President Robert Mugabe is reported to have allowed investigations into Emmerson Mnangagwa’s alleged corruption to go ahead but ultimately intervened to save him from substantial damning evidence, according to a cable released by Wikileaks.
The United States embassy said as a result Mnangagwa continued to be a central figure in the publicly quiet but fractious jockeying for position in the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front’s putative succession race.
The only handicap was Mnangagwa’s reputed unpopularity among party rank and file and his pivotal role in the Matabeleland massacres of the 1980s.
But he still retained considerable control over the party’s purse strings and reportedly commanded the loyalty of many in the party’s provincial hierarchies and the security apparatus.
The embassy said, however, Mnangagwa’s strength and that of all those who in the succession battle depended on Mugabe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE1790, SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT CONFIRMS ELECTORAL REFORMS,
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
290916Z Oct 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001790
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR BNEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2009
SUBJECT: SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT CONFIRMS ELECTORAL REFORMS,
PREVIEWS RULING PARTY CONGRESS
REF: (A) HARARE 1335 (B) HARARE 1157
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a courtesy call by the Ambassador on
October 26, Speaker of the Parliament and ZANU-PF Secretary
for Administration Emmerson Mnangagwa outlined modest
electoral reforms under consideration by the Parliament. He
confirmed that the GOZ intended to implement reforms in time
for the upcoming Parliamentary elections, which he confirmed
would take place in March. He recited a familiar litany of
ruling party achievements and objectives that he expected to
shape the December ZANU-PF Party Congress. His reiteration
of proposed electoral reform did not include anything that
would address the fundamental flaws in the electoral process.
His prescriptions for economic recovery hearkened back to
failed command and control policies. All in all, the ever
cordial Speaker broke little new ground and appeared to
foreshadow no substantial change in GOZ policy in the run-up
to next year’s elections. END SUMMARY.
Implementing SADC Principles: Legislate Now, Change
Constitution Later
——————————————— ————–
¶2. (C) In a parliamentary meeting room accompanied by Clerk
of the Parliament Austin Zvoma and two notetakers, Mnangagwa
reported that the current parliamentary session would wrap up
no later than three months before the conduct of
parliamentary elections. Elections would be conducted in
March, as President Mugabe had announced, although a date had
not been set. As speaker, Mnangagwa was coordinating the
passage of a host of key GOZ priority bills, including an
electoral reform bill that Mnangagwa characterized as
implementing Zimbabwe’s commitment to SADC electoral
principles.
¶3. (C) Elaborating on the election, the Speaker noted that
the Lancaster House Constitution gave the Government
authority to run elections. Nonetheless, “SADC trends” were
to move away from government-administered elections and the
GOZ had agreed to follow that trend by appointing an
“independent” electoral commission. The current composition
of Parliament would prevent the ruling party from effecting
necessary constitutional changes, but the electoral reform
bill and other government policies would satisfy electoral
principles agreed to at SADC’s Mauritius summit. If the
ruling party won at least a 2/3 majority in next year’s
elections, it would enact constitutional amendments to
solidify and fine tune the electoral changes. Among the
constitutional changes under discussion was the creation of
an upper legislative house.
¶4. (C) Mnangagwa asserted that, in addition to legislative
electoral reform, the GOZ was implementing additional
relevant measures through administrative regulations. Other
measures, such as a code of conduct worked out by the parties
and a constructive role for churches, could further improve
the electoral climate. Mnangagwa concluded that Zimbabwe
was ahead of most SADC members in implementing the electoral
principles and hoped that “the U.S. will see that we mean
well for our people.”
Party Congress to Showcase Achievements and Failures
——————————————— ——-
¶5. (C) Mnangagwa confirmed that the ZANU-PF Party Congress
would be held in Harare December 1-5. The Congress was
conducted every five years to critique the ruling party’s
performance over the past five years and to chart its course
for the next five. Previewing this year’s exercise,
Mnangagwa indicated that the party would feature land reform
and the broadening of the commercial farm base as its
principal achievement of the past five years. At the same
time, the party would debate its shortcomings and focus on
how to make the new economy more productive.
¶6. (C) Mnangagwa asserted that the GOZ’s policies to combat
HIV/AIDS, while not fully successful, were an important
achievement. Zimbabwe was the first country in Africa to
implement an “AIDS levy”, which even in this time of economic
difficulty was funding critical programs to benefit infected
and affected populations. Anti-retro virals were now being
produced and disseminated in the country and wider
distribution of nevarapine was a high priority in stemming
mother to child transmission. The Ambassador interjected
with a description of the levels and nature of extensive CDC
and USAID HIV/AIDS-related assistance in Zimbabwe.
¶7. (C) The Speaker identified high unemployment as among the
ruling party’s perceived areas of failure. However, formal
sector statistics belied the significant growth of employment
in the informal sector, where he asserted many were doing
quite well. One of the GOZ’s challenges was to reduce
nervousness about the informal sector and to position it to
contribute more meangingfully to the fiscus. Stimulating
small operators would be a priority in rehabilitating the
economy. In the mining sector, for example, large tracts
were reserved for multinational firms, such as
Anglo-American, even thought they had been unutilized for
years. The GOZ intended to open up previously reserved
dormant land for exploitation by small operators.
¶8. (C) The Speaker indicated that agriculture would remain
the nation’s principal engine of growth once confidence in
the sector was restored. Most of the sector would rest on
99-year leases, although private ownership would remain to
some extent. For government-owned leaseholds, the GOZ would
dictate crop choices and set production targets for each
province, but would leave portions of each property for
personal use.
¶9. (C) Foreign relations was another subject that would
require discussion at the Party Congress. The Party would
have to account for the deterioration of relations with the
United States, the UK, the EU, the World Bank and the IMF,
which he attributed to Western opposition to land reform and
how it was implemented. Notwithstanding existing tensions,
though, the Speaker said the Party wanted to improve the lot
of ordinary Zimbabweans and would “be delighted if old
partners were with us, not against us.”
¶10. (C) The Ambassador welcomed the Party’s apparent shift
of focus from the history of land reform to the challenge of
how to make the economy more productive. He questioned the
utility of government production targets and urged Zimbabwe
to exploit market mechanisms to unlock the land’s true
potential. The Speaker accepted the Ambassador’s offer to
share with him a book by developmental economist Hernando de
Soto on such issues. Finally, Mnangagwa expressed
appreciation for the USAID-funded State University of New
York program, which he said was making important
contributions to the growing effectiveness of the
Parliament’s committee system.
Comment
——-
¶11. (C) The Speaker’s tone and substance conveyed an
interest in better bilateral relations consistent with other
recent encounters with senior GOZ officials. Nonetheless,
there was nothing here to suggest the GOZ intends to engage
in more than superficial gestures and public relations geared
principally with SADC audiences to rehabilitate its stature.
Mnangagwa’s preview of the ruling party’s economic policy
prescriptions, with its heavy state role and atomization of
the private sector, was especially disappointing. Conjuring
up images of decades-old failed communist experiments
elsewhere, it testified to the continued priority of
political control over economic recovery within the
leadership and the dearth of meaningful strategies to
rehabilitate the once productive economy.
¶12. (C) We see no indication that Mnangagwa is any more
willing than other senior ZANU-PF officials to countenance
measures that could undermine the party’s political
dominance. However, the pragmatic political operator may be
prepared to show a more moderate face, perhaps learning
lessons from his 2000 loss to an MDC candidate for Parliament
and his loss of the party chairmanship race the same year to
John Nkomo. An NGO contact from Kwekwe reported that
Mnangagwa recently instructed local party structures that he
wanted to run a tolerant, non-violent MP election campaign
that would not alienate those inside or outside the party.
In the same vein, he has urged themes of tolerance and
non-violence in national media broadcasts. Other NGO
contacts have characterized him as “constructive” on numerous
issues in the Parliament as long as ruling party control was
not at stake. Local lawyers credit him as being the most
effective Minister of Justice the nation has seen, although
standards for that position have not been particularly high.
¶13. (C) Mnangagwa continues to be a central figure in the
publicly quiet but fractious jockeying for position in the
ruling party’s putative succession race. Handicapping his
chances are his reputed unpopularity among party rank and
file and his pivotal role in the Matabeleland massacres of
the 1980s. Nonetheless, he retains considerable control over
the party’s pursestrings and reportedly commands the loyalty
of many in the party’s provincial hierarchies (who will be
crucial in selection of a Vice-President to succeed the late
Simon Muzenda) and the security apparatus. In any event, as
with all pretenders to power here, his relative strength will
hinge for now on the will of the President. The President
reportedly allowed investigations of alleged Mnangagwa
corruption to proceed earlier this year but ultimately
intervened to save him from substantial damning evidence. If
true, such reports imply that the President may intend to
keep all pretenders off balance but in play, defending
themselves and undercutting each other while he remains above
the fray. As always, Mugabe has positioned himself to play
the ball either way: should he ultimately pick Mnangagwa as
his successor he can fireproof the Speaker against corruption
charges by claiming that the allegations have already been
investigated and dismissed as groundless.
DELL
(65 VIEWS)
