Britain was so optimistic two days before a United Nations Security Council meeting in July 2008 that China and Russia would support a resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe that Prime Minister Gordon Brown felt that his “nose had been bloodied” by the Russians when they vetoed the resolution.
Britain was so devastated that it decided to give Zimbabwe “a break in the security council for a while”. Instead Brown decided to pursue further sanctions on the Southern African country through the European Union but once again faced resistance as some members such as Germany were opposed to the sanctions.
These revelations are made in two United States embassy cables just released by Wikileaks, one dispatched on July 9, 2008, two days before the UN Security Council meeting, and the other dispatched on July 15, four days after the defeat.
Zimbabwe had held its controversial elections in March in which the Movement for Democratic Change led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai pipped the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front of Robert Mugabe by winning 100 seats against ZANU-PF’s 99. Ten more seats went to the smaller Movement for Democratic Change faction led by Arthur Mutambara and a single seat to Jonathan Moyo who had stood as an independent candidate.
President Mugabe was beaten by Morgan Tsvangirai in the presidential elections by a narrow margin which necessitated a re-run but Tsvangirai had pulled out of the re-run because of the violence that ensued.
According to the cable Britain’s Foreign Minister Lord Malloch-Brown was optimistic that the security council resolution on Zimbabwe would sail through because he had made progress with Russia and China in New York and at the G-8 summit in Japan.
“In his view, China will likely do the right thing because it does not want another human rights fight on its hands before the Olympics,” the cable said. “Russia, however, was more problematic. President Medevev agreed to the G-8 Summit statement that implied sanctions, but seemed to walk back from that in statements he made today.”
Britain had also lobbied Burkina Faso which it felt was on its side. Libya was ambiguous. During the vote both China and Russia voted against the resolution. They were joined by Libya, South Africa and Viet Nam. Burkina Faso voted for the imposition of sanctions.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown was so devastated by the defeat that his office said he felt as though “his nose has been bloodied” by the Russians.
Brown instead sought further sanctions through the European Union. These were to be the adding of an additional 36 or 37 individuals to the current asset freeze and travel ban; sanctioning approximately ten companies; and limiting the exceptions that allow Mugabe and others in his regime to travel to the EU.
The cable, however, says there was opposition to the additional sanctions by some members of the EU like Germany.
“Germany continues to question the legality of some of the instruments, and some of the Southern European states (like Greece, Spain, and Italy) have their “usual existential problems with sanctions”, the cable said.
Below are the two cables:
Viewing cable 08LONDON1823, ZIMBABWE: UK OPTIMISTIC ON UNSC RESOLUTION
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Reference ID
Created
Released
Classification
Origin
08LONDON1823
2008-07-09 16:04
2011-02-04 21:09
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy London
VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHLO #1823 1911604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091604Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9159
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE IMMEDIATE 0166
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1219
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001823
SIPDIS
DEPART FOR IO/JEAN CLARK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC ZI UK
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE: UK OPTIMISTIC ON UNSC RESOLUTION
REF: SECSTATE 73173
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4 (b/d).
¶1. (C) Per reftel, the Charge spoke on July 9 with FCO Minister for Africa Lord Malloch-Brown, who was optimistic there would be sufficient votes to pass the current UNSC draft resolution on Zimbabwe. Malloch-Brown suggested progress had been made with Moscow and Beijing in New York and at the G-8 Summit in Japan. In his view, China will likely do the right thing because it does not want another human rights fight on its hands before the Olympics. Russia, however, was more problematic. President Medevev agreed to the G-8 Summit statement that implied sanctions, but seemed to walk back from that in statements he made today. FCO Zimbabwe Desk Ben Llewellyn-Jones told us that the PM,s Foreign Policy Advisor, Simon MacDonald, called his Russian counterpart to lobby in favor of the resolution, but did not receive any assurances. When directly asked, the Russians did not say if they would veto. Given the current frosty UK-Russia relations, Malloch-Brown said USG engagement with the Russians might be more effective. He also questioned if Moscow would really want to use its veto on this issue.
¶2. (C) Malloch-Brown said Ouagadougou is “on our side” from what the UK Embassy in Burkina Faso is reporting, but that the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister’s visit will test the depth of that commitment. On Libya, Malloch-Brown said that UK Foreign Secretary Miliband had telephoned the Libyan Foreign Minister, who was ambiguous but promised to be as supportive as possible. Visit London’s Classified Website:XXXXXXXXXXXX LeBaron
Viewing cable 08LONDON1853, ZIMBABWE: UK LOOKS FOR WAY FORWARD, TURNS TO EU
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Every cable message consists of three parts:
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* The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
* The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
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Reference ID
Created
Released
Classification
Origin
08LONDON1853
2008-07-15 11:11
2011-02-04 21:09
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy London
VZCZCXRO7200
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHLO #1853 1971102
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151102Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9193
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 0167
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3250
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1224
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001853
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC KDEM ZI ZU UK
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE: UK LOOKS FOR WAY FORWARD, TURNS TO EU
FOR SANCTIONS
Classified By: Political Counselor Richard Mills, reasons 1.4(b/d).
¶1. (C/NF) The Foreign Office continues to treat the situation in Zimbabwe as a crisis. After the July 11 defeat of the U.S. draft UNSCR on Zimbabwe, FCO Zimbabwe Team Leader Ben Llewellyn-Jones said July 14 HMG will “give Zimbabwe a break in the Security Council for a little while,” especially since Prime Minister Brown feels as though “his nose has been bloodied” by the Russians. Instead, he said, HMG will pursue EU sanctions. The UK is aiming for three measures: add an additional 36 or 37 individuals to the current asset freeze and travel ban; sanction approximately ten companies; and limit the exceptions that allow Mugabe and others in the regime to travel to the EU, as Mugabe did for the Lisbon Summit and the UN World Food Summit in Rome. The FCO has requested, to the extent possible, the USG provide names and details of companies already subject to U.S. sanctions. Embassy London requests the Department consider sharing company names and details with HMG to bolster the UK’s argument for EU sanctions.
¶2. (C/NF) Llewellyn-Jones said there has been some opposition to additional sanctions amongst EU partners. Germany continues to question the legality of some of the instruments, and some of the Southern European states (like Greece, Spain, and Italy) have their “usual existential problems with sanctions.” He said the U.S. could be helpful in two ways with specific groups of European countries. He thought a general demarche to the entire EU would be counterproductive. First, he suggested, the USG could approach UNSC member states in Europe to encourage them to weigh in the EU to push forward tougher EU measures. Second, he said, the USG could approach Eastern European states (like Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungry) to encourage them to support EU sanctions. Llewellyn-Jones said that Foreign Secretary Miliband thought that Russia’s veto in the Security Council could be useful in engaging these states. Miliband’s view was that these states could be encouraged to support EU sanctions “as advocates of democracy, unlike Russia.” Miliband also specifically suggested that engaging Georgia to reinforce democracy would be fruitful. Llewellyn-Jones said HMG would approach Germany and the Southern European states separately.
¶3. (C/NF) Llewellyn-Jones also said Miliband had asked Her Majesty’s Treasury to look into financial flows of funding to the regime to see what pressure, if any, could be applied that way. Visit London’s Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX TUTTLE
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