The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front deputy political commissar Sikhanyiso Ndlovu said members of the party were so disgruntled with President Robert Mugabe that he asked whether the United States government could fund the creation of a prestigious educational foundation and support Mugabe to head it so that he could step down.
He said this way back in 2003 because he was concerned about Zimbabwe’s economic implosion and its impact on the educational institutes that he owned around the country.
Ndlovu said he did not want his reputation to be tarred by some of the government’s decisions and policies.
He said many of those in the ZANU-PF politburo, including him, simply wanted Mugabe out of office but at the same time he dismissed the Movement for Democratic Change as a British puppet organisation.
Ndlovu said that strong US criticism of Mugabe made him more determined to hold on to power as he was afraid the US would press for his prosecution if he left office.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 03HARARE64, RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT WITHIN ZANU-PF
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000064
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT WITHIN ZANU-PF
REF: 02 HARARE 2829
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) A
ND (D).
SUMMARY
———
¶1. (C) Concern and frustration with Zimbabwe’s worsening
economic and other crises are mounting among senior ZANU-PF
officials, many of whom blame Robert Mugabe. No one appears
willing or able to nudge the Zimbabwean President into
retirement, however. Internal discussions of succession
scenarios focus predominantly on how to preserve the ruling
party’s hold on power in a post-Mugabe era, and none that we
know of envision a voluntary retirement by Mugabe prior to
2005, or reconciliation and cooperation with the opposition
MDC. END SUMMARY.
————————-
DISSENSION WITHIN ZANU-PF
————————-
¶2. (C) In a January 8 conversation with ruling party
politburo member Solomon Mujuru, the Ambassador asked about
recent public allegations by opposition leader Morgan
Tsvangirai that armed forces chief Vitalis Zvinavashe was
SIPDIS
working with the British and South African governments on a
plan to replace Mugabe with Speaker of Parliament Emmerson
Mnangagwa. Mujuru said he doubted that Zvinavashe would have
done anything more than informally sound out ideas with
Tsvangirai through Colonel Dyck, and that Mugabe certainly
SIPDIS
would not have made proposals for succession without first
vetting it through the appropriate ZANU-PF channels. Mujuru,
who is close to the armed forces and opposed to Mnangagwa’s
ambitions, declined to comment on Mnangagwa’s future role.
¶3. (C) Asked to predict how the political situation would
unfold, Mujuru surmised that parliamentary elections in 2005
would likely go ahead as scheduled. He was confident that
ZANU-PF would regain a two-thirds majority, then move to
change the constitution to allow the President to appoint a
successor who would serve out the remainder of his mandate
(the constitution currently provides that an election must be
held within 90 days of the presidency being vacated.).
Shortly thereafter, Mujuru thought Mugabe would appoint a new
vice-president or two, then step down. If the constitution
were not amended, Mujuru believed Mugabe would step down
anyway and would allow the required election to proceed
within 90 days. Even if Morgan Tsvangirai and the opposition
MDC won, Mujuru pointed out, they would likely have to work
with a ZANU-PF majority in Parliament. Mujuru acknowledged
that further economic deterioration would be inevitable in
the two years until then and that risks of a political
explosion were growing, but he appeared stymied by Mugabe’s
own objections to addressing the political crisis at this
time.
¶4. (C) In a separate meeting, senior ZANU-PF parliamentarian
and elder party statesman Eddison Zvobgo confirmed to us the
existence of a group of dissatisfied party cadres, comprising
both young and more longstanding members, including himself,
that is trying to distance itself from Mugabe. Zvobgo implied
that their goal is forcing Mugabe out, but they have not
devised any plan to accomplish this and their uncertainty
about the sort of political dispensation that would obtain
after Mugabe’s departure is giving many of them pause. In
any case, Zvobgo plans a trip soon to Atlanta, Chicago, and
New York to raise funds for this dissident group, presumably
to give them some flexibility and financial heft.
¶5. (C) ZANU-PF deputy political commissar Sikhanyiso Ndlovu
confirmed to polchief on January 2 that resentment with
Mugabe’s leadership is growing among politburo members,
including himself. He said he was increasingly concerned
about Zimbabwe’s economic implosion and its impact on the
educational institutes he owns around the country, and he did
not want his reputation tarred by some of the GOZ’s decisions
and policies. At the same time, Ndlovu said a new election
was out of the question, and he dismissed the MDC as a
British puppet organization. Many of his politburo
colleagues, he continued, simply want Mugabe out of office,
but they have not contemplated who or what might follow him.
Ndlovu claimed that strong U.S. criticism of Mugabe makes the
Zimbabwean leader more determined to hold on to power, as
Mugabe is afraid that we would press for his prosecution if
he leaves office. Ndlovu asked whether the USG would be
willing to fund creation of something like a prestigious
educational foundation and support Mugabe to head it, if such
an arrangement might convince the Old Man to step down.
Polchief was noncommittal.
——————–
Reconciliation Talks
——————–
¶6. (C) With the Ambassador, Mujuru repeated the common ruling
party refrain that Zimbabwe’s disagreements with the United
Kingdom were at the root of this country’s problems, and that
normalization of that relationship would make the internal
political crisis easier to resolve. The Ambassador replied
that he could not speak for the British, but emphasized that
it would not be possible to come to an understanding with the
United States unless Zimbabwe’s political crisis and the
other crises which flowed from it were addressed in a way
acceptable to most Zimbabweans.
¶7. (C) Asked whether resumption of the dialogue between
ZANU-PF and the MDC was possible, Mujuru noted the high level
of distrust between the parties and parroted the party line
that dialogue would be difficult so long as the MDC continues
to pursue its court challenge of the presidential election
results. In addition, convincing Mugabe to resign, the MDC’s
publicly stated precondition for any political solution,
would be “the hardest part.”
—————–
Food distribution
—————–
¶8. (C) The Ambassador commented to Mujuru that ZANU-PF has
believed that controlling distribution of scarce food
supplies is a huge political advantage, but he noted
increased infighting within the party over access to — and
authority to distribute — those supplies. A strong GOZ move
to facilitate food distributions on an impartial basis would
make a favorable impression with the international community
and could help restore trust within Zimbabwe. Some steps,
the Ambassador suggested, might include allowing private
sector food imports, inviting the United Nations to monitor
Grain Marketing Board distributions, and involving the MDC in
monitoring food distributions. Mujuru was noncommittal.
——-
COMMENT
——-
¶9. (C) An increasing number of ruling party insiders are
beginning to acknowledge the depths of Zimbabwe’s political
and economic crises and are increasingly convinced that
Mugabe’s departure is the solution. Recognizing the
existence of a problem is, of course, the first step to
resolving it. It is clear, however, that the growing
frustration among those party cadres appears motivated not by
a genuine concern for the welfare of their once prosperous
country but, rather, by the deleterious impact on their
continued access to the gravy train. Our sense is that those
around Mugabe are scrambling to figure out a way to get rid
of the Old Man without jeopardizing ZANU-PF’s maintenance of
power. None of the discussions of which we are aware have
focused on the need for political reconciliation and
cooperation with the MDC.
SULLIVAN
(32 VIEWS)
