Botswana President Ian Khama told United States ambassador to Botswana Stephen Nolan that he was frustrated with Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s initial reaction to the Southern African Development Community summit communiqué which mapped the timetable for the formation of the inclusive government as well as the MDC’s tendency to reverse itself during negotiations.
He said Tsvangirai was briefed about the points in the communiqué, which included the fact that he must be sworn in as Prime Minister on 11 February and agreed to them but he seemed to be backsliding in his public statements after the summit.
Khama said former South African President Thabo Mbeki, who was the facilitator in the Zimbabwe talks, had made the same complaint about the MDC.
Khama said according to Mbeki it was the MDC that first proposed the idea of sharing the Ministry of Home Affairs, but it then backed out and condemned the idea.
This shifting of positions undermined the MDC in the eyes of other SADC members.
Khama said when he asked Tsvangirai about the perception that the MDC had changed its mind on the deal, a day after the release of the communiqué, Tsvangirai disavowed the MDC statement issued in response to the communiqué calling it “just a first reaction”.
Tsvangirai assured Khama that most in the MDC would agree to the unity government and the timeline and it would be approved by the MDC National Council.
He said that he wanted to avoid the danger of the MDC being seen as the “bad guys” sensing that if they refused the SADC deal, they would be held responsible for plight of the Zimbabwean people and prolonging their suffering through intransigence, while ZANU-PF had publicly accepted the timeline.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09GABORONE88, BOTSWANA: READ-OUT FROM PRESIDENT KHAMA ON THE
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VZCZCXRO9281
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHOR #0088/01 0301315
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301315Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5529
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0385
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0214
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0107
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0197
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0399
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GABORONE 000088
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/S, AF/RSA, INR/AA
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USAID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM PINR ZI BC
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA: READ-OUT FROM PRESIDENT KHAMA ON THE
SADC SUMMIT
REF: A. HARARE 70
¶B. GABORONE 82
¶C. GABORONE 70
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. During a 90 minute meeting January 29,
President Khama shared his impressions of the January 26-27
SADC summit with a small group of Chiefs of Mission at his
office in Gaborone. Khama described the overall dynamics of
the summit and commented that he and Tanzanian President
Kikwete had been the most active participants and had worked
together to advocate for a fair outcome for the MDC. He
characterized Robert Mugabe as more subdued and conciliatory
than in previous meetings, and assessed that Mugabe may
personally be ready to make a deal. However, Khama also
noted that Mugabe is probably constrained by hard-liners
within his inner circle. Khama also expressed some
frustration with MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, particularly
with his initial public reaction to the summit communique and
the MDC’s tendency to reverse itself during negotiations.
Finally, President Khama urged the USG and other friends of
Zimbabwe to carefully craft our public reaction to the unity
government if it comes about. He urged us to quickly engage
at a political level with the new government, increase
humanitarian assistance if possible, and to focus on the
positive in our public statements so as to “offer some light
at the end of the tunnel” both to the new government and the
suffering Zimbabwean people. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) President Khama invited Ambassador Nolan and his
counterparts from the UK, France, Germany, and the European
Union to a meeting at his office January 29 regarding the
January 26-27 SADC Extraordinary Summit. Khama was
accompanied by Minister of Defense (and acting Foreign
Minister) Seretse, MFA Permanent Secretary Samuel Oututle,
MFA Deputy Permanent Secretary Sesara George, and his Chief
of Protocol Daphne Kadiwa. President Khama was relaxed and
forthright during the 90 minute meeting, offering the
assembled diplomats a detailed and colorful exposition of the
summit. Since Khama’s overall account of the proceedings at
the summit tracks closely with the information in reftels A
and B, this cable will focus on adding detail and color
regarding the summit proceedings and participants to give
Washington a fuller picture.
Dynamics of the Summit
———————-
¶3. (S) President Khama told the assembled diplomats that in
December 2008 he phoned South African President Motlanthe to
inform him that Botswana was prepared to withdraw from any
participation in SADC’s mediation efforts, withhold
recognition of Mugabe as the Zimbabwean President, and cease
attending SADC summits unless the Zimbabwean government
provided Morgan Tsvangirai a passport and “Mugabe stopped
playing games.” Khama believes that this threat forced the
GOZ to issue Tsvangirai’s passport in December and broke the
impasse in negotiations. Moving to the summit itself, Khama
said that the meeting began late due to the late arrival of
the Swazi King, and that some of the other participants were
frustrated by both the late start and the length of the
meeting. Lesotho, for example, Khama cited as seeming
frustrated at spending time on yet another Zimbabwe meeting
and would do all it could to move the process along quickly.
Khama explained that the dialogue was almost exclusively
among the heads of state. He said that both he and Tanzanian
President Kikwete were the most active participants, and that
they confronted Mugabe on issues. He seemed disappointed
that the new Zambian President Banda did not contribute.
Khama noted that Banda is “a gentleman, nice and pleasant”
but felt that with the passing of Mwanawasa he had lost an
ally in Zambia within the SADC proceedings. The Chairman
restricted most of the summit to only heads of state or
senior country representatives, which meant that MDC was not
permitted in the room. Khama argued that it made no sense to
try to articulate MDC concerns and positions without Morgan
Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube present, but he was over-ruled
GABORONE 00000088 002 OF 004
as Lesotho, DRC, and others insisted that SADC protocol
permitted only heads of state in such meetings. Tsvangirai
and Ncube were only allowed in the room late in the meeting.
¶4. (C) Regarding distribution of governorships, the summit
agreed that ZANU-PF monopoly on governorships was untenable,
but they could not agree upon a fair distribution of the 10
positions amongst the three parties. It was resolved that
MDC-T, MDC-M, and ZANU-PF negotiators will meet and negotiate
the distribution. MDC-T wants 5 seats for itself, 4 for
ZANU, and one for MDC-M, based on parliamentary seats. ZANU
claims it should be 5-4-1 (ZANU getting 5) based on “popular
vote,” while MDC-M wants a 4-4-2 split based on the
negotiated allocation of cabinet positions. Mugabe conceded
that the governorships could be negotiated immediately,
however, it was not decided when the incumbent governors
would be removed.
¶5. (C) Khama reports that he attempted to re-open discussion
on the allocation of the Home Affairs Ministry. He still
feels that the sharing of the Ministry is unworkable and will
create a mess. Another country suggested that to be fair,
perhaps the Defense portfolio should also be shared between
ZANU-PF and MDC. However, Mugabe strongly objected to this
idea and it was dropped. The Chairman suggested, because of
depth of mistrust and suspicion on both sides, it would be
better for all sides to work together in government in order
to get beyond the acrimony and begin to build some
confidence, and after six months review ministerial
portfolios. President Khama says that he objected, noting
that only Home Affairs was in dispute, and President Kikwete
supported him. Though Khama and Kikwete could not convince
their colleagues that only Home Affairs should be reviewed,
Khama did succeed in getting SADC to remove any mention of
the sharing of Home Affairs from the communique.
¶6. (C) President Khama told the Ambassadors that the issue
of the abducted MDC members and NGO activists was raised
during the summit. Tsvangirai insisted that all the
abductees be released immediately, but Mugabe objected
insisting that they had all broken the law and that is why
they had been “arrested.” Welshman Ncube suggested that
since they had been arraigned in the courts, that this issue
should be put aside for the moment to allow the negotiations
to continue. Khama indicated that the assumption was that
once the unity government was formed, they would be released
quickly.
Khama’s Impressions of Mugabe
—————————–
¶7. (S) Robert Mugabe’s demeanor was calm, pleasant and
collected during the summit, according to Khama. He did not
bang on the table like he had at previous summits. Khama
senses that Mugabe is no longer the “strong-man” of years
past and he believes that Mugabe may personally be ready to
make a deal, but notes that he is now cornered by his own
hard-liners. Khama also believes that Mugabe is feeling the
pressure of Zimbabwe’s deteriorating situation. President
Khama told the Chiefs of Mission that Mugabe started dozing
off as the hours passed, head nodding and eyes half-closed,
but according to Khama, Mugabe was always able to respond at
the right moments, which Khama characterized as having
“mastered the art of sleeping with one ear open.”
¶8. (S) President Khama had a harsh exchange with Mugabe when
the issue of MDC training in Botswana came up in passing.
(Note: When discussing the missing MDC and opposition
activists, Mugabe said they had been arrested due to training
“in another country.” He didn’t mention Botswana
specifically. End Note.) Khama said that he confronted
Mugabe, complaining this was just a typical distraction
tactic on his part. Khama argued out that Mugabe and the GOZ
had never previously raised these training camp allegations,
either in recent bilateral meetings or to former President
Mogae in their periodic meetings, and no Zimbabwean military
officials ever brought this allegation to Khama himself when
he was Commander of the BDF. Khama then told the assembled
GABORONE 00000088 003 OF 004
Heads of State that he would step down as President if
Zimbabwe’s allegations were found to be true, but asked if
Mugabe would also agree to resign if they turned out to be
false. According to Khama, Mugabe did not respond.
¶9. (S) According to Khama, at the end of summit, Mugabe
asked to speak, and he adopted a conciliatory posture. He
thanked all the countries – including Botswana, South Africa,
and Zambia – that had helped Zimbabwe with its cholera
epidemic. Mugabe said that the cholera epidemic had taken
the GOZ by surprise, and that they never expected it to get
to its current levels. Khama opined that Mugabe’s more
conciliatory posture results from the pressure he is under.
Per Khama, Mugabe is aware that his options are dwindling and
he needs to find a way out.
Frustration with the MDC
————————
¶10. (S) At the end of the summit, Khama says that the points
of the communique were all briefed to Tsvangirai and he
agreed to them. Khama was therefore not pleased at
Tsvangirai’s public statements at the end of the summit,
which seemed to be backsliding on his part. According to
President Khama, former President Mbeki made the same
complaint about the MDC. Per Mbeki, the MDC actually first
proposed the idea of sharing the Home Affairs Ministry, then
later they backed away and condemned the idea. According to
Khama, this shifting of positions undermined the MDC in the
eyes of other SADC members.
¶11. (S) President Khama also reported that he met privately
with Morgan Tsvangirai in Gaborone January 28, and he asked
about the perception that MDC had changed its position on the
deal. According to Khama, Tsvangirai somewhat disavowed the
MDC statement issued in response to the communique, calling
it “just a first reaction.” Tsvangirai assured Khama that
most in the MDC would agree to the unity government and the
timeline and it would be approved by the MDC National
Council, though some hard-liners would object. Tsvangirai
wanted to avoid the danger of the MDC being seen as the “bad
guys,” sensing that if they refused the SADC deal, they would
be held responsible for plight of the Zimbabwean people and
prolonging their suffering through intransigence, while
ZANU-PF had publicly accepted the timeline. Khama reported
that he advised Tsvangirai to patch up relations with the
Mutambara faction of the MDC soon in order to strengthen
their position against ZANU-PF. Khama stressed that
Tsvangirai and the MDC can continue to count on his advice
and support, including after they enter government.
Vision of the Way Ahead
———————–
¶12. (C) The bottom line for President Khama was that the
agreement is not ideal and he would have preferred to see
genuine elections in Zimbabwe, but he recognizes that they
will be impossible under current circumstances. He said that
this is a Zimbabwean problem and ultimately only the
Zimbabweans can resolve it. Khama also noted that the MDC
have themselves partly to blame for allowing Mugabe to stay
in power after the June elections. He said he can only be
hopeful the unity government will succeed this time. He also
noted that SADC is “agitated” at having the finger of blame
constantly pointed at them for Zimbabwe’s problems. The
prevailing attitude within SADC, according to President
Khama, is that “it is the Zimbabweans who can’t get their act
together, so blame them, not us.”
¶13. (C) President Khama stressed that the Joint
Implementation and Monitoring Committee (JMIC) must be set up
and functioning immediately for this deal to succeed. He
noted that former President Mbeki will convene the JMIC, and
though Zimbabweans from all three parties will be on the
committee, SADC will still play a role in guaranteeing the
process. Ambassador Nolan asked President Khama whether he
believes that Mugabe is entering this agreement with good
faith. Khama expressed some skepticism about whether the
deal will hold, but noted that he believes “there are no
GABORONE 00000088 004 OF 004
other options at present.” Khama also said that the
timeline’s benchmarks will quickly demonstrate whether or not
Mugabe is serious.
Advice for the International Community
————————————–
¶14. (S) There was some discussion about the many changes the
US, UK and Europe would have to see on the ground before
removing sanctions or changing our overall posture toward
Zimbabwe. President Khama clearly understood this, but he
also counseled that it would be helpful for the United States
and other friends of Zimbabwe to engage at a political level
“sooner rather than later” with the new government.
Increasing humanitarian assistance quickly would also be an
important step, according to Khama, but he said that he knows
there will be reluctance to provide development and
reconstruction assistance absent concrete evidence of change.
He also suggested that it would be helpful for the US, UK,
and Europe to issue positive statements about the new
government, to give people in Zimbabwe confidence that what
they have done has the backing of the international
community, to show that there is a willingness to enter into
dialogue, and that “there is light at the end of the tunnel.”
¶15. (S) Khama acknowledged that the sanctions question will
arise. He advised that if the western countries simply say
that sanctions will continue indefinitely, it will throw cold
water on the agreement and will not be well-received in the
SADC region. According to Khama, this sort of statement will
also feed Mugabe’s considerable paranoia about Western
motives. Instead, Khama counseled that western governments
could try to focus on the positive, by mentioning types of
humanitarian assistance that can be provided quickly and
engaging in limited political dialogue, while also leaving
the door open to reviewing sanctions in the near future and
promising to link action on the sanctions to solid evidence
of progress and reform. If the new government does not make
satisfactory progress on key benchmarks, engagement could
then be slowed or halted. President Khama also suggested
that the international community could send a fact-finding
delegation to Zimbabwe in approximately three months to
assess such progress, and then base future US engagement with
the GOZ on their report. Khama mentioned that our feedback
on what is happening inside Zimbabwe and information about
our humanitarian programs would be useful to him, and he
offered to present information about ZANU-PF backsliding or
misconduct to SADC if needed.
NOLAN
(71 VIEWS)
