Instead the UK decided to rely on sanctions applied to Rhodesia’s major exports and to key imports, particularly oil. It had been a huge shock to those in Africa, which included President Kuanda, who believed that British oil companies, BP and Shell, were not using their oil to supply Rhodesia. In 1977 I was faced by documentary evidence that in 1967 a controversial swap arrangement made with Total ensured that Rhodesia was supplied with oil directly and Total were then compensated by Shell and BP in South Africa. This arrangement operated until 1971.
The fact that this swap arrangement had been revealed in full by the oil companies to the British government in 1968, and the British government had taken no steps at the time to consider prosecution for the breaches in the law, was confirmed by the enquiry which I established under Thomas Bingham QC. His deeply embarrassing report published in 1978 revealed to the wider world the ambivalence of British policy towards Rhodesia and reluctance to use the full weight of sanctions against South Africa. Of course, their reluctance was in part self-interest, but there was also an important strategic element in trying to preserve a strong economy for a post-apartheid South Africa.
Probably the only time the UK might have used force over Rhodesia was when the Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in April 1974, but again a Labour government had only just been elected and was short of a majority. They saw the main immediate challenge was to ensure that Portugal itself became a stable democracy. The Beira Patrol lasted until 25 June 1975, when Mozambique gained independence from Portugal and assured Britain that it would not allow transship oil to Rhodesia.
Doran's book does not dwell much on the external pressures put on Ian Smith until independence in 1980; instead it provides a fascinating account of the origins and of the struggle of black Rhodesians for independence – the truly crucial factor.
How Joshua Nkomo was chosen to lead the Southern Rhodesian ANC (African National Congress) which was outlawed in July 1959 when Nkomo was travelling abroad. The continuing problem with Nkomo’s readiness to compromise, and in February 1961 he was publicly condemned for accepting new constitutional proposals which he soon backed off.
The British High Commissioner in Salisbury, Cuthbert Alport, later Lord Alport, wrote, “Nkomo’s fear of being bumped off… is, of course, absolute nonsense, but indicates his well-known physical cowardice… leading Africans sympathetic to ZAPU [the Zimbabwe African People’s Union having been formed in December 1961] now tend to write Nkomo off and are looking around for someone to replace him.” (Lord Alport telegram, 27 September 1962)
In early 1963, Mugabe was talking about the need to replace Nkomo, and on 8 August, the Revd Sithole announced the establishment of the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU).
Mugabe assumed the presidency of ZANU by default, when Sithole was formally deposed in 1973. He held that position until 2017. The rivalry between Nkomo and Mugabe had by the spring of 1977, when I first met them as Foreign Secretary, become painfully obvious and it was simmering in the background throughout the Malta conference in January 1978 to discuss the Anglo-American Plan.
This was also the time when we saw more of the tension between the military figures within the two armies of the Patriot Front and Field Marshal Lord Carver met them with Josiah Tongogara, the person he then believed held the key to a successful integration of the two armies in any pre-electoral period.
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