The United States embassy said President Robert Mugabe has chosen Joyce Mujuru as vice-President in 2004 making her heir apparent and dumping Emmerson Mnangagwa who had been for years seen as his likely successor.
In a briefing for a visiting ambassador the embassy said through Mugabe was widely expected to step down in 2008, the pace of transition was not yet clear.
Mnangagwa’s supporters had, however, not yet reconciled to Mujuru’s ascendancy and several of his supporters had left the ruling party and were talking about a third force.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE1115, SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR HALL,S VISIT TO
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050959Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001115
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, AF A/S NEWMAN/DAS WOODS; NSC FOR
ABRAMS, COURVILLE, USAID FOR NATSIOS, PIERSON
DEPARTMENT PASS EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2015
TAGS: ECON EAID PREL PGOV PHUM OVIP ZI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR HALL,S VISIT TO
ZIMBABWE
Classified By: CDA Eric Schultz, reason 1.4 (b) (d)
——–
Overview
——–
¶1. (SBU) The US Mission in Harare, Zimbabwe welcomes your
August 9-13 visit. You are coming at a critical time in
Zimbabwe,s independent history. Once the breadbasket of
Southern Africa the country is now a basket case. The
political, economic, and humanitarian crises that have
gripped the country the last six years have all intensified
in 2005 and are threatening to spin out of control,
especially the latter two.
¶2. (C) Bilateral relations remain strained by the Mugabe
regime,s repressive policies. U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe
remains to isolate the regime. On Wednesday of this week we
announced new financial sanctions. Tougher travel
restrictions are also in the works. While we have sought to
isolate the government we have simultaneously sought to
assist the Zimbabwean people in their time of need. The U.S.
has been the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to
Zimbabwe over the past six years. We have been particularly
generous with respect to food and HIV/AIDs assistance.
¶3. (SBU) We would like you to focus your visit on the
alarming food situation in the country and on the aftermath
of Operation Restore Order, the GOZ,s latest act of
repression. In the words of Secretary Rice, it is an
&outpost of evil8 as the operation, which destroyed the
homes and livelihoods of 700,000 people, made manifest. Our
goals for your visit are to convince the GOZ to be more
transparent about its needs and plans for addressing the
country,s massive food shortage and to make clear to the
Zimbabwean people and the world at large that if asked we are
ready to provide food assistance.
¶4. (C) The GOZ is an extremely difficult government to work
with. They have publicly blamed Western sanctions for their
economic difficulties and have attributed those sanctions to
Western ire over the seizure of land from white farmers.
Along with the UK, we are their favorite targets. The
government has muzzled most of the country,s independent
press and the local media playing field is heavily tilted in
the GOZ,s favor. For that reason, we recommend that you
hold your press conference in Johannesburg after your visit
and limit your press exposure while in Zimbabwe.
——————-
Humanitarian Crisis
——————-
¶5. (SBU) Zimbabwe has faced growing food insecurity over the
last few years due principally to the disruptive effects of
its fast-track land reform program. Drought and government
overregulation and mismanagement of the economy have also
been factors. Maize (corn) is the staple crop and the
harvest this year will likely be one of the worst since
independence. Reliable estimates put it at 400,000 metric
tons (MTS), a fourth of the country,s food needs. The
government has acknowledged that it needs to import 1.2
million MTs of maize to meet the country,s needs. The GOZ
has told the World Food Program and us that while they will
accept food assistance, they have the situation in hand and
will not ask for it. The GOZ claims that they have
contracted with South African suppliers for the delivery of
all of the needed maize at favorable prices. Imports did
increase in May and June to around 100,000 MTs, but have
since fallen off and there remain major questions about the
government,s ability to import all of the needed food.
¶6. (SBU) The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee
estimates that nearly 3 million of the country,s 11.6
million people will be food insecure by the end of the year,
but independent experts believe the true number of food
insecure people will be much larger, possibly as many as 6
million people. WFP is concerned at the pace of donor
contributions. They acknowledge that greater transparency on
the part of the GOZ would be a spur to donations and have
encouraged such transparency but to little effect. In the
absence of GOZ cooperation, WFP has reworked its regional
food appeal to include an additional 300,000 MTs of food aid
for Zimbabwe.
¶7. (SBU) The humanitarian crisis has been exacerbated by
&Operation Murambatsvina,8 or &Restore Order8, which made
hundreds of thousands homeless in Zimbabwe,s coldest months
of the year without access to food, water, sanitation, health
care or education. The UN Special Envoy, Anna Tibaijuka,
found that it was carried out in an indiscriminate and
unjustified manner with indifference to human suffering and
without regard for local and international law. The result
of the Government of Zimbabwe,s actions is an enormous,
man-made humanitarian tragedy. The International Office for
Migration (IOM) estimates that 40,000 households
(approximately 200,000 people) require urgent humanitarian
assistance. Approximately half of these 40,000 households
(20,000) are living out in the open and need temporary
shelter. Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence
rates in the world, with a prevalence rate of 24.6% among the
adult population, and many of the operation,s victims are
part of the country,s most vulnerable groups, including the
HIV positive. The US has contributed nearly $2 million
dollars to assist these victims, mostly provided through IOM.
——————-
Political Situation
——————-
¶8. (C) In December, 2004 President Mugabe chose Joyce Mujuru,
the wife of the former commander of Zimbabwe,s Defense
Forces to be one of his two Vice Presidents and his heir
apparent. In doing so, the 82-year old Mugabe set in motion
the transition to the country,s post-Mugabe future. The
pace of that transition is not yet clear, but it is widely
expected that Mugabe will step down as President by 2008,
when the next elections are to be held. Mugabe chose Joyce
Mujuru over the man who had been seen for many years as his
likely successor, former Speaker of Parliament Emmerson
Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa,s supporters are not yet reconciled to
the Mujuru,s ascendancy. Several prominent supporters have
recently left the ruling ZANU-PF party and have talked about
creating a &third force8 in Zimbabwean politics.
¶9. (C) Beyond personal ambition, ethnic politics will play a
key role in the succession struggle. The Mujurus, like
Mugabe, come from the Zezerou, a sub-set of the county,s
majority Shona. Mugabe and the Zezerou have dominated
ZANU-PF and the country,s political life since independence
through an elaborate patronage system that is deteriorating
with economic decline, as well as through violence and
repression. Mnangagwa is an ethnic Karanga, like the Zezerou
a part of the country,s majority Shona population. The
Karanga are restive at the prospect of continued Zezerou
predominance, as is the third major part of the Shona, the
Manicas, who predominate in the Eastern Highlands you will
visit. The country,s other major ethnic group, the Ndebele,
comprise roughly a third of the population and are
concentrated in the country,s southwest. The government
suppressed the Ndebele in the 1980s and killed tens of
thousands of civilians in the process. The Ndebele are now
the most reliable bloc of opposition voters.
¶10. (C) The other key political event of the past six months
was the March 2005 parliamentary elections. Notwithstanding
the sharp divisions within ZANU-PF, the ruling party
significantly strengthened its position, taking 78 out of 120
elected seats (another thirty are appointed by the president
giving ZANU-PF the two-thirds majority needed to amend the
constitution at will). In the absence of international
observers, the Embassy mounted a major observation effort in
conjunction with like-minded nations. As a result of our
direct observations we condemned the elections. Not only did
the government heavily tilt the playing field but it also
appears to have rigged the results in a number of
constituencies and has ignored requests to release the
polling data. The country,s democratic forces, including
especially the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC), have not recovered from the March electoral defeat,
and have remained unable to coordinate their activities or
demonstrate leadership to Zimbabwe,s disaffected masses.
¶11. (C) Following the parliamentary elections, with its
two-thirds majority secure, many observers expected the GOZ
to moderate its policies and reach out to the international
community. Instead, the GOZ has continued to employ
repressive tactics against the country,s democratic forces,
including restricting the independent media and harassing
those non-government organizations (NGOs) pushing for greater
democratic space. The GOZ also launched Operation Restore
Order, which though it appears to have strengthened their
hold on the country has cost them support both
internationally and regionally. In particular, Tibaijuka,s
report, written by an African at the behest of an African UN
Secretary General has put added pressure on South African
SIPDIS
President Mbeki and other regional leaders to reign-in
Mugabe.
——————
Economic Situation
——————
¶12. (SBU) Economically, Zimbabwe is rapidly melting down.
The IMF team that came in May 2005 to conduct an Article IV
inspection predicted that GDP would drop by 7 percent, a
seventh consecutive year of decline while sub-Saharan Africa
as a whole has recorded an average gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate of 3.4% over that time span. The IMF also
estimated the GOZ,s budget deficit at 14.5 percent and
predicted inflation would top 300 percent this year. Worse,
the IMF team said the government appeared unconcerned about
his state of affairs and unwilling to consider policy changes
to improve the country,s economic outlook.
¶13. (SBU) Three interlinked shortages have contributed to the
sense that the economy is in freefall: food, fuel, and
foreign exchange. We discussed the food situation above.
The fuel crisis is equally dire. The country has literally
been bereft of fuel for months. The price on the black
market is up to z$80,000 a liter, eight times the official
price (roughly U.S. $10 a gallon) and even at that price is
almost impossible to find. Economic activity is grinding to
a halt as a result of the fuel shortages. The country is not
only desperately short of food and fuel it also lacks the
foreign exchange needed to buy them. The IMF estimated
effective reserves at zero. With no access to balance of
payments support, the country is caught in a vicious circle
of declining exports leading to less foreign exchange leading
to further declines in exports.
¶14. (SBU) The GOZ has sought external support as a way out of
its self-created crisis. Mugabe returned essentially empty
handed from his recent visit to China, putting even greater
emphasis on the negotiations with the South Africans for a
bridge loan. The SAG has agreed to the loan, which must
still be debated and approved by the South African
Parliament, but is reportedly considering placing economic
and political conditions on the loan, which would mark a
major departure in SAG-GOZ relations.
———-
Conclusion
———-
¶15. (C) The turn to repression symbolized by Operation
Restore Order has cost the regime support internationally,
regionally, and domestically. The Europeans have stiffened
their resolve and even the region may finally have had enough
if recent signals from South Africa are to be believed. ZANU
itself is riven with dissension, exacerbated by the
succession struggle and the decline of patronage, waiting
only for Mugabe,s passing or incapacitation to burst forth.
For its part, the MDC bides its time, convinced that the
regime will implode and that it will pick up the pieces. The
country,s future remains unpredictable but one thing seems
clear after this winter, the restoration of democracy and
prosperity in Zimbabwe will be more difficult, especially as
what remains of the educated populace appears increasingly
ready to throw in the towel and emigrate. The remainder of
the population, psychologically scarred but unable to leave,
is hunkering down and trying to survive what could be a very
bad next few years.
SCHULTZ
(14 VIEWS)
