considerable
time, return to lead the party and provide focus on the
events ahead. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- --
The Election Aftermath and the ZANU-PF Calculus
--------------------------------------------- --
¶3. (C) ZANU-PF's apparent intent going into the March 29
elections was to open up democratic space and allow an
election that many would consider free and fair. ZANU-PF
hoped in this way to secure legitimacy. Thus, it permitted
the MDC to campaign with some access to media and allowed
some international observers (primarily SADC). There was
little to criticize on voting day itself which our observers
and others said went relatively smoothly. ZANU-PF
miscalculated, however, the degree of discontent in the
country and the willingness of many of its former supporters
to defy party and traditional leaders to vote for the MDC.
Thus it was clear soon after March 29 voting that the party
had lost its parliamentary majority and that MDC leader
Morgan Tsvangirai had won more votes than President Robert
Mugabe. (COMMENT: Although the MDC and Tsvangirai claim he
won an outright majority, we have no hard evidence on this.
END COMMENT.)
¶4. (C) We understand from numerous conversations that in the
10 days or so after the election ZANU-PF considered several
options. First, was a declaration that Mugabe had won and a
state of emergency if necessary, but this would have required
an obvious falsification of electoral results and would have
been unacceptable even to SADC. Second, was a negotiated
exit for Mugabe and a GNU headed by Tsvangirai. Mugabe may
have been amenable to this according to both ZANU-PF and MDC
HARARE 00000367 002.2 OF 004
sources, but some in his inner circle, including Defense
Forces Chief Constantine Chiwenga, were insecure about their
security and financial futures, and vetoed this approach.
¶5. (C) The last option, ultimately adopted, was a runoff
election, as mandated by the Electoral Act. ZANU-PF then,
stung by the election results and determined that it would
not lose again and give up power, apparently decided to
create conditions that would make a victory inevitable.
Military units were deployed to rural areas as a symbol of
strength and as a means of intimidation. And the party
structures in key provinces--Mashonaland East, Central, and
West; Manicaland; and Masvingo--unleashed youth militia and
war vets in an orchestrated and systematic reign of terror
against opposition (mostly MDC) supporters. The goal was to
create an atmosphere of fear so that in a runoff election,
many of those who voted for Tsvangirai and the MDC on March
29 would vote for ZANU-PF, or would not vote. While the
actual numbers of victims of abduction, beating, and rape are
limited, the effect of course has been widespread.
¶6. (C) We believe the original delay in announcing results
was aimed at giving ZANU-PF time to consider options. After
having apparently decided on a runoff election, further delay
occasioned by recounting allowed ZANU-PF to initiate and
continue its campaign of violence. The combination of the
delay and violence has, in addition to fear, caused many
Zimbabweans to doubt that there can be a fair electoral
outcome.
------------------
The MDC's Response
------------------
¶7. (C) The MDC initially announced that, based on its
electoral analysis, Tsvangirai had won and there was no need
for a runoff election. MDC leaders added, however, that if
official results showed Tsvangirai had not received a
majority, he would contest a runoff under protest.
¶8. (C) As violence escalated, the MDC national council voted
to boycott the election and Tsvangirai told regional leaders
that he would not participate as violence and intimidation
made chances of a fair election impossible. In his talks
with these leaders, Tsvangirai has urged UN and AU
intervention to deal with the crisis. Tsvangirai also
addressed the April 13 SADC Summit in Lusaka.
¶9. (C) Tsvangirai is coming under increasing criticism from
his supporters, allies, and from civil society, for remaining
outside the country at a time of crisis and at a time when
MDC supporters are being attacked. Momentum from the March
29 results has dissipated. There is little internal
leadership with Tsvangirai and secretary general Tendai Biti
gone for the last two weeks; MDC supporters are unaware of
the MDC's strategy and are becoming despondent. Apart from
international intervention to end the violence, Tsvangirai
and the MDC have not articulated what they see as the
resolution of the crisis. Is it an internationally
supervised election or a negotiated GNU? This is not clear.
-------------
Toward a GNU?
-------------
¶10. (C) With the crisis deepening, we understand some
regional leaders have urged consideration of a GNU. The
government newspaper The Herald carried an op-ed April 23
suggesting a GNU, albeit with Mugabe remaining in power
during a transitional period and a lifting of western
sanctions. (NOTE: The Herald later in the day pulled the
HARARE 00000367 003 OF 004
op-ed from its website and a government spokesman denied the
government was considering a GNU. END NOTE.) A business
source with strong ties to the ruling party told us Mugabe
insiders Nicholas Goche, Patrick Chinimasa, and Emmerson
Mnangagwa were now interested in a GNU with an interim leader
other than Mugabe. Last week, Simba Makoni suggested a GNU
to the Ambassador (Reftel). And regional leaders have
suggested a coalition government may be the best way out of
the crisis, most recently yesterday the ANC's Jacob Zuma.
¶11. (C) The ZANU-PF interest in a GNU appears to be the
result of several factors. First, Mugabe and his party have
always been able to shrug off western criticism by noting
support from SADC and the region. Of late, however, SADC and
the region have demonstrated their unease with the current
situation. The fact that the April 13 Summit was called was
a clear signal. The Summit implicitly criticized the
electoral process by calling for enhanced participation by
party agents and observers in future electoral processes.
Despite South African president Thabo Mbeki's proclamation
that there was no crisis, ANC president Jacob Zuma and COSATU
pointedly said otherwise. Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa
opined that the Chinese ship with armaments destined for
Zimbabwe should not be allowed to dock and offload in
neighboring countries. Secondly, ZANU-PF is now aware of its
lack of support and party insiders realize the party could
lose a runoff election. Thirdly, another election would be
expensive and logistically difficult. Finally, many in
ZANU-PF realize that under present circumstances it is
incapable of governing and turning around the economy.
¶12. (C) Whether ZANU-PF is serious about negotiating a GNU
is as of now subject to serious question. Goche, Chinimasa,
and Mnangagwa represent one power center, Reserve Bank
Governor Gideon Gono another, and the military, particularly
Defence Chief Chiwenga, a third. Finally, it is unlikely any
deal can be negotiated without the assent of Mugabe, and his
feelings on the matter are not known.
¶13. (C) As highlighted in The Herald op-ed, ZANU-PF believes
it should dominate a GNU.Q+l}QU~ppression and
violence over the years. We expect a GNU to be a continuing
subject of discussion both in Zimbabwe and among regional
leaders, but as of now the concept should be viewed with at
least a dose of skepticism.
--------------
FINAL COMMENTS
--------------
¶14. (C) Both apparent options are fraught with problems. A
runoff election at this time cannot be free and fair. Yet if
the MDC boycotts, ZANU-PF will proclaim victory and the MDC
will be forced to attempt negotiations from a weaker position
than it occupies now. A GNU appears difficult to achieve
unless ZANU-PF and the MDC agree to make concessions they are
not now willing to make.
¶15. (C) Perhaps most important is for Tsvangirai to return
to Zimbabwe and, with Simba Makoni, Arthur Mutambara, and
others, establish a united front and coordinate strategy:
Will they participate in elections and, if so, under what
conditions? An immediate end to violence, space to campaign,
and pre-electoral international observers? Or do they want
to pursue a GNU, and if so, under what conditions?
¶16. (C) Finally, the situation on the ground has
dramatically changed. The March 29 elections went relatively
HARARE 00000367 004 OF 004
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