President Robert Mugabe’s Independence Day speech in 2003, in which he encouraged open discussion of the succession issue within ZANU-PF councils, opened the floodgates of speculation.
At the forefront were Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa and former Finance Minister Simba Makoni.
Though Mugabe’s favourite, Mnangagwa could not pass muster with the Ndebele because of his involvement in the Matebeleland massacres of the 1980s. In addition, he was feared and mistrusted by many ZANU-PF insiders, including his arch-rival Solomon Mujuru, for his ruthlessness.
Makoni was the darling of the donors, popular with the more liberal-minded, and acceptable to many in the MDC. But, he came from Manicaland and lacked a broad constituency base in Mashonaland rural areas and was anathema to pro-Mugabe hard-liners for his commitment to reform and his conciliatory political views.
Defence Minister Sidney Sekeremayi had considerable politburo support but suffered from a reputation for personal weakness.
Retired Army General Solomon Mujuru.was widely considered too rough-edged and uneducated to handle the job.
Ambitious Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo was widely disliked in party circles.
Minister of Local Government Ignatius Chombo was from the Zezuru sub-clan and his nomination would spark fierce opposition from the competing Karanga and Manyika sub-clans.
Minister of Special Affairs in the President’s Office John Nkomo could qualify for a prime ministerial or custodial role, but certainly not a strong presidential one.
Old-timers Didymus Mutasa and Nathan Shamuyarira were expected to resist mightily any change from the effective one-party system they had known so long.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 03HARARE1446, MUGABE SUCCESSION ELUSIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001446
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2013
SUBJECT: MUGABE SUCCESSION ELUSIVE
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER KIMBERLY JEMISON FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D.
¶1. (C) Summary. Over the past two months the domestic
written press, both government and opposition, has churned
out a stream of reporting on President Mugabe,s possible
retirement. The local rumor mill has kept pace. Competing
succession scenarios and successor lists have appeared, and
different timelines have been presented. In the final
analysis, however, there appears to be no heir apparent that
does not suffer some disqualifying flaw, and no clear-cut
scenario for when, or under what terms, Mugabe might actually
step aside. As usual, and barring unforeseen actuarial
developments, the decision on where Mugabe goes remains
squarely with Mugabe himself. His willingness to commit to a
fixed timetable for succession is the key to moving beyond
the status quo and bringing the possibility of meaningful
change to Zimbabwe. End summary.
¶2. (C) Mugabe,s April 18 Independence Day speech, in which
he encouraged open discussion of the succession issue within
ZANU-PF councils, opened the floodgates of speculation.
Politburo members and ZANU-PF party members long known to
harbor latent presidential ambitions suddenly stampeded to
the fore. Journalists have examined various individuals and
scenarios, including interviews with some prominent ZANU-PF
officials who have declared themselves ready to step forward
when the time is ripe. The unanswered question is when this
might be. The most optimistic observers are pushing a
scenario in which Mugabe resigns as ZANU-PF President at the
in 2003 and anoints a new party president, who will become
his heir apparent for the national presidency. Less
exuberant commentators predict a longer-term scenario, and
possibly one in which ZANU-PF engineers two-thirds a
parliamentary majority (by hook or crook) in early
parliamentary elections in 2004 and pushes through a
constitutional amendment that allows Mugabe to serve out most
or all of his current term as titular president while a newly
created post of Prime Minister — nominated by Mugabe, of
course — takes up the reins of power. (Comment. Whoever
might take hold of the reins; it is difficult for even the
most nave to imagine that a titular President Mugabe would
relinquish the whip as well. End comment.)
——————–
In the Starting Gate
——————–
¶3. (C) Free and fair elections or a transitional government
of national unity do not figure into any scenario that
ZANU-PF insiders or government-owned newspapers have conjured
up. In ZANU-PF logic, ZANU-PF succession is a given. Recent
Politburo discussions of the succession issue reportedly
concluded that any successor to Mugabe must meet two basic
requirements: enjoy significant acceptance in all provinces,
and be acceptable to the Ndebele in the South. The two names
most frequently mentioned as presidential successors are
Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe,s clear
favorite, and former Finance Minister Simba Makoni; but
neither of them cleanly fit the bill. Because of his
involvement in the Matebeleland massacres of the 1980s,
Mnangagwa cannot pass muster with the Ndebele. In addition,
he is feared and mistrusted by many ZANU-PF insiders,
including his arch-rival (and former ZAN/ZANLA Commander)
Solomon Mujuru, for his ruthlessness. For his part, Makoni
is the darling of the donors, popular with the more
liberal-minded, and acceptable to many in the MDC. However,
he comes from Manicaland and lacks a broad constituency base
in Mashonaland rural areas and is anathema to pro-Mugabe
hard-liners for his commitment to reform and his conciliatory
political views.
¶4. (C) Other potential successors worth mention include
Defense Minister Sidney Sekeremayi, who has considerable
Politburo support, and retired Army General Solomon Mujuru.
The former suffers from a reputation for personal weakness,
while the latter is widely considered too rough-edged and
uneducated to handle the job. In Mujuru,s case, he seems
more interested in being kingmaker than the king. The very
ambitious Minister of Information Jonathan Moyo, an Ndebele,
is widely disliked in party circles. His dependence upon the
patronage of Mugabe is such that he appears determined to
block or delay any moves toward Mugabe,s departure, since
Moyo himself is an unlikely dauphin. Like Mugabe, Minister
of Local Government Ignatius Chombo is from the Zezeru
sub-clan of the Shona, and his nomination would spark fierce
opposition from the competing Karanga and Manyica sub-clans.
¶5. (C) Other candidates include Minister of Special Affairs
in the President,s Office John Nkomo, whose Ndebele
bloodlines and ZAPU origins might qualify him for a prime
ministerial or custodial role, but certainly not a strong
presidential one. Lesser candidates include Minister of Home
Affairs Kembo Mohadi, Minister of State for National Security
Nicholas Goche, Minister of Social Welfare July Moyo, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge. Most are not
serious contenders for ethnic/clan reasons, or for a lack of
political traction with the generation of ZANU-PF
heavyweights from the liberation era who must ultimately
second Mugabe,s choice. Many of these old-timers in their
70s and 80s, including the two Vice Presidents, Didymus
Mutasa, and Nathan Shamuyarira can be expected to resist
mightily any change from the effective one-party system they
have known so long. Less entrenched and ideological insiders
would like to see reform, but only ZANU-PF reform, and fear
that the party has not prepared for succession and would be
extremely vulnerable in the post-Mugabe period. For
different reasons, many within the party would prefer to
still the winds of change. The fact that there are competing
rivalries and factions with ZANU-PF has serves to slow
change, whether these divisions are the critical factor, or a
pretext for Mugabe to cling to power.
——————————————— ————
ZANU-PF Extraordinary Congress – the Harbinger of Change?
——————————————— ————
¶6. (C) From the ZANU-PF perspective, the path to the
Presidency of the Republic clearly goes through the ZANU-PF
presidency. Mugabe has held this position since 1987 and
will continue to serve until next December at the earliest,
when the ZANU-PF Extraordinary Congress will take place.
Mugabe,s five-year term as ZANU-PF leader does not expire at
that time, but there is widespread speculation that he will
take this occasion to step aside, and thus open the way for a
successor whom he can designate and who will presumably
become the favorite to succeed Mugabe as President of the
Republic. According to well-informed ZANU-PF MP Edison
Zvobgo, this is the scenario that has been painted to the
South Africans. This may also be a wishful scenario. We
note for the record that there was widespread speculation
before ZANU-PF,s last two major get-togethers in 2000 and
2002 that Mugabe would either name a successor or would be
confronted by the party membership, neither of which
transpired.
¶7. (C) Should Mugabe choose to stand aside, however, the
ZANU-PF party Constitution provides a clear framework for
electing party leadership. The National People,s Congress,
which is held once every five years, elects the President,
two vice-presidents, and the National Chairman of the party
directly, upon nomination by at least six provincial
executive councils of the party, meeting separately, in
special session called for that purpose. If more than one
candidate is presented, then the candidate having the highest
number of votes stands as the nominee. In the event of a
tie, the National Congress votes by secret ballot. The
ZANU-PF constitution does not address the case of a
resignation in mid-term. Whether Mugabe would respect the
established rules in this case, and accept the caucus of the
provincial executive councils, is known only to him. There
is ample proof that he is not prone to leaving political
choices to electoral chance, and he would try to tip the
contest to his preferred candidate.
———————
Looking at Tea Leaves
———————
¶8. (C) If Mugabe seeks re-election as ZANU-PF President in
December, he will almost certainly prevail. Despite the
increased muttering of a growing number of party members
adversely affected by Mugabe,s policies, there seems to be
no individual or coalition within ZANU-PF willing to tackle
him head on. His retention of the ZANU-PF presidency would
also indicate that his retirement from national office would
not be imminent. Mugabe,s decision to cede ZANU-PF to
another, however, could signal willingness to pass
Zimbabwe,s presidency to a hand-picked successor as well,
probably well before the expiry of Mugabe,s current term in
¶2008. It would not necessarily signal a commitment to a
government that includes the opposition or an early election
in which Mugabe,s successor, and by extension ZANU-PF, would
take their chances. A scenario in which Mugabe stepped down
as ZANU-PF chairman in December, then resigned as president
in 2004 to start the constitutionally-mandated three-month
electoral clock ticking, might not be a desirable outcome.
In fact, it could well signify a replay of the violent,
fatally flawed presidential election of 2002.
¶9. (C) Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF leadership have been
sending out ambiguous messages for most of a year about their
willingness to embark on a genuine transition process. Their
willingness to contemplate such a transition has waxed and
waned depending on the degree of pressure that the Government
has been under, particularly from their African colleagues.
When pressed, Mugabe and ZANU-PF hint of a transition
possibly beginning with the December party congress and
ending no later than the 2005 parliamentary elections. Once
the pressure is off — as ZANU-PF leaders may now perceive it
to be following the GOZ,s successful use of security forces
to prevent the MDC-called June demonstrations, the conclusion
of President Bush,s trip to Africa, and Mugabe,s rotation
into the AU,s regional Vice President slot — Mugabe and
coterie may once again be ready to reject any change that
occurs on terms other than their own. ZANU,s Information
Secretary Shamuyarira provided a graphic illustration of this
SIPDIS
last week, on Monday pleading with the Ambassador that the US
should refrain from doing anything rash because Mugabe was
open to change, but on the following Saturday telling the
Ambassador that he and his colleagues flatly reject any
compromises with the MDC, which is a puppet of the British
and Uncle Sam. In sum, probably only Robert Mugabe knows how
sincere are his intimations that he is ready to contemplate a
departure from power under circumstances other than a forced
exit.
——-
Comment
——-
¶10. (C) Because Mugabe,s departure is necessary for any
meaningful political change in Zimbabwe )- although his
departure will not necessarily guarantee this — Mugabe,s
exit should remain our top priority. We must seek to use all
means at our disposal in our dealings with regional leaders
such as Mbeki to seek to get Mugabe to publicly commit to a
timetable for stepping down from party leadership and the
Presidency, not later than December. Barring such a
commitment, and combined with Mugabe,s coyness on whether
his talk about succession is merely that, we could otherwise
end up facing a worst case scenario for Zimbabwe,s future )
a lingering status quo. End comment.
SULLIVAN
(45 VIEWS)
