President Robert Mugabe was skilled at managing confrontation and he was not good when it was not there, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tuliameni Kalomoh told United States embassy officials in Harare.
Kalomoh, a Namibian, said Mugabe had played on African resentment of the West and a genuine perception among Africans that the West could not tolerate the government’s redistribution of land from whites to blacks.
Africans generally regarded Zimbabwean elections as no worse than many other African elections; the contrast between the West’s rejection of Zimbabwe’s elections and its relative acceptance of others fuelled conspiracy theories.
Kalomoh also said the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the Movement for Democratic Change were not separated as much by substantive policy differences as by “too much war of words” over the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections.
He said ZANU-PF had deep antipathy toward MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai in contrast to its more positive view of MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube.
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Viewing cable 04HARARE1360, UN VISITOR TESTS WATERS
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001360
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2009
SUBJECT: UN VISITOR TESTS WATERS
REF: (A) HARARE 1335 (B) HARARE 1313 (C) HARARE 1250
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting at the Embassy August 6, United
Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs
Tuliameni Kalomoh solicited the Ambassador’s assessment of
the Zimbabwean political and humanitarian situations. He
advised that his five-day visit to Zimbabwe was “private” but
that he had met with leaders from the ruling and opposition
parties and would report back to Secretary-General Annan, who
was following Zimbabwe closely. Kalomoh commented on the
ruling party leadership’s hostility to the United States, and
inquired what steps might be taken by either side to lower
temperatures. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (SBU) The Assistant Secretary-General, a Namibian
national, was in Zimbabwe August 2-7. He did not request a
meeting with the Ambassador (he said he thought the
Ambassador had left post), and the Embassy only became aware
of his visit through other diplomats. We understand that he
met separately with Swedish and Norwegian ambassadors, ruling
party officials (NFI), selected representatives of civil
society, and MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai. His visit was
ignored by the state media but noted in the independent
Financial Gazette (owned by Reserve Bank Governor Gono) in a
front page article, “UN Spying on Zim.” Kalomoh reportedly
was hosted by the Center for Peace Initiatives in Africa,
whose director, Leonard Kapungu, is a retired UN official and
Zimbabwean national. During the meeting with the Ambassador,
Kalomoh was accompanied by Kapungu but no UN officials.
UN Posture
———-
¶3. (C) Kalomoh said that Secretary-General Annan was
concerned that, while Zimbabwe was not in conflict, its
political crisis lacked resolution. The Secretary-General’s
hope was for the creation of an environment for free and fair
elections in 2005 that would effectively put the 2000
parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections behind the
country. The UN was interested in fostering dialogue between
the two parties and civil society, and was encouraged by
proposed electoral reforms and prospects for the
establishment of a truly independent election commission with
real authority. The UN was not in a position to observe
Zimbabwean elections but could help to coordinate observers
and offer technical assistance. The GOZ, however, still
maintained that it had sufficient resources to conduct its
election without assistance. Kalomoh noted that ruling party
elements differed in their views of the UN; some regarded it
as a lackey of the British and Americans but others appeared
willing to engage meaningfully.
Polarization and Elections
————————–
¶4. (C) Kalomoh remarked on the leading parties’ starkly
different perceptions regarding upcoming elections. To the
ruling party, the election climate was fine; it looked
forward to elections in March or at the latest June following
the implementation of proposed election reforms. The
opposition had nothing good to say about the election
climate; its principal objections to election reforms were
that they didn’t go far enough and the opposition had not
been sufficiently consulted.
¶5. (C) Kalomoh asserted that the parties were not separated
as much by substantive policy differences as by “too much war
of words” over the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential
elections. He noted deep ruling party antipathy toward MDC
leader Morgan Tsvangirai in contrast to its more positive
view of MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube; he inquired
about the relationship between the two. He said he had
discussed concerns over the treason trial with the parties
and with civil society; many thought Tsvangirai would be
convicted but ruling party interlocutors gave the impression
that he would not be executed. He recognized that the
upcoming parliamentary elections and the ZANU-PF succession
issue complicated political posturing within each party and
between them. Kalamoh asserted that the fact that each side
seemed to believe that it would win a free and fair election
offered some hope that they could come together on the terms
of a free and fair election. He reported that the GOZ
planned to conduct a by-election in September for the Seke
seat vacated by MDC MP Ben Tumbare-Mutasa’s death last month.
(Comment: Electoral Supervisory Commission officials told
poloff they were unaware of plans to conduct the by-election,
which we understand would not be required legally given the
imminence of scheduled parliamentary elections. End comment.)
Mugabe, Africa, and the United States
————————————-
¶6. (C) According to Kalomoh, the ruling party did not speak
with one voice but was unanimous on its view of the United
States, the UK, and the EU as being out to dictate Zimbabwean
policy and to impinge on Zimbabwean sovereignty. Ruling
party officials had been adamant that the parliamentary
elections would involve observers from SADC and African
countries but none from the United States, Canada or EU
member states.
¶7. (C) Kalamoh noted Mugabe’s skill at managing
confrontation — “he’s not so good when it’s not there.” In
this instance, Mugabe had played on African resentment of the
West and a genuine perception among Africans that the West
could not tolerate the GOZ’s redistribution of land from
whites to blacks. Kalamoh said Africans generally regarded
Zimbabwean elections as no worse than many other African
elections; the contrast between the West’s rejection of
Zimbabwe’s elections and its relative acceptance of others
fueled conspiracy theories. In that vein, he expressed
personal bitterness over the West’s reliance on Commonwealth
assessments of Zimbabwean elections in 2002 in complete
disregard of SADC observation reports with which he had been
involved. In any event, Africans perceived that the United
States had been enlisted by the UK to support its effort
reverse land reform and believed that the two western powers
should “make the first move”.
¶8. (C) Kalomoh asked about interactions between the USG and
State House, and whether the Ambassador would be paying a
farewell courtesy call on the President. He inquired about
USG views of proposed electoral reforms and whether some
positive note could be taken of the reform efforts. If not
now, how far would the GOZ have to go? Under what
circumstances could any of the targeted sanctions be removed?
Doubts on Food
————–
¶9. (C) Noting that he also had talked to offices involved in
the food situation here, Kalomoh expressed concern about GOZ
crop forecasts. He said that UN agencies and others had
concluded that GOZ forecasts were significantly
underestimated.
GOZ and USG Distance
——————–
¶10. (C) The Ambassador advised Kalomoh that he had submitted
a pro forma request for customary departure courtesies,
including a call on the President, but had yet to receive a
response. (Comment: The British Embassy received no response
to a similar submission prior to the recent departure of its
Ambassador; in blaring front page headlines, the state media
then blasted his “slinking out” without observing diplomatic
etiquette. End comment.) He recounted his meeting
periodically with the MFA PermSec and selected members of the
Cabinet, but indicated that the GOZ and ruling party had
shown little interest in engaging. The USG had issued
balanced statements on elections and repeatedly voiced
support for lawful and non-violent land reform, but any
positive or encouraging tenor in USG pronouncements had been
ignored. On the contrary, the state media appeared to seize
and to exaggerate every possible issue to drive a deeper
wedge in bilateral relations.
¶11. (C) The Ambassador stressed the great importance attached
by the USG to progress on the rule of law, cessation of
political violence, and the conduct of free and fair election
as a means to move the country in the right direction. He
emphasized the potential significance of the treason trial
outcome: a guilty verdict based on the flimsy evidence
presented would erase the last vestige of judicial integrity
in the country and cast a pall over prospects for meaningful
political reconciliation. The Ambassador also noted
bipartisan Congressional support for the USG position on
Zimbabwe. Americans of all political stripes were concerned
about the situation in Zimbabwe not because “white land” had
been taken, but because of the violence, abuse of human
rights and attacks on the independence of the media and
judiciary that had occurred. In conclusion, the Ambassador
expressed concern that the proposed NGO bill (ref C) would
further shrink democratic space in the country and outweigh
any putative benefits of election reform.
Comment
——-
¶12. (C) The ruling party generally has been suspicious of
the UN, as evidenced by its disinvitation of a UN election
assessment team in mid-visit last March and official media
castigation of selected UN employees for disseminating “bad
information” on Zimbabwe. The state media’s non-coverage of
Kalomoh’s visit was uncharacterisic in that regard, and may
reflect divisions or uncertainty in the leadership about the
means and ends of marketing electoral reforms
internationally. Some of Kalomoh’s inquiries implied
interest in tying benchmarks of political progress to
international re-engagement, echoing an effort by the bishops
troika to elicit benchmarks from us to entice the ruling
party into inter-party dialogue last year. We were impressed
with Kalomoh’s familiarity with the issues and believe that
UN interest can be constructive, especially to the extent it
connects election fairness to legitimacy in the eyes of
domestic and regional players.
SULLIVAN
(16 VIEWS)
