Movement for Democratic Change supporters marched twice to Harvest House to protest against the imposition of James Makore as the party’s candidate in the Zengeza by-election but they were driven away by party youths on both occasions.
Makore had been imposed by party chairman Isaac Matongo.
Party secretary-general Welshman Ncube said Matongo had failed to follow MDC procedures in verifying candidate selection but had persuaded the Zengeza membership to accept Makore.
Some 80 to 100 youths were camped at Makore’s house and 40 to 50 women were staying inside the house.
Makore said the youths provided security while the women provided further protection.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE530, HOTLY CONTESTED URBAN CONSTITUENCY UP FOR GRABS IN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000530
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
DS/OP/AF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: HOTLY CONTESTED URBAN CONSTITUENCY UP FOR GRABS IN
MARCH 27-28 PARLIAMENTARY BY-ELECTION
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer for reasons 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sporadic violence and intimidation has
characterized the campaign period in an important
parliamentary by-election to be held in Zengeza (a
high-density suburb of Harare) March 27-28. The opposition
MDC selected a candidate rumored not to be the choice of the
MDC membership in Zengeza. For the first time since the 2002
presidential elections, the Electoral Supervisory Commission
(ESC) formally accredited Harare-based diplomats to observe;
however, the accreditation did not result in full access to
campaign events. Zengeza will be a key yardstick for both
parties. ZANU-PF has loudly forecast victory but a loss in
this urban area would simply preserve the status quo and not
cost the party much. The poll is especially important to the
MDC: a loss in this constituency it won decisively in the
past would further sap party morale and magnify its decline.
END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) The Zengeza seat was left vacant by the departure of
MDC MP Tafadzwa Musekiwa, who fled to the UK in 2003 and has
applied for asylum. The contesting candidates are
Christopher Chigumba for ZANU-PF, James Makore for the MDC,
Tendai Chakanyuka for the National Alliance for Good
Governance (NAGG) and Gideon Chinogureyi of ZANU-Ndonga.
(Comment: The latter two candidates represent very small
parties that have been all but invisible during the campaign
period. End Comment.)
MDC Candidate Selection Snafu
—————————–
¶3. (C) In mid-February groups of MDC members from Zengeza
reportedly went twice to the MDC’s offices at Harvest House
in downtown Harare to protest the MDC leadership’s selection
of Makore as the party’s Zengeza candidate. MDC youths
dispersed the crowds with force on both days, resulting in
reported injuries to five MDC members. MDC Secretary General
Welshman Ncube met with representatives of the groups on
February 18. Ncube told Poloff that MDC National Party
Chairman Isaac Matongo had not properly confirmed agreement
between MDC Zengeza local officials and the MDC Zengeza
membership on candidate selection. Nevertheless, Matongo
reported back to Harvest House that the constituency had
chosen Makore. A separate inquiry from within the MDC
reportedly revealed that the constituency actually favored
Zengeza local MDC official Charlton Hwende. Ncube
acknowledged that Matongo had failed to follow MDC procedures
in verifying the candidate selection but had persuaded the
Zengeza membership representatives to accept Makore
nonetheless.
MDC Candidate Makore
——————–
¶4. (C) Emboffs conferred with MDC candidate Makore frequently
by phone and other diplomats met him on numerous occasions at
his campaign headquarters. In the final weeks of the
campaign, some 80-100 MDC youths camped in Makore’s yard,
with another 40-50 women staying inside the house itself.
Makore said the youths provided security while the women
inside provided further protection. In various conversations
with diplomats Makore said that campaigning had been
difficult especially in early March, but things had quieted
down somewhat for the last week.
ZANU-PF Candidate Chigumba
————————–
¶5. (C) Emboffs attempted repeatedly to contact and meet with
Chigumba. On separate occasions Chigumba yelled over the
phone at emboff and a UK diplomat and refused to meet or
talk. Swedish diplomats did manage to meet Chigumba briefly
by the side of the road in Zengeza. Chigumba berated the
diplomats and white people in general for their supposed
colonial intentions, and for supporting their “puppets”, the
MDC. Chigumba also criticized MDC youths for attacking
ZANU-PF members. He alleged that MDC youths attached four
ZANU-PF members, one of whom was an elderly woman who
subsequently sought medical attention.
Violence and Intimidation
————————-
¶6. (C) Makore and other MDC officials reported sporadic
violence and intimidation in the run-up to the election. The
candidate said that by March 22 ZANU-PF supporters had beaten
about thirty MDC supporters, seriously enough to need medical
attention. Makore said that they had relied on female
activists to assist with campaigning in the hope that they
would be less targeted for abuse by ZANU-PF youths and
militia members. On March 22 a Harare-based Swedish diplomat
reported interviewing a woman at the MDC’s Zengeza campaign
headquarters who had been threatened and beaten by ZANU-PF
supporters. On March 19, the same diplomat interviewed a
woman at a local torture rehabilitation center who reported
that she knew of four other women who were beaten by ZANU-PF
supporters and hospitalized on March 17.
¶7. (U) The MDC reported that on March 10 ZANU-PF youths
abducted MDC youth Enock Mukudu and stabbed him in the leg
before they demanded and Mukudu paid them Z$30,000 (about
US$7.00) for his release.
¶8. (U) The MDC reported that on March 10 about 100 ZANU-PF
youths stoned three houses belonging to members of the
opposition in Zengeza, including the house of candidate James
Makore. On March 18, a Harare-based Canadian diplomat
reported that several windows of Makore’s house were broken
and there was visible damage to roofing tiles. The MDC
reported that ZANU-PF youths also beat an unspecified number
of people in the near vicinity and stole household goods on
March 10.
¶9. (U) The MDC reported that ZANU-PF youths disrupted its
official campaign launch rally on March 7 and the party
rescheduled the rally for the following week with a request
for greater police protection. The party then held its
launch rally on March 14. About 350 MDC members attended.
Also present were twenty Zimbabwe Republic Police and
representatives from the Electoral Supervisory Commission
(ESC).
¶10. (U) On March 19, the MDC reported that ZANU-PF youth
members had been patrolling Zengeza in recent weeks and
harassing suspected MDC members, forcing people to attend
ZANU-PF meetings and rallies, preventing people from
attending MDC meetings, tearing down MDC campaign posters and
attacking MDC members who were putting up posters.
¶11. (C) Makore and other MDC members reported that soldiers
in civilian clothes had visited MDC activists’ homes in
Zengeza late at night in recent weeks. The MDC members said
that the soldiers had beaten some of them and threatened them
with unspecified consequences if they continued campaigning
for the MDC. (Comment: The MDC members were unable to
explain satisfactorily how they knew the perpetrators were
soldiers if they were in civilian clothes. End Comment.)
Vote Buying Allegations
———————–
¶12. (C) The MDC alleged that ZANU-PF activists had given
residents Z$10,000 (about US$2.33) and later shouted in the
streets that the recipients should attend upcoming rallies or
face unspecified consequences. (Comment: With party’s
resources extremely tight, we find it unlikely that ZANU-PF
would have done this on a large scale. End Comment.) The
MDC also alleged that ZANU-PF officials were confiscating
national identity cards from residents who were then ordered
to vote ZANU-PF in order to get their identity cards back on
voting day.
Accreditation / Observing
————————-
¶13. (C) In many recent by-elections the GOZ has ignored
Harare diplomats’ requests for accreditation. However, for
the Gutu-North by-election in February diplomats were invited
to observe using only their Ministry of Foreign Affairs
diplomatic identification cards. In the Zengeza election,
however, the GOZ announced that the ESC would grant
diplomats’ requests for accreditation if the requests were
forwarded through the MFA, and if diplomats paid a US$100.00
accreditation fee. Eleven diplomats from Western embassies
obtained accreditation this way, including four emboffs.
According to ESC officials, at least thirty independent
observers, mostly from local NGOs, were also
accredited–paying a much lower fee in local currency.
(Note: According to the Deputy Reserve Bank Governor, only
the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) was
authorized to charge in foreign currency. End Note.) Post
has coordinated with other missions to visit Zengeza in the
weeks before the election, and will coordinate on the voting
days to observe the voting itself.
Observing: Emboffs Chased from ZANU-PF Rally
——————————————–
¶14. (C) On March 24 two emboffs were chased away from a
ZANU-PF rally of about 300 people in Zengeza 4. As emboffs
walked along the road apart from the rally area itself, a
local ZANU-PF official approached, asked what they were doing
there and whether they had been invited. Emboffs responded
that they were there to observe the rally and showed their
ESC accreditation cards. The official inquired whether
emboffs had been invited; emboffs responded that they had
informed the ZANU-PF candidate of their interest in attending
the rally. The official asked emboffs to leave. As they
began walking back to their car, other ZANU-PF officials
approached emboffs and yelled similar comments: what interest
did the U.S. have in little Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe was not like
Iraq; emboffs needed to be accompanied by representatives of
“the Ministry”; emboffs’ accreditation cards were not valid
until voting started. To each accusation emboffs responded
that they were happy to leave. As emboffs prepared to drive
away, a ZANU-PF official threatened to beat emboffs and the
embassy driver. Emboffs departed without further incident.
¶15. (C) When emboffs first arrived at this rally, they
consulted with several ESC observers who said they had not
been informed of the rally, but were just driving by, noticed
the gathering, and stopped. The ESC representatives left
before the candidate had arrived and the rally started.
There were young men milling around unthreateningly.
(Comment: it was unclear whether these were ZANU-PF youths or
militia members. End Comment.) Almost all of the 300
attendees were wearing ZANU-PF T-shirts. The crowed was
subdued, huddled in small groups with some standing, some
sitting.
Observing: Militia Bases?
————————-
¶16. (C) The MDC reported that ZANU-PF had set up seven
militia bases in Zengeza and provided emboff with the
addresses of each one. Emboff and a British diplomat visited
a few of the sites. They observed nothing noteworthy at one
and a group of about 15-20 youths milling without apparent
purpose at another. In the vicinity of what was the reported
site of the largest base, the diplomats observed a crowd of
about 50 individuals, many wearing ZANU-PF T-shirts. Alcohol
flowed freely at what one participant described as a ZANU-PF
command center. After a polite exchange between the
diplomats and a gathering crowd of ZANU-PF supporters, a
ZANU-PF official approached the team and requested to see
their ESC accreditation cards. Emboff and the UK diplomat
complied. The individual said he was concerned for the
diplomats’ safety at the hands of MDC youths and did not want
ZANU-PF to be blamed for anything bad that might happen to
the diplomats.
¶17. (C) In the 2000 parliamentary election and the 2002
presidential poll the MDC polled about 15,000 votes in
Zengeza. In the same two elections, ZANU-PF polled about
5,400 votes.
Comment
——-
¶18. (C) The stakes are high for both parties this time
around. Zengeza and the upcoming by-election in Lupane (a
rural constituency in Matabeleland North) will be important
yardsticks for both parties to set momentum for 2005 general
elections. For ZANU-PF, a win in Zengeza would demonstrate
that the ruling party has made solid inroads into an urban
high-density area — something that it has thus far not
achieved. Despite official media predictions of a ZANU-PF
victory, the ruling party is the underdog in this fight and a
loss would likely not affect the party’s overall prospects in
the run-up to March 2005. A win for the MDC would help
arrest growing public perceptions that its popularity is on
the wane; a loss in an urban high-density area would be a
serious blow. Although the question of ZANU-PF obtaining a
two-thirds parliamentary majority before March 2005 is almost
moot, for the record, the ruling party still needs four more
seats to achieve that goal.
¶19. (C) Absent intimidation and improper manipulations, the
voting tallies from previous elections in Zengeza suggest an
easy MDC win. With the ruling party’s strong organization
and heavy-handed tactics, its motivated supporters can be
counted on to vote. The election’s outcome may turn on the
extent to which the MDC can motivate enough of its faithful
to overcome voter apathy and disillusionment, brave the risks
of harassment, and get out and vote on their principles.
SULLIVAN
(34 VIEWS)