Botswana’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs Samuel Otlule told United States embassy officials in Gaborone that Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai had no authority over the MDC national council and this was a weakness which had not helped in the negotiations for the formation of an inclusive government.
He said this after Tsvangirai had agreed to a plan by the Southern African Development Community summit that he should be sworn in as Prime Minister on 11 February.
Otlule said though Tsvangirai had agreed to the plan he still had to get approval from the party’s national council and this was not a given.
He said negotiations for the setting up of a government of national unity had been very intense and only Botswana, Tanzania and Lesotho were on Tsvangirai’s side.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09GABORONE82, BOTSWANA: READ-OUT FROM MFA ON SADC SUMMIT
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DE RUEHOR #0082/01 0281459
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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0383
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GABORONE 000082
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/S, AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA: READ-OUT FROM MFA ON SADC SUMMIT
REF: GABORONE 70
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen J. Nolan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Samuel Otlule, the Permanent
Secretary at Botswana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed
that the Communique issued by SADC at the close of the
January 26 Extraordinary Summit on Zimbabwe was a “consensus
document” and was supported by Botswana. Otlule
characterized the summit as “very intense” and said that the
communique represents a “best deal” under present
circumstances for the MDC. SADC’s timeline for formation of
the unity government breaks the current impasse and opens the
door to more constructive dialogue in future. According to
Otlule, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai accepted the SADC plan,
but he still must obtain the endorsement of the MDC’s
National Council, which is not a given. Botswana encouraged
the MDC to join the unity government in Zimbabwe because the
GOB believes that once in government the MDC will be better
placed to shape and influence outcomes. President Khama will
brief Ambassador Nolan and a select group of Chiefs of
Mission on January 29, and we will report septel Khama’s
insights on the summit and on the way ahead. END SUMMARY.
Dynamics of the Summit
———————-
¶2. (C) Ambassador Nolan phoned Samuel Otlule, the Permanent
Secretary at Botswana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs late on
January 27 to seek a read-out from the GOB on the SADC
Extraordinary Summit on Zimbabwe that took place in Pretoria
January 26-27. According to Otlule, the communique issued by
SADC after the summit does represent a consensus view and it
was supported by Botswana. He characterized the summit as
“very intense” and told the Ambassador that President Khama
worked hard and applied strong pressure to ensure that the
communique reflected the concerns of both Botswana and the
MDC. Botswana, Tanzania, and Lesotho were the only SADC
members in the MDC’s corner at the summit. Other SADC
members present remained largely silent throughout, Otlule
remarked. The Heads of State and former President Mbeki met
in closed session much of the time, excluding even their
ministers, while they worked out the key points.
¶3. (C) President Khama tried throughout the negotiations to
keep the focus on the MDC’s five key issues, as outlined in
Tsvangirai statement. These conditions include a) enacting
constitutional amendment 19; b) legislation regarding the
National Security Council; c) equitable allocation of
ministerial portfolios; d) appointment of provincial
governors; and e) how to handle breaches of the agreement.
Though the GOB understands that the January 27 SADC proposal
is less than ideal, according to Otlule it represents a “best
deal” for the MDC under present circumstances, one that
breaks the impasse and at least opens the door to more
constructive dialogue in future. Botswana felt the MDC would
have more influence working on these key issues from within a
unity government rather than continuing to bang on the door
from outside. In particular, regarding the question of
guarantees to hold the parties to account, the GOB believes
that the summit wasn’t the right place to negotiate such
details. Otlule said that ZANU-PF acknowledged that issues
regarding accountability must be addressed quickly. The GOB
was also concerned with a perception amongst some SADC
members that the MDC has been the main “spoiler,” preventing
any forward movement on implementation of the unity
government. Botswana wanted to avoid having the MDC or the
GOB blamed for the failure of the negotiation process.
Unity Government: Next Steps?
—————————–
¶4. (C) Permanent Secretary Otlule said that Tsvangirai
“accepted” the deal outlined in the communique, but noted
that Tsvangirai still must obtain the endorsement of the
MDC’s National Council, which is not a given. Otlule
commented that Tsvangirai should closely examine the decision
making process within the MDC. According to Otlule,
Tsvangirai’s lack of authority and subsequent second-guessing
by the MDC National Committee is a weakness and hasn’t helped
the MDC in negotiations. Though MDC National Committee
GABORONE 00000082 002 OF 002
approval is still pending, Botswana hopes the MDC will join
the unity government, and wants them to consider how they can
make best use of this opening. It will not be easy, but the
GOB believes that the MDC will be better placed in government
to shape and influence outcomes. If there is lack of good
faith on the part of ZANU-PF and the issues ultimately cannot
be resolved, then the deal will dissolve in a few months and
Zimbabwe will have to go back to the ballot box.
Comment
——-
¶5. (C) COMMENT: Though the Perm Sec’s read-out was useful,
it is clear from his account that the key negotiations took
place with only SADC Heads of State and Former President
Mbeki in the room. Therefore, we look forward to hearing
from President Khama himself to better understand the summit
dynamics and Botswana’s views on the way ahead. The
President has invited our Ambassador and a few other Chiefs
of Mission to a debrief on January 29, and we look forward to
reporting septel on that meeting. Post respectfully requests
that Washington send us any specific points they wish to have
raised with President Khama as soon as possible.
¶6. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Though Otlule says that Khama
worked hard to ensure the MDC got a fair deal at the summit,
it is hard to see what was achieved. Indeed, other than the
timeline and the suggestion to take a look at the division of
ministerial portfolios in six months, the January 27
communique is remarkably similar to SADC’s proposal from
November 2008. The MDC did not win control of the Home
Affairs Ministry or any other noticeable concessions. What
seems to have shifted is the GOB’s stance. If Otlule’s
read-out is accurate, the GOB would appear to believe that
getting the MDC into government is the best way to break the
impasse and put pressure on Mugabe to honor the agreement.
Perhaps the GOB has accepted that SADC will not budge, and
the AU will continue to defer to SADC, so MDC entry into even
a bad deal may be the only way to create forward movement.
END COMMENT.
NOLAN
(14 VIEWS)
