The United States welcomed the European Union’s addition of central bank governor Gideon Gono and some state-owned enterprises to its sanctions but urged the EU to consider listing all individuals and entities on its sanctions list.
The US had implored the EU to add Gono onto its sanctions list as it was planning to lobby the United Nations to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe and 14 top Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front members including Gono.
It wanted the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe which would allow military intervention in the Southern African country.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08STATE96598, APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER
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|
Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO9090
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #6598/01 2540238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 100234Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 2952
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 9113
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2994
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 8616
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4327
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0668
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1476
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 9778
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 5728
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 2016
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 4600
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5651
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 8594
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 096598
SIPDIS, BELGRADE PASS TO PODGORICA
E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 09/09/18
TAGS: EUN PHUM PREL PGOV ZL ZI SO YI TU GG RS
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER
15-16 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)
¶1. (U) Classified by Bill Lucas, Office Director,
EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
¶2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 14.
¶3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their
next General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on September 15-16. We
expect the formal agenda to include: Zimbabwe, Somalia,
Serbia, Turkey, and Georgia. A background section
covering all of these issues except Georgia is provided
prior to a section containing talking points. Georgia
will be addressed in a separate cable. Points are to be
delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level
to EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver
these points. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS
caption on their response cables and to reference this
cable.
BACKGROUND
———
ZIMBABWE
¶4. (SBU) On July 24, Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and Robert Mugabe
entered into negotiations mediated by South African
President Thabo Mbeki under the auspices of the Southern
African Development Community. The talks have since
stalled over the central question of the division of
executive authority, including control of the security
forces. On August 25, the lower house of Parliament
selected an MDC speaker, energizing the opposition to
continue to hold the line in negotiations. The
economic and humanitarian situations remain in flux in
Zimbabwe. Since the March 29 national elections, at
least 171 people have lost their lives, 30,000 have been
driven from their homes, and hundreds have sought
medical attention because of political violence.
Hyperinflation and a crumbling economy, fueled by the
regime’s unwillingness to follow rudimentary financial
protocols and practices, have put Zimbabwe on the brink
of complete collapse. Prior to the June 27 runoff
presidential election, the Mugabe regime also suspended
activities of many NGOs, compounding an already delicate
humanitarian situation; on August 29, the regime
announced a lifting of the ban, but imposed new
administrative requirements that could still impede
delivery of aid.
SOMALIA
¶5. (C) The U.S. and several Allies are engaged in
looking at, both bilaterally and in EU and NATO
frameworks, possible naval responses to the recent sharp
increase in pirate attacks off Somalia and in the Gulf
of Aden. In June, the UN Security Council passed
resolution 1816, which expires in December, calling upon
states and organizations to use any assets to repress
piracy in the area. In light of the current situation,
the EU is examining the possibilities for deploying an
ESDP maritime anti-piracy presence off of Somalia to
deter these attacks.
SERBIA
¶6. (SBU) On August 15, the Government of Serbia formally
submitted to the UN General Assembly a request to seek
an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion
on the legality of Kosovo’s February 2008 declaration of
independence. State 91908 provided “if asked” guidance
on our ICJ strategy and pulsed capitals for potential
voting trends; initial results indicate widespread
ambivalence. Although the advisory opinion would not be
STATE 00096598 002 OF 004
legally binding, its impact is likely to be substantial.
Once the matter is referred to the ICJ, the Court could
take many months to issue its opinion. During the
interim, states and institutions may hesitate to
recognize Kosovo or move forward with cooperation on
Kosovo. Uncertainty also risks undermining the
effectiveness of the Government of Kosovo (GoK) as well
as international missions on the ground in Kosovo which,
in turn, could encourage extremists on both sides.
Furthermore, the Court’s advisory opinion could have an
adverse impact beyond the Kosovo question and create
uncertainty in other states where secession and
territorial integrity are under debate.
¶7. (U) Serbian President Tadic, accompanied by PM
Cvetkovic and FM Jeremic, met with European Commission
President Barroso and High Representative Solana in
Brussels on September 3. Speaking afterwards, President
Barroso stated it was “possible” that Serbia could get
EU candidate status in 2009 if all requirements were
met. President Tadic stressed Serbia’s determination to
do everything possible to speed up the process and
expressed hope for a positive report from ICTY Chief
Prosecutor Brammertz following his September 10-11 visit
to Belgrade.
¶8. (SBU) Over 300 EULEX personnel are now deployed in
Kosovo. The MOU governing asset-sharing by UNMIK has
been signed, and further deployment of EULEX personnel
(approximately 80 to 100 per week) is scheduled to re-
commence in mid-September. The EULEX presence in
northern Kosovo, however, remains nominal at best, and
the EU’s readiness to fully deploy north of the Ibar
River and in other Serb enclaves remains in doubt. UN-
EU cooperation on the ground is good, and senior leaders
on both sides are confident there will be no security
“gaps.”
TURKEY
¶9. (SBU) Turkey and the EU signed an Association
Agreement in September 1963 aimed at bringing Turkey
into the customs union and eventual membership, but the
GOT’s efforts to join have been stymied by geographic,
cultural, and economic differences. The EU and Turkey
finally opened negotiations on accession in October
¶2005. Since then, the EU has been internally deadlocked
over Turkish accession issues by Cyprus, as well as
objections by members like France and Austria, who are
skeptical whether Turkey belongs in the EU. France is
home to the largest Muslim population in the EU (5
million, most of whom are Arab).
¶10. (SBU) In November 2006, the European Commission
suspended eight of the 32 Acquis chapters until Turkey
meets obligations to open ports in Northern Cyprus to
Republic of Cyprus ships and aircraft. Turkey has said
it will do so only in conjunction with the EU opening of
commercial access for Turkish Cypriot goods and people.
To date only one chapter has been provisionally closed
(ie. completed).
¶11. (SBU) The Commission’s November 2007 accession
report on Turkey said the process was “on track” noting
free and fair elections in 2007 and urged more rapid
political reforms regarding Article 301 of the penal
code (insulting Turkishness), religious freedom, and
corruption. The Turkish Parliament amended Article 301
on April 30. It was symbolically published in the
Official Book on May 9, date of the “Day of Europe” in
the 27 EU member states.
GEORGIA
¶12. (SBU) Updated guidance on Georgia following the
visit of President Sarkozy, President Barroso, and High
Representative Solana to Moscow will be provided Septel.
¶13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as
STATE 00096598 003 OF 004
possible (in advance of the September 15-16 GAERC).
BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT
ZIMBABWE
— We welcome the EU’s expansion of its list of targeted
sanctions of individuals including Gideon Gono and
state-owned enterprises. We urge the EU to consider
listing all of the individuals and entities subject to
the U.S. Zimbabwe sanctions program. The United States
would welcome further information sharing with the EU on
this matter.
— We believe it is important to keep the United Nations
focused on Zimbabwe and hope that the UN Assistant
Secretary General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios
will brief the UNSC as soon as he returns from his
travels to southern Africa. We encourage the EU to
support such a briefing and any appropriate follow up UN
action.
— We need your support in urging the AU and UN to work
closely with SADC to help the parties reach a political
solution in Zimbabwe.
SOMALIA
— We applaud the EU’s intention to launch a naval
operation to protect the flow of humanitarian aid and
help deter piracy and defend commercial shipping. The
EU member states possess sufficient naval forces to
deploy and sustain a capable force without detracting
from other commitments in the region, so we welcome this
mission as a positive step forward for ESDP.
— We encourage EU planners and decision makers to
pursue coordinating the unique assets and capabilities
that might be made available to them through the agreed
NATO-EU framework.
SERBIA
— The U.S. is committed to help Serbia move along the
path to Euro-Atlantic integration, and we strongly
support Serbia’s democratic future in Europe. We view
the arrest and extradition of Radovan Karadzic in July
as a very positive step forward for the Government of
Serbia (GoS.) We look to Serbia now to apprehend
remaining fugitives Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic to
close this ugly chapter in the region’s history.
— We have expressed to the GoS our regret at the
unhelpful public statements against EULEX by some
Serbian leaders and explained that threats, intimidation
and violence against EU personnel in Kosovo will have
consequences. We have also stressed that EULEX will
help ensure the safety of all communities in Kosovo;
limiting the EULEX mission can only increase insecurity
among Kosovo Serbs.
— Many in the Kosovo Serb community are ready for
dialogue with Pristina but look to Belgrade for a
signal. Therefore, some accommodation may be possible
if Belgrade is prepared to be constructive. However, we
believe any compromise must be acceptable to the GoK and
consistent with EULEX’s role in implementing the
Ahtisaari Plan, and must not harden partition.
Accommodation must not come at the cost of EULEX’s
authority or credibility, especially with the Kosovar
Albanian majority.
— We recognize the need for “technical” discussions
with Belgrade over customs and other modalities in
supervising northern Kosovo. However, the EU does not
need Belgrade’s permission to deploy in the north or
elsewhere. Any such “approval” by Belgrade would
undoubtedly come with unacceptable conditions, such as
requiring a new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR),
permitting ethnic Serbs in the Kosovo Police Service or
STATE 00096598 004 OF 004
local courts to serve under a separate chain of command,
or establishing Serbian rather than Kosovo law in Serb
enclaves and the north.
— Belgrade’s proposal of requiring a new UNSCR for
EULEX (calling for a “status neutral” EULEX reporting to
the UN) is a non-starter. UNSYG Ban welcomed EULEX
deployment in his June 22 statement to the UNSC, and no
further action is warranted, or feasible.
— We believe Serbia’s pursuit of an ICJ advisory
opinion request from the UNGA is counterproductive. It
will only delay the inevitable in the region and
threatens to muddle Serbia’s attempts to move forward on
Euro-Atlantic integration. While we are confident that
the recognition of Kosovo’s independence – and the steps
the international community has taken in response – were
lawful, we are concerned that a challenge could delay
progress on the ground, foster division rather than
promote Serbia’s and Kosovo’s common future within
Europe, and cede the discourse to extremists on both
sides.
— Introducing this new element of delay or uncertainty
could upset the current balance in the Balkans at this
sensitive time. Instead, we wish to encourage both
parties to work together to establish practical
cooperation and improved relations.
TURKEY
–The United States strongly supports Turkey’s candidacy
for European Union membership. While this is a decision
for the EU to take, we have and will continue to
encourage the EU and Turkey to reach this goal.
–Turkish membership in the EU would strengthen our
transatlantic community, anchor Turkey to the West, and
build bridges between the West and the Islamic world.
–The prospect of EU membership has helped encourage
important economic and political reforms in Turkey, and
has set a trajectory for still-needed reforms that will
bring Turkey fully into line with European standards of
democratic governance.
–We recognize that the accession process is lengthy and
challenging and that, as part of the accession process,
Turkey will also have to normalize relations with
Cyprus.
–Turkey also has critical near-term objectives with the
EU in the security arena, which remain unfulfilled and
affect U.S. interests. Turkey is seeking a greater role
in planning ESDP missions, membership in the European
Defense Agency, and an EU information-sharing
agreement. We continue to urge the EU to work with
Turkey to address its concerns, as lack of progress on
these issues hinders EU-NATO cooperation on Kosovo and
Afghanistan. Likewise, on items where Cyprus has
difficulty with NATO cooperation because of Turkish
objections, we urge Turkish cooperation with the same
objective in mind.
–We note a renewed sense of optimism for the UN
settlement process for Cyprus. We strongly support the
resumption of full-fledged negotiations between Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives to achieve a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation
END NON-PAPER TEXT
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