The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front was in a slow, irreversible decline. It had no ideas and no programme other than to proclaim its liberation credentials. But President Robert Mugabe was the glue that held the party together.
This was the view of the United States embassy in the run-up to the party’s 2009 congress.
It said ZANU-PF was old and there were significant fissures as evidenced by the ongoing struggle between former army commander Solomon Mujuru and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa.
“With no ideas and no program, other than to proclaim its liberation credentials as the anti-MDC, it is increasingly unpopular.
“But in the face of the challenge by MDC, and perceived efforts at regime change by the West, we can expect that for the time being it will unite behind Mugabe to maintain power.
´Mugabe is the glue that holds the party together. The death knell of the party may await his death and/or that of the other dinosaurs at the helm,” the embassy said in a cable released by Wikileaks.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 09HARARE946, MUGABE AND ZANU-PF MAINTAIN POWER
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO0259
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0946/01 3421019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081019Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5191
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 3193
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 3302
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1729
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2563
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 2932
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3350
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 5798
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 000946
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B.WALCH
DRL FOR N. WILETT
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
NSC FOR M. GAVIN
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR J. HARMON AND L. DOBBINS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2019
SUBJECT: MUGABE AND ZANU-PF MAINTAIN POWER
Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ray for reason 1.4 (d).
——-
SUMMARY
——-
¶1. (C) President Robert Mugabe, in advance of the ZANU-PF
Congress set to begin on December 8, has consolidated his
position within ZANU-PF and will continue to rule with the
support of the military leadership. The Congress will likely
confirm decisions already made by the party. ZANU-PF in turn
is focused on maintaining power. While it will undoubtedly
make concessions in the ongoing South African-directed SADC
mediation on the Global Political Agreement (GPA), unless
SADC and MDC-T factions are able to address the current
paradigm of a ZANU-PF-military alliance, fundamental reform
will not be achieved. MDC-T recognizes that continued
presence of securocrats within the military, police, and
intelligence structures is the primary impediment to change,
but is unable to engage them. Further, MDC-T lacks strategic
vision and is focused more on elections, which it feels it
can win because of the popularity of Tsvangirai and the MDC
party, than on achieving real reform. It now appears that
elections will take place in 2012 or 2013. The results will
probably depend on whether institutions develop to check
ZANU-PF intimidation and violence and to permit a relatively
fair election, or whether ZANU-PF will be able to use the
same tactics as in June 2008 to gain victory. END SUMMARY.
—————————-
Mugabe and the Zezuru Factor
—————————-
¶2. (SBU) The Shona, concentrated in Mashonaland, constitute
about 80 percent of the Zimbabwean population and the
Ndebele, centered in Matabeleland, 17 percent. Within the
Shona, the three main subgroups are the Zezuru, the Karanga,
and the Manyica. Mugabe is a Zezuru, and since independence
in 1980 the Zezuru have been the dominant ethnic group in
Zimbabwe. With the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987,
Mugabe, who had been prime minister, became president, and
two vice presidents were selected: Joshua Nkomo, an Ndebele,
and Simon Muzenda, a Karanga. Under the Accord, there was an
understanding that one vice president would be Ndebele.
Nkomo died in 1999 and was replaced by Joseph Msika, also an
Ndebele. Muzenda died in 2003. In what became known as the
Tscholotsho incident, Emmerson Mnangagwa, a Karanga,
attempted to succeed Muzenda. Msika was elderly and
Mnangagwa and his backers, including Jonathan Moyo, schemed
that Mnangagwa, after becoming vice president, would become
first vice president after Msika’s death and would be first
in line to succeed Mugabe. Mugabe instead selected Joice
Mujuru, a Zezuru.
¶3. (SBU) The support of a majority of Zimbabwe’s 10
provinces is required for election to ZANU-PF positions.
With the death of Msika earlier this year, and in
anticipation of the Congress, Mnangagwa formulate a slate for
the presidium, ZANU-PF’s highest organ: Mugabe, First
Secretary (National President), Oppah Muchinguri, and John
Nkomo (now ZANU-PF Chair), Second Secretaries (National Vice
Presidents), and Kembo Mohadi (now co-Minister of Home
Affairs) as ZANU-PF Chair. Nkomo, an Ndebele, and Mohadi, a
QAffairs) as ZANU-PF Chair. Nkomo, an Ndebele, and Mohadi, a
Venda allied with the Ndebele, would satisfy the ethnic
proportion required by the Unity Accord. Mnangagwa’s goal
was to displace Mujuru. The nominations of Nkomo and Mohadi
from Matabeleland in Mnangagwa’s plan would secure the
support of three provinces: Matabeleland North, Matabeleland
South, and Bulawayo; Muchinguri, a Manyika, would get the
support of Manicaland; and Mnangagwa would bring along the
Karanga-dominated provinces of Midlands and Masvingo.
Mnangagwa’s plan did not play out. Didymus Mutasa, a Manyika
from Manicaland, put himself forward for ZANU-PF Chair with
the support of Manicaland and Mashonaland Central and
Muchinguri lost Manicaland support. Mujuru ultimately
emerged with the support of at least nine provinces. Mohadi
HARARE 00000946 002 OF 006
failed to develop support, and Simon Kaya Moyo, currently
Ambassador to South Africa, won the support of a sufficient
number of provinces as party Chair. Moyo and his backers
argued that under the Unity Accord, the position of party
chair, as with one vice president position, should be filled
by an Ndebele.
¶4. (C) The ZANU-PF Politburo met on December 7 in advance of
the Congress. With the support of Mugabe, Mutasa argued that
the Unity Accord did not apply to the position of national
chair. Mugabe backed Mutasa, a longtime colleague, and the
Mujuru faction supported Moyo. The Mujurus prevailed and the
Politburo endorsed Mugabe, Joice Mujuru, John Nkomo, and
Moyo.
¶5. (SBU) The ZANU-PF Congress will rubber stamp the above
decisions made by the provinces and the Politburo, and the
ZANU-PF presidium will consist of Zezurus Mugabe and Joice
Mujuru and Ndebeles Nkomo and Moyo. Ndebele officials have
little backing within their constituencies — they come from
Matabeleland where ZANU-PF is generally reviled because of
the Gukurahundi massacres of the 1980s — and Nkomo and Moyo
can be counted on to do Mugabe’s bidding. In addition to
Mugabe and Mujuru, almost all of the top ZANU-PF party
positions are held by Zezuru. Almost all the top securocrats
are Zezuru: Chief of Defense Forces Constantine Chiwenga,
Air Force Commander Perrance Shiri, CIO Director Happyton
Bonyongwe, Commissioner of Police Augustine Chihuri, and
Prison Services Commissioner Paradzai Zimondi. The Zezurus
are now in undisputed control of ZANU-PF — Mnangagwa and the
Karangas have been badly beaten — but the fight between
Mugabe and the Mujurus over Mutasa has demonstrated Mugabe
does not have total control.
——————
ZANU-PF Succession
——————
¶6. (C) Conventional analysis posits that there are two
principal factions within ZANU-PF, Mujuru and Mnangagwa, and
that the dominant faction is likely to provide the successor
to Mugabe. Over the years, as Mugabe has manipulated party
politics, the fortunes of one have risen with the decline of
the other. For now, the Mujuru faction is in the ascendancy.
But it appears unlikely that either Mujuru or Mnangagwa will
eventually become president. ZANU-PF, according to most
analysts, is not ready to accept a woman as president. And
Mugabe has made clear by his actions that his successor will
be a Zezuru.
¶7. (C) Mugabe in 2006 promised he would step down as
president in 2008. He now appears determined to die in
office and it is unlikely that at the Congress he will
provide any clues to succession. Determining a successor to
Mugabe is therefore speculative. Two possible candidates are
Chiwenga and Sydney Sekeramayi. The military plays an
important role in Zimbabwean politics and it would be logical
that Chiwenga help perpetuate this role, albeit in a civilian
capacity, by succeeding Mugabe. A major handicap would be
his legacy of violence. Sekeramayi has a close relationship
to the military; he was Minister of Defense for a number of
years and is now Minister of State for National Security in
Qyears and is now Minister of State for National Security in
the President’s office. He is also close to General Solomon
Mujuru, the power behind the Mujuru faction.
—————–
Maintaining Power
—————–
¶8. (C) Despite the GPA, which provides for a National
Security Council (NSC) to oversee military and security
matters, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) continues to meet
and support Mugabe; the NSC has met only once. (NOTE: The
JOC consists of the service chiefs, Mnangagwa as Minister of
Defense, and reportedly Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor
Gideon Gono. A legacy of the Rhodesian government, it is
HARARE 00000946 003 OF 006
responsible for security and recently has played a policy
role. In 2008 it coordinated election violence and
intimidation. END NOTE.) ZANU-PF has maintained its
structures throughout Zimbabwe and we continue to receive
reports of intimidation and occasional violence, particularly
in Mashonaland. There are reportedly about 20,000 youths on
the civil service rolls who are performing no jobs; their
activities are coordinated by ZANU-PF officials and national
and local military officials. Additionally, there are
thousands of youths in resettled areas. Without jobs and
educational opportunity, they are subject to manipulation by
ZANU-PF.
¶9. (C) ZANU-PF is old and there are significant fissures, as
evidenced by the ongoing struggle between Mujuru and
Mnangagwa. It appears to be in a slow, irreversible decline.
With no ideas and no program, other than to proclaim its
liberation credentials as the anti-MDC, it is increasingly
unpopular. But in the face of the challenge by MDC, and
perceived efforts at regime change by the West, we can expect
that for the time being it will unite behind Mugabe to
maintain power. Mugabe is the glue that holds the party
together. The death knell of the party may await his death
and/or that of the other dinosaurs at the helm.
¶10. (C) ZANU-PF has been weakened by dollarization and the
sidelining of Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono’s
printing press. In the past, for example, in financing
Congresses or Conferences, the party would determine the cost
and Gono would print the money. A ZANU-PF member in charge
of raising money for the Congress told us that the party’s
goal was to raise US$3 million to support the attendance of
10,000 people. In the run-up to the Congress, the party had
raised about US$900,000, much of it from ZANU-PF allies such
as Billy Rautenbach, John Bredenkamp, and Nicholas Van
Hoogstraten. Provincial party branches were contributing
little and the party was considering scaling back the number
of attendees.
¶11. (C) To finance itself and party insiders, ZANU-PF has
been looking for new revenue streams. The Marange diamond
fields appear to have the most potential. The Mining
Development Corporation of Zimbabwe has entered into deals
with companies to exploit Marange, but it appears a cabal of
Gono and military officials is siphoning off substantial
profits. The press continues to carry occasional reports of
Chinese investment, but this appears to be wishful thinking.
An adequate source of revenue is critical for ZANU-PF to
perpetuate itself by keeping insiders happy, financing its
repressive machinery, and financing its electoral machinery.
The party’s concern about finances has probably caused Mugabe
and Gono to talk about bringing back the Zimbabwe dollar.
(NOTE: Biti has been adamant that he will not allow the
Zimbabwe dollar to return; nevertheless, rumors persist — to
the detriment of investment. END NOTE.)
————————–
The Future of the Military
————————–
¶12. (C) The military leadership is the fundamental
impediment to meaningful political reform. Leaders
Qimpediment to meaningful political reform. Leaders
understand that political change would likely result in loss
of their positions. In March 2008, Mugabe was reportedly
ready to retire after a humiliating loss. Chiwenga and
others, concerned for their own hides, convinced him to fight
on; and then orchestrated the reign of violence that resulted
in Mugabe’s “reelection” in June. Similarly, they oppose
full compliance with the GPA, since that could lead to fair
elections and the concomitant defeat of ZANU-PF. Their
obvious concern is that, stripped of the protection of
ZANU-PF, they would be subject to prosecution for a variety
of offenses ranging from crimes against humanity, to human
rights violations, to common crimes.
¶13. (C) Prime Minister and MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai
HARARE 00000946 004 OF 006
realizes the importance of the military problem. He and
others in his party have discussed the possibility of a
buy-out and amnesty. (NOTE: While there are those who
believe the benefits of removing the military from service
would be worth almost any cost, including immunity, many
Zimbabweans who remember well Gukurahundi and other
atrocities would certainly oppose any deal. END NOTE.)
Chiwenga and others consider themselves liberation heroes,
and look down upon Tsvangirai for not having participated in
the struggle. MDC-T does not have a representative and
interlocutor that can talk to Chiwenga and his military
colleagues about making the NSC a functioning body and about
such issues as amnesty.
¶14. (C) For now, top military leaders, particularly
Chiwenga, exist in a symbiotic relationship with Mugabe.
They need him in order to maintain their positions and have
the protection of the party. He needs them in order to
intimidate and threaten would-be challengers, and to
perpetuate the climate of fear which has enabled him to rule
seemingly in perpetuity. The military and party may
gradually meld together. There are rumors that Chiwenga is
interested in becoming ZANU-PF Commissar in Charge of
Elections, as a prelude to becoming president. 20 generals
and colonels are in a three-year program at the University of
Zimbabwe to obtain a B.A. in international relations, and 12
generals, including Chiwenga, are in a one-year international
relations masters program.
¶15. (C) The military has a tradition of internal discipline
and adherence to the hierarchy. But below top military
leadership, the military reflects the ethnic divisions and
rivalries that exist in ZANU-PF. For example, there is
resentment on the part of higher-level Karanga officers that
their advancement has been stymied by the Zezuru top echelon.
Younger officers without liberation credentials, regardless
of their ethnicity, are likewise held back by a promotion
ceiling, imposed by ageing veterans of the independence
struggle who do not trust the younger generation and have no
plans for the future. There are recurring reports of
dissatisfaction over pay and conditions; and desertions are
reportedly on the rise. So far, however, military leadership
has kept the lid on, and there is no expectation the military
will soon fracture.
——————
The SADC Mediation
——————
¶16. (SBU) Zuma’s new mediation team of Mac Maharaj, Charles
Nqakula, and Lindiwe Zulu visited Harare last week and met
with the GPA principals (Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Arthur
Mutambara) and with the negotiators of the three parties.
The South Africans reportedly listened, but did not resolve
the outstanding issues. They returned to Harare this week
and will report to South African President Zuma on progress.
He in turn will report to President Guebuza of Mozambique who
heads the SADC Troika. SADC and the parties have obviously
missed the goal set at the Troika Summit in Maputo on
November 5 of resolving issues within 30 days. With the
ZANU-PF Congress taking place this week, Mugabe and
QZANU-PF Congress taking place this week, Mugabe and
Tsvangirai traveling to Copenhagen next week for the United
Nations Climate Change Conference, and the Festive Season, it
is likely negotiations will go into next year.
¶17. (SBU) The main issues for the MDC continue to be the
appointment of MDC governors, the replacement of Gono and
Attorney General Johannes Tomana, and the swearing-in of Roy
Bennett as Deputy Minister of Agriculture. (NOTE: Bennett’s
treason trial will resume in January. END NOTE.) ZANU-PF
has put forth the issues of sanctions and pirate radio
stations (stations such as SW Radio and Studio 7 which
broadcast from outside of Zimbabwe). A host of other GPA
issues have apparently been raised, and we anticipate the
South Africans will try to focus on core disputes.
HARARE 00000946 005 OF 006
¶18. (C) There is a sense in Harare that Zuma and his team
bring more intensity and resolve to the SADC mediation than
did the former facilitator, Thabo Mbeki. We expect that
Mugabe will make some concessions, perhaps in exchange for an
agreement by Tsvangirai that he will ask the West to review
and/or lift some sanction, e.g. on parastatals and banks.
The commissions — Media Commission (which would license
newspapers), Electoral Commission, Human Rights Commission,
and Anti-Corruption Commission — may be established. Mugabe
may agree to appoint MDC provincial governors. But even with
some ZANU-PF concessions on GPA issues, Mugabe and the
military will continue to hold the balance of power. The
Zimbabwean question is not political, but political/military,
and unless the MDC and SADC focus on ZANU-PF and the
military, the fundamental paradigm of power will not change.
————————
MDC Focused on Elections
————————
¶19. (C) MDC-T and Tsvangirai enjoy immensely greater
popularity than Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Zimbabweans give
Tsvangirai credit for peace and stability — especially
compared to last year — that the country enjoys, as well as
improvement in the economic situation. Tsvangirai and the
MDC are confident they would win a relatively fair election
— and getting to an election is the focus of their efforts.
They are willing to tolerate the bumps in the road —
intimidation, violence (at a much lower level than a year
ago), and selective prosecutions. In their view, this is all
part of the process of reaching elections.
¶20. (C) But, apart from elections, MDC-T seems to lack a
strategic vision. It is not focused on building institutions
and forming alliances that would help ensure victory in an
election. Civil society complains that MDC-T has not reached
out to it. Zuma and SADC were reportedly upset that they
learned about MDC-T’s temporary “disengagement” from the
transitional government from the newspapers and not from
Tsvangirai.
¶21. (C) Part of MDC-T’s problem is that much of the party
leadership is in government. Tendai Biti, for example, is
the party’s Secretary General and should be responsible for
coordinating strategy. But he is preoccupied by his job as
Minister of Finance and the party’s Secretariat is weak.
Relatedly, the Office of the Prime Minister lacks a strong
Chief of Staff, and there is a lack of coordination among
ministries. While in this divided government, it is not
surprising that Tsvangirai, as Prime Minister, does not have
control over ZANU-PF-led ministries, there is nevertheless a
marked absence of coordination between MDC-led ministries.
————
The End Game
————
¶22. (C) The GPA contemplated an 18-month process for the
drafting of a new constitution, followed by a referendum, and
then elections. More and more, the parties are talking about
an elongated transitional period which could result in
elections in 2013 as required by the current constitution.
ZANU-PF knows it would lose an early election unless it
resorted to violence; it wants to try to heal internal
Qresorted to violence; it wants to try to heal internal
divisions and rebuild. MDC-T is becoming comfortable in
government. Its parliamentarians are enjoying the
perquisites of office and don’t want to contest elections
sooner than necessary. MDC-T supporters have fresh memories
of the 2008 election-related violence and are enjoying
relative peace and stability, as well as improved economic
conditions. They also do not desire early elections.
Finally, MDC-M office holders know that they will probably be
defeated in elections. In particular, ministers such as
Arthur Mutambara, Welshman Ncube, and Priscilla
Misihairabwi-Mashonga would lose their government positions.
HARARE 00000946 006 OF 006
¶23. (C) Genuine political reform is unlikely until reformers
decisively win an election. MDC-T is correct that it would
win a fair election. But ZANU-PF is intent on holding on to
power, and many believe the party would resort to the
violence of 2008 to avoid losing. The critical issue in the
months and years ahead is whether MDC-T, MDC-M, and civil
society can build electoral institutions, and whether ZANU-PF
and the military can be controlled, so that fair elections
can take place.
RAY
(33 VIEWS)
