The Electoral Court which had ruled in favour of jailed Movement for Democratic Change Member of Parliament for Chimanimani Roy Bennett reversed itself in consultation with Bennett’s lawyers after an emotional public attack on the decision by President Robert Mugabe.
According to the United States embassy serious resource and procedural constraints made the court’s capacity to handle any large volume of disputes questionable.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE467, PLAYING FIELD HEAVILY TILTED, BUT OUTCOME STILL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000467
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
SUBJECT: PLAYING FIELD HEAVILY TILTED, BUT OUTCOME STILL
UNCERTAIN AS ZIMBABWE BRACES FOR ELECTIONS
REF: (A) HARARE 459 (B) HARARE 428 (C) HARARE 418 (D)
HARARE 345
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
—-
Summary
—-
¶1. (C) With less than a week to go before Zimbabwe,s
electorate goes to the polls the result is uncertain. The
election playing field is heavily tilted in the ruling
party’s favor. However, the MDC has proven stronger than
expected and ZANU-PF weaker. Mugabe,s gamble to reduce
violence in order to legitimize the election may backfire.
The MDC believes it is poised to win 70-80 seats, perhaps
enough for a majority in the 150 seat unicameral parliament
despite the 30 seats Mugabe appoints. There are too many
unknown factors, principally the extent to which the ruling
party will cheat on election day, to embrace the MDC,s
optimism. Still, we find it increasingly likely that the MDC
will win at least 51 seats, preventing a two-thirds majority
for ZANU-PF and likely setting the stage for resumed
intra-party negotiations following the election.
———-
Election Framework Heavily Favors Ruling Party
———
¶2. (C) As we reported earlier (Ref D), Zimbabwe,s election
falls far short of the South African Development Community,s
(SADC) guidelines and is heavily tilted in favor of the
ruling ZANU-PF party. Zimbabwe’s repressive laws and biased
institutions remain fundamental flaws in the election
environment. Start with the fact that only 120 out of 150
seats are directly elected. Under the constitution,
President Mugabe chooses the other 30. As a result, the
opposition needs to win a super-majority of 76 seats to take
control of parliament. In addition, five years of GOZ
repression and harassment of the opposition and its
supporters have likely cowed the populace, conditioning them
to accept yet another fraudulent outcome. The regime’s legal
toolbox of repression is also fuller now than ever. The
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) were both
strengthened during the last session of Parliament and the
infamous NGO bill, though unsigned, has also loomed in the
background and limited civil society activism.
¶3. (C) A host of other GOZ policies and decisions have served
to undermine the integrity of the election. New legal
constraints have reduced the level of voter education
nationally and brought more of it under state control,
although key NGOs, such as the Zimbabwe Election Support
Network, have been conducting voter education despite the
constraints. Furthermore, a recent adverse court decision
effectively squelched political and legal campaigns to extend
the vote to the three million-strong Zimbabwean diaspora.
The so-called Delimitation Commission also gerrymandered
three constituencies from MDC-controlled areas to ZANU-PF
areas, ostensibly justified by voter registration numbers,
and safe MDC majorities in urban constituencies have been
diluted by the inclusion of additional voters from nearby
rural traditional ZANU-PF areas. However, the lack of
transparency and apparent poor state of the voter rolls is
itself potentially the most problematic aspect of the
election.
¶4. (C) Finally, although the recently passed Zimbabwe
Electoral Act incorporated some of the opposition’s technical
demands (i.e., translucent ballot boxes, one-day voting,
ballot counting at the polling station) for election
administration, it did so on the government,s terms. The
ruling party has cynically misused aspects of the technical
reforms to manipulate and intimidate some of the electorate,
especially in rural areas where voters are told that reforms
will help the ruling party know how individuals and
communities voted.
———-
Pre-Election Environment: Less Violent but Still Distorted
———-
¶5. (C) We reported recently (Ref A) on the significantly
reduced levels of election violence, which does mark a
significant improvement, regardless of the GOZ,s motivation.
However, as we also reported fear remains a significant
factor in many constituencies, particularly in rural areas.
Forms of intimidation vary, but typically revolve around
threatened withholding of government benefits to individuals
or communities or physical violence targeting opposition
supporters after the election.
¶6. (C) Campaign space and freedom of assembly still fall far
short of SADC guidelines and international norms but have
improved significantly compared to the 2000 and 2002
elections. Authorities have permitted the opposition to
campaign widely, frequently, and without physical disruption
in most areas over the past month. However, that the MDC
(and civil society) must receive permission at all
distinguishes the opposition it sharply from the ruling
party, for which permission is perfunctorily given, if sought
at all.
¶7. (C) The GOZ is also continuing to use State assets to
support ZANU-PF,s campaign. The most cynical example is its
manipulation of food. The GOZ is exploiting national food
distribution to favor the ruling party’s election prospects
as hunger grows in most parts of the country. The most
common practice appears to be channeling the para-statal
Grain Marketing Board,s (GMB) distributions through ruling
party MP candidates or rallies. While food is the most
prominent abuse of GOZ resources, the ruling party taps into
a host of GOZ benefits (e.g., fuel, agricultural inputs,
“free cash” for the ostensibly disadvantaged) to secure voter
support. The ruling party has also stepped up its efforts to
influence votes by controlling locally influential chiefs
through cash payouts and other leverage. We have witnessed
police and military in uniform at ZANU-PF party offices
moving campaign paraphernalia and food.
¶8. (C) State controls on the media remain yet another
significant advantage for the ruling party. Recently
implemented regulations afford the opposition radio and TV
space for paid advertising (reportedly at rates significantly
higher than ZANU-PF pays) and state news coverage has been
giving the MDC unprecedented exposure. Nonetheless, news
reporting continues to feature the ruling party more
prominently and favorably, and ruling party ad spots far
outnumber opposition ones. According to MDC Shadow Minister
for Foreign Affairs Priscilla Misihairabwa-Mushonga, the
state TV informed the MDC that its political advertising
would no longer be aired after Sunday, March 26. No reason
was offered. The MDC has not been given access to the state
print media, which continues to be heavily biased in its news
reporting. Moreover, AIPPA continues to chill freedom of
speech and to be applied in a purely partisan manner. The
nation’s only opposition-aligned daily newspaper remains
closed (Ref C), and a new independent weekly was closed
earlier this year within months of its opening over purported
violations of AIPPA. GOZ office raids last month prompted
four local journalists associated with foreign publications
to flee the country.
———
Election Day Concerns
———
¶9. (C) Most observers here expect little overt violence on
election day but we cannot rule out the possibility in
selected constituencies, especially if national or local
ruling party leaders conclude that violence is the only way
to secure what they regard as a particularly vital seat.
That said, prospects of other kinds of skullduggery seem more
probable. The poor state of the voter rolls is a primary
concern. There were widespread reports of GOZ-ballot
stuffing in past elections. There are currently 5.8 million
voters are on the rolls, an increase of 200,000 in just the
past two weeks (well after registration was to have ended)
and a sizeable increase over the numbers in 2002 ) despite
the fact that some 3 million Zimbabweans have left the
country.
¶10. (C) In addition, opposition polling agents and
independent observers will have difficulty fully covering the
more than 8,000 polling stations, many of them in remote
rural areas. These remote polling stations reportedly will
also not do vote counting &in situ8 given the lack of
electricity, but will have to transport their ballots to
other polling stations to be counted ) further raising
concerns of fraud. More subtle forms of vote-rigging ) the
presence of traditional chiefs, party people appearing to
record names, etc. ) are also likely to influence the voting
at many polling stations, especially in rural areas. MDC
leaders assure us that they have identified at least four
party polling agents to staff each polling station, and ZESN
advised that it already has more than 6,000 accredited
observers but it remains to be seen how effective they will
be in preventing ruling party fraud. (Note: The diplomatic
community is planning to deploy about 50 teams of observers,
including 25 U.S. Embassy teams, that will visit polling
stations in 75 of the 120 contested constituencies. End
note.)
¶11. (C) The performance of key election institutions ) the
Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC), the Electoral Supervisory
Commission (ESC), and the ad hoc electoral court ) remain
potentially key unknown variables. In its first substantive
decision, the electoral court surprisingly ruled in favor of
jailed MDC MP Roy Bennett (Ref B) but reversed itself in
consultation with Bennett’s lawyers after an emotional public
attack on the decision by Mugabe. In any event, serious
resource and procedural constraints make the court’s capacity
to handle any large volume of disputes questionable. The
ZEC, which was constituted only in February, lacks sufficient
resources or track record to inspire much confidence.
Nonetheless, the opposition, which consulted with the GOZ on
the ZEC’s composition, grudgingly accepted its authority
publicly, and confided to us that it had faith in three or
four of the five commissioners. Finally, the ESC
historically has been technically competent in most areas but
either powerless or too partisan to address significant
inter-party disputes in the field. Embassy field trips so
far suggest that the coordination and quality of ZEC and ESC
officials is uneven at best.
———-
And the Winner Is?
———-
¶12. (C) Despite the ruling party’s overwhelming advantages,
the opposition has effectively exploited the openings
available to it and made significant inroads nationally,
including in former “no-go” areas. The size and frequency of
MDC rallies have been impressive. The party’s exposure on
radio, TV and in the independent media and its growing
rallies have created a buzz in much of the country, and our
sense is that the political apathy endemic just six months
ago is yielding to an atmosphere of cautious hope. With
USAID-funded assistance from IRI and NDI and others, the MDC
is projecting a message that appears to be resonating with a
beleaguered electorate. ZANU-PF’s contentious primaries,
Party Congress, and widely publicized espionage and
corruption scandals have fueled divisions and disaffection
within the ruling party, sapping its energy and further
fueling the appearance of an opening for the opposition. The
collapsing economy and growing hunger in the face of all GOZ
propaganda to the contrary further undermine ZANU-PF support
in both rural and urban areas.
¶13. (C) Buoyed by its unprecedented exposure and connection
with the electorate, the MDC leadership speaks confidently of
winning 70-80 seats. An increasing number of observers
outside the party also acknowledge that most voters may be
prepared to signal “zvakwna” – the opposition slogan meaning
“enough!” Winning more than half the contested seats, 61,
could be enough to bring into question the democratic
legitimacy of the GOZ. There are too many key unknown
variables – the impact of a legacy of fear and continuing
intimidation, whether voter apathy will prevail, and the
degree to which ZANU-PF will cheat ) for us to endorse the
MDC,s optimism. That said, we are increasingly confident
that the MDC will win at least the 51 seats it needs to
continue to block the ruling party’s intended constitutional
amendments and setting the stage for renewed intra-party
negotiations. The stronger the showing by the MDC, the more
likely the prospect that the end-game of Mugabe’s long rule
will have begun. Conversely, were ZANU-PF and Mugabe to
steal the elecitons and claim a 2/3 majority based on fraud
and cheating alone, the end-game may begin in a different
way.
Dell
(58 VIEWS)
