Former United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Joseph Sullivan said President Robert Mugabe was not likely to be dislodged by pressure or persuasion from the West, African governments, the opposition or population, or his own colleagues and support structures.
In his farewell analysis of the Zimbabwean leader in August 2004 Sullivan said Mugabe was not dotty. He paid attention to those things he chose to focus on and pretended not to see those things he did not want to.
“He is driven less by money than by vanity and fear of the consequences of ‘dismounting from the tiger he is riding’. He remains a skilled politician and uses all means, fair and foul, to stay in power at all costs. His unrivalled and unquestioned power within ZANU-PF sucks the oxygen out of the party, which remains largely a self-absorbed, paralysed institution incapable of addressing, or even debating the nation’s myriad real problems,” the ambassador said.
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Viewing cable 04HARARE1423, A FEW FINAL REFLECTIONS
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241423Z Aug 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001423
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2014
SUBJECT: A FEW FINAL REFLECTIONS
Classified By: JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D
¶1. (C) Rather than reiterate previous analyses, I shall
offer a few closing reflections in shorthand form.
— The situation in Zimbabwe today is best defined as a
“FROZEN TRANSITION,” a political crisis whose lack of
resolution affects and deepens all of Zimbabwe’s other
crises, economic, social, and humanitarian. Notwithstanding
this fact, 80-year old Robert Mugabe is probably more
entrenched than he has been in several years and is unlikely
to be dislodged by pressure or persuasion from the West,
African governments, the Zimbabwean opposition or population,
or his own colleagues and support structure. While there is
certainly competition within ZANU-PF, Mugabe has taken none
of the steps he could to facilitate an orderly transition,
thereby ensuring substantial uncertainty and perhaps
instability in the event of his sudden death or serious
illness.
— Mugabe is not dotty; he pays attention to those things he
chooses to focus on and pretends not to see those things he
does not want to. He is driven less by money than by vanity
and fear of the consequences of “dismounting from the tiger
he is riding.” He remains a skilled politician and uses all
means, fair and foul, to stay in power at all costs. His
unrivaled and unquestioned power within ZANU-PF sucks the
oxygen out of the party, which remains largely a
self-absorbed, paralyzed institution incapable of addressing,
or even debating the nation’s myriad real problems.
— Mugabe, the state security apparatus and ZANU-PF’s
instruments of repression and intimidation have succeeded for
now in convincing the public once again that there is no
alternative to Mugabe’s rule and that they will be given no
opportunity to choose a different future. In the face of
these multiple pressures, most Zimbabweans have opted for
submission, emigration or waiting until Mugabe dies. Unless
political space reopens substantially, most Zimbabweans seem
unwilling to take the risks of opposition politics or mass
action.
— The political opposition is down, but not out. The MDC
still reflects the will of many, and probably most
Zimbabweans if they thought their choice was free and could
matter. Next year’s parliamentary elections provide the MDC a
better opportunity to preserve some strength than recent
by-elections where ZANU-PF has been able to address all its
attention to individual constituency by-elections. The MDC
has done well to hold together under the pressure of state
repression, infiltration and intimidation, but it faces new
and difficult challenges to maintain itself and stay united
for the long haul since its prospects are dim of coming to
power or even being allowed to exercise the shares of power
it has won in the parliament, mayoralties and municipal
councils.
— Because Mugabe is only focused on remaining in power and
has learned that he can withstand sanctions, isolation and
even sharp economic decline, the Mugabe Regime will continue
to defy criticism from the West and seek to capitalize
domestically and in Africa by playing the nationalist and
anti-imperialist cards. The GOZ is also facing increased
criticism from within Africa, although most is expressed in
private or in polite terms. The Regime appears willing to do
battle with its critics, even in Africa, as witness state
media critiques of Nigeria and other West Africans deemed to
have been unsupportive and regular tirades against Botswana.
Mugabe’s reliance on backing from fellow Africans is an
increasingly most vulnerable area, however, and would be even
more important if the South African Government were willing
to take a stronger stand in favor of crisis resolution.
— Mugabe shows little interest in re-engagement with the
West on other than his own terms and Mugabe and ZANU-PF
radicals seem inclined to run the 2005 parliamentary
elections as a referendum against Prime Minister Tony Blair,
a clear indication of the absence of any substantive campaign
theme. Others in ZANU-PF, Reserve Bank Governor Gono and even
the Armed Forces have expressed interest in reengagement
because of their frustration over their exclusion from
traditional Western cooperation. Accordingly, avoiding direct
confrontation and focusing our attention on what the GOZ must
do on election reform for positive reengagement are useful
messages for regional leaders and also for the more moderate
voices in ZANU-PF.
— HIV and AIDS remain an enormous crisis for Zimbabwe’s
present and future, aggravated by Zimbabwe’s economic crisis,
food deficit, emigration of health professionals and decline
of the health system and by Zimbabwe’s political leadership’s
diminished ability to lead the nation. Nonetheless, Zimbabwe
has some advantages in a still adequate and reasonably
dispersed health system and those talented health
professionals who do remain in country, as well as a populace
which is used to reasonably good health care and might
respond well if outside financing was available to provide
substantial treatment to HIV and AIDS victims.
— Food shortages are somewhat less than in the past several
years, but still loom as a major threat in the months ahead
to the most vulnerable Zimbabweans. Yet GOZ insistence that
Zimbabwe has produced a bumper harvest as a result of the
land redistribution program and GOZ refusal to request
assistance threatens the lives of many Zimbabweans within
several months. It is not sufficient for us to say we will
not allow hunger when we do not have the means to assist and
would likely take several months to deliver food, should the
GOZ belatedly make a request. Instead, I urge that we be
pro-active in forcing a report by UN agencies (WFP and FAO)
to the UNSC Security Council in an effort to stimulate a GOZ
request, or alternatively, identify where responsibility lies
for upcoming food shortages.
— Emigration is the under-estimated phenomenon in Zimbabwe’s
crisis in a country that had very little emigration of its
black population from 1980 until very recently. Now, however,
as many as a quarter of Zimbabwe’s population is living
outside the country, relieving somewhat the burden on
Zimbabwe’s shrinking economy and sending home remittances to
sustain their families in Zimbabwe, but also representing an
enormous millstone around Zimbabwe’s future. Sixty per cent
of accountants, 80 per cent of medical school graduates, most
experienced agronomists, many of the country’s best judges
and human rights lawyers are emigrating. How many or how few
return depends on how long the crisis persists and on a
return to positive economic and political prospects. And if
these emigrants do not return, Zimbabwe’s recovery will be
that much more difficult.
¶2. Conclusions: The above depressing picture coincides with
the national mood of depression, which in turn contrasts
sharply with the excessive optimism that most black and white
Zimbabweans exhibited several years ago. Unfortunately,
everything still seems to depend on Mugabe, and how short or
long Zimbabwe’s national crisis lasts likely depends on how
long Mugabe insists on staying in unfettered control. And how
rapid and complete a recovery can be depends on how much
longer Zimbabwe’s national crisis persists. Zimbabwe’s own
population has mostly opted to flee rather than fight;
Zimbabwe’s near neighbors appear to hold the best prospect
for avoiding indefinite prolongation of Zimbabwe’s national
agony. I urge that we engage deeply and creatively with
Southern African Governments to help find a way forward.
SULLIVAN
(24 VIEWS)
