Former Defence Forces chief Vitalis Zvinavashe and Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa are reported to have discussed an exit strategy for President Robert Mugabe with the opposition in 2002 but surprisingly Zvinavashe was tipped as Mugabe’s possible successor when he retired from the army a year later, a cable released by Wikileaks says.
According to the cable both Zvinavashe and Mnangagwa denied any involvement in such talks when the plan faced vocal criticism from the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front hard-liners.
Ironically Zvinavashe had made world headlines before the 2002 presidential elections when he said the defence forces would not salute any political leader without liberation credentials, a clear slap at Tsvangirai.
The cable also listed who was who in the succession game.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 03HARARE2359, RULING PARTY SUCCESSION RACE: IS ZVINAVASHE THE
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 002359
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013
SUBJECT: RULING PARTY SUCCESSION RACE: IS ZVINAVASHE THE
ONE?
REF: A. HARARE 2286
¶B. HARARE 1446
¶C. HARARE ZI 2264
Classified By: Political Officer Audu Besmer under Section 1.5(b)(d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The retirement of Vitalis Zvinavashe as
commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) and his
emergence on the national political scene underscore
uncertainties surrounding the ruling party’s contortions over
prospective leadership succession. His possible appointment
as Vice-President could mute disappointment among competing
aspirants and facilitate the ruling party’s management of
political-military relations, but he reportedly is unpopular
among military officers, and his entrance into politics could
bolster Parliamentary Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa’s efforts to
consolidate power and succeed President Mugabe. For his
part, Mugabe gives no indication of planning to hand over the
reins of power any time soon. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) The announcement in early November that Zvinavashe
was retiring effective December 31 had been rumored for some
time. President Mugabe’s remarks at his retirement party,
commentary in the government media, and Zvinavashe’s own
reported comments indicate that he will play a role in ruling
party politics, although precisely what role remains to be
seen.
Old Soldier Not Ready To Fade Away
———————————-
¶3. (C) Although the ZDF brass generally has eschewed public
involvement in politics, Zvinavashe’s name has been featured
in well-publicized political circumstances on several
occasions. In late 2002, Zvinavashe and Parliamentary
Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa reportedly sent an emissary to
opposition leaders to discuss a Mugabe exit strategy. In the
face of vocal criticism by party hard-liners, each denied
involvement in such talks. Last year Zvinavashe also was
reported to have urged the formation of a national task force
to address the nation’s economic situation, which he
attributed to bad economic policy. Earlier, he created a
stir in the run-up to national elections of March 2002 by
stating publicly that the defense forces would not salute any
political leader without liberation credentials, a clear slap
at Tsvangirai. Notwithstanding his somewhat checkered public
past, Zvinavashe’s retention of the top military slot
suggests the depth of Mugabe’s reliance on him.
¶4. (C) Upon announcement of his retirement, Zvinavashe
publicly proclaimed his availability for national office and
dismissed suggestions that he would take a “district”
position. Early speculation on his likely political role
revolved around the Masvingo provincial party chair or
governorship; however, both of those slots were recently
filled. That would appear to leave the Vice-Presidency or a
slot in a rumored upcoming cabinet reshuffle. According to a
family friend of Minister of Justice, Legal, and
Parliamentary Affairs Patrick Chinamasa, Chinamasa’s wife
(who is the older sister of Zvinavashe’s wife) said the late
Vice President Simon Muzenda on his deathbed told Mugabe that
he wanted Zvinavashe to succeed him as MP for Gutu North and
as Vice-President. While Mugabe will not be bound by the
dying wish of his trusted Vice-President, chief party
strategist Muzenda’s faith in Zvinavashe testifies to the
defense chief’s party loyalty and reliability and reflects
positively on his standing for the Vice-Presidency in the
President’s eyes.
¶5. (C) Complicating Zvinavashe’s path to national office is
that he must hold an MP slot in order to fill a
vice-presidential or cabinet slot for more than three months.
A constituency MP position might be of interest to
Zvinavashe as a means to the vice-presidency. One open
non-constituency MP slot reportedly is slated for another
individual, but presumably could be made available to
accommodate Zvinavashe should party priorities dictate.
Indeed, more non-constituency slots could open should a
rumored cabinet reshuffle take place.
Zvinavashe’s Cache: Military Credentials…
——————————————-
¶6. (C) Sporting strong liberation credentials, the 60-year
old Zvinavashe joined the Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (ZANLA) in 1968 and has held his current
position since 1994. With the MDC distracted and lying low,
and the ruling party having steeled itself to international
pressure and economic collapse, an increasingly disaffected
military may pose the biggest threat to the ruling party’s
firm control. Mugabe and others in the party may calculate
that Vice-President (or President) Zvinavashe would enhance
ZANU-PF’s management of a potentially restive and financially
pinched military. It is not clear that it would, however.
The cold and impersonal Zvinavashe is reputed to be unpopular
among military colleagues, many of whom chafed at the lack of
opportunity in a military that ossified at the top under his
leadership.
… and Ethnic Ties
——————-
¶7. (C) To strengthen party unity and enhance party prospects
in a national election, conventional wisdom dictates that the
party’s next leader should come from the Karanga ethnic
subgroup, the largest within the dominant Shona tribe (Mugabe
is from the Zezuru subgroup). A Karanga, Zvinavashe may be
expected to help subdue the historical split that has
re-emerged within an important Masvingo-based Karanga
subgroup with the death of Vice-President Muzenda. Muzenda,
the elder statesman in one of the Karanga subgroups, served
to quell rivalry with the other subgroup. Other key members
of the Muzenda Karanga subgroup are Mnangagwa, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge, and the presidentially
appointed Governor of Masvingo province Josaya Hungwe. Party
strategists reportedly hope that a relatively apolitical
figure of Zvinavashe’s stature would help to keep a lid on
simmering rivalries in the key ZANU-PF heartland of Masvingo.
But there are doubts that he alone could unify ZANU-PF in
the province, much less stand up to the MDC in Masvingo were
he to run. Indeed, some senior party officials reportedly
already are trying to undermine Zvinavashe’s position,
stressing his lack of position/background in the party.
¶8. (C) The other Karanga subgroup is headed by ZANU-PF MP
for Masvingo South and intellectual elder statesman Eddison
Zvobgo, and also includes former Air Marshal Josaya
Tungamirayi. In 1995 Tungamirayi challenged Muzenda for the
ZANU-PF nomination for Gutu North, and he has publicly
declared his intention to run for the seat now that it is
vacant, placing himself as a potential rival to Zvinavashe
were he to run. Tungamirayi is a relatively popular and
potentially formidable political force in his own right. The
power of this subgroup is unclear, though, as Zvobgo has been
in a South African hospital since October 2003 when he was
operated on for an undisclosed ailment.
¶9. (C) For now, the Muzenda Karanga subgroup appears to be
in ascendancy, notwithstanding the death of its leader.
Mnangagwa continues to be regarded by most as Mugabe’s chosen
successor. He remains the point person for ZANU-PF’s empire
of companies with special government privileges. The
November 2003 ZANU-PF provincial elections resulted in
Mnangagwa faithfuls Mutumwa Mawere and Daniel Shumba being
elected as party provincial chairman and the newly created
secretary for economic affairs respectively in Masvingo.
SIPDIS
Mawere and Shumba are both businesspeople with financial ties
to Mnangagwa.
¶10. (C) As required in advance of the December 2003 ZANU-PF
conference, the party has gone through a provincial
restructuring exercise over the past few months. This
exercise has resulted in officials reportedly friendly with,
aligned with, or at least acceptable to Mnangagwa to be
re-confirmed or substituted into party structures throughout
the country, particularly in Midlands, Masvingo, and
Manicaland. The restructuring exercise has not only been
important on a backroom lobbying level, but per the ZANU-PF
constitution provincial councils propose nominees for all of
the national party positions, including President and
Chairman of the party, at the party congress (to be held next
in 2005). Some observers have suggested that Mnangagwa might
take over from Mugabe as President of ZANU-PF sometime
between December 2003 and the party congress in 2005, and
that this would be a clear message to the broader party
membership that Mnangagwa is the best candidate for the next
head of state. With some Mnangagwa-friendly provincial
structures in place already, Mnangagwa may already be
engineering this scenario.
¶11. (C) As for Zvinavashe, he reportedly gets along well
with Mnangagwa and shares business relationships with him
through their companies. He presumably would prosper under a
Mnangagwa presidency. Mnangagwa would not feel politically
threatened by a Vice-President Zvinavashe, who could be
counted on to yield to the Speaker at the appropriate time.
Indeed, one scenario has Zvinavashe taking Muzenda’s
vice-presidential slot as a stalking horse for Mnangagwa.
Succession Scorecard
——————–
— Zvinavashe
¶12. (C) As a relative party outsider and newcomer to the
political arena, Zvinavashe has not been subjected to the
kind of political scrutiny that has taken a toll on other
ostensible candidates to succeed Mugabe. Although
unquestionably loyal to Mugabe (probably the most important
eligibility criterion), Zvinavashe seems to lack charisma and
broad support from within the party. In spite of his
military credentials, the military hierarchy would likely be
ambivalent to him as a presidential candidate. Rather than
being a serious successor in his own right, more significant
is the contribution he could make to Mnangagwa’s position.
— Mnangagwa
¶13. (C) Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa remains
the favorite and is reputed still to have the nod from Mugabe
himself. He has been on the hustings more than anybody, and
Zvinavashe’s elevation probably buttresses rather than rivals
Mnangagwa’s relatively weak support in the party. But
Mnangagwa is not without significant liabilities: most
notably his lack of broad party support, his record of
ruthlessness in the Matabeleland massacres, and a label as
unelectable in a free and fair election. Despite his
ruthlessness and the fact that Mugabe elevated him through
various Ministerial roles up to Speaker of Parliament, he is
resented in quarters of the ZANU-PF hierarchy, most
importantly Solomon Mujuru (Ref B). Additionally, his
bungled approach through Colonel Dyke and Zvinavashe to MDC
leader Morgan Tsvangirai in late 2002 chafed Mugabe.
— Simba Makoni
¶14. (C) A Mass Public Opinion Institute poll conducted in
October demonstrated that “dissident” ex-Finance Minister
Simba Makoni was the only party luminary who commanded broad
national support without regard to provincial lines. This
should weigh heavily for those in the party who want to
compete realistically in a democratic process. Nonetheless,
Makoni’s lack of a strong political base in ZANU-PF and his
liberal economic views, which are anathema to Mugabe, make
him an unlikely choice. The introduction of hard-liner old
guard politburo member Didymus Mutasa as a vice-presidential
candidate reportedly was apparently designed to undercut
emerging support for Makoni’s candidacy within their home
province of Manicaland.
— Solomon Mujuru
¶15. (C) Notwithstanding the fact that retired
Lieutenant-General Solomon Tapfumanei Mujuru, (nom de guerre
Rex Nhongo) was named in a 2001 Zambian government report as
having played a role in the 1975 assassination of then ZANU
Chairman Herbert Chitepo, Mujuru reportedly enjoys
significant support within the ZDF and the Central
Intelligence Organization (CIO). Considered too rough-edged,
uneducated and more of a kingmaker than a candidate, in 2002
he advanced Simba Makoni’s name in succession discussions,
and has consistently opposed Mnangagwa. After the March 2002
elections, and responding to assessments that the outcome was
flawed he reportedly asked Mugabe when he intended to retire.
More recent reports suggest he himself might want the job,
or that he would support Secretary of Defense Sydney
Sekeramayi in the race.
— Sydney Sekeramayi
¶16. (C) If Sekeramayi’s name is raised in succession
discussions, it is usually in connection with Mujuru.
Sekeramayi reportedly has played a low profile but respected
role in the cabinet. However, he reportedly advocated
economic reforms within the cabinet, which may have dropped
him a peg in Mugabe’s eyes and prejudiced his prospects. His
credentials have not been extensively debated or discussed in
public, and he may offer the appeal of not having as
significantly negative a public image as others. A Zezuru,
Sekeramayi has broad experience, having held various
ministerial roles within ZANU-PF since independence, and has
been active in ZANU since 1963.
— Charles Utete
¶17. (C) Charles Utete, Cabinet Secretary since independence,
is a dark horse candidate whose name emerges periodically. A
Zezuru, he is deeply loyal to Mugabe and does not appear to
have strong enemies. Utete generally has a reputation for
integrity, although this has suffered outside the party with
the release of his commission’s report on land reform, which
avoided most difficult issues and drew careful “political”
conclusions.
— Others
¶18. (C) Several other names raised in succession debates
months ago — Party Chairman John Nkomo, Information Minister
Jonathan Moyo, and Dumiso Dabengwa (Ref B) — have received
little serious public speculation as of late. Their Ndebele
ethnicity makes Nkomo and Moyo unlikely candidates. The
party’s prominent hardline faction, including Moyo, Justice
Minister Chinamasa, and Agriculture Minister Made, lack
significant geographic constituencies, making them unlikely
candidates. Nonetheless, through their control of key party
levers of power (information, judicial administration, and
land reform, respectively), they could exert meaningful
influence on candidate selection.
Comment
——-
¶19. (C) That Zvinavashe is being touted in official circles
as potential vice-presidential (and by implication
presidential) material underscores how murky the succession
picture remains. None of the candidates stand above the
rest, though Zvinavashe’s entrance into politics tends to
bolster Mnangagwa’s ongoing — and of late somewhat
successful — efforts to consolidate his position.
Mnangagwa’s evident liabilities, however, make his candidacy
far from a foregone conclusion. The key variable for
succession is Mugabe’s intent, which remains unknown. While
the international press has speculated that Mugabe might
reveal his successor or a timeline for stepping down at the
party conference this week in Masvingo, Party Spokesman
Nathan Shamuyarira recently publicly declared what party
members have been telling us in private: succession is not on
the conference agenda. We are inclined to think that because
Mugabe has not yet decided, a clear announcement is unlikely
for some time.
SULLIVAN
(84 VIEWS)
