Presidential hopeful Emmerson Mnangagwa was playing his cards to his chest and was lying low after the 2004 Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front congress which saw Joice Mujuru being elevated to vice-president.
According to the United States embassy this was typical of Mnangagwa and he preferred to operate largely behind the scenes.
Although his faction had been sidelined by the Solomon Mujuru faction, the embassy said Mnangagwa was still a force to reckon with.
“That Mnangagwa’s Young Turk faction garnered seven of the ten provincial presidium votes before Mugabe squelched its bid for power testifies to that faction’s continued broad support,” the embassy said, implying that Mnangagwa could have beaten Mujuru, a point also raised by Patrick Chinamasa’s wife Monica.
“The six pro-Mnangagwa provincial chairpersons suspended after the Tsholotsho meetings and other demoted Mnangagwa supporters retain influence among rank and file. While accepted publicly, last December’s establishment of Joyce Mujuru as Mugabe’s heir apparent deeply rankled Mnangagwa’s forces and many view her election as a temporary setback, not the end of the contest,” the embassy said.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE1345, CONTINUING RIVALRIES, SUCCESSION TENSIONS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HARARE 001345
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: CONTINUING RIVALRIES, SUCCESSION TENSIONS
COMPLICATE ZANU-PF’S FUTURE
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell for reasons 1.5 b/d
————————
Summary and Introduction
————————
¶1. (C) By many measures, the Robert Mugabe’s ruling ZANU-PF
party is as firmly in control of Zimbabwe as ever. Its
tainted but overwhelming parliamentary election “victory”
in March left it in firm control of the legislature and
executive, and simultaneously demoralized Zimbabwe’s
political opposition and civil society. Emigration
continues to bleed much of the best human resources for
democratic forces; destitution or prospective destitution
hobbles many of the rest. “Operation Restore Order” has
politically and economically disrupted the urban masses
viewed by many as critical to any effective domestic
opposition; that hundreds of thousands of victims submitted
without resistance testifies not only to the passive nature
of the populous, but also to the effectiveness of the GOZ’s
heavy hand.
¶2. (C) Below the surface, however, ZANU-PF remains a party
on the edge. Deep resentment and concern over Restore
Order is palpable outside and inside the party. The
magnitude of the party’s economic failures complicate
relations with the outside world and fuel discontent within
the country and within the party. Compounding all of this
is Robert Mugabe’s autocratic rule and refusal to
countenance meaningful debate over serious challenges
facing the party – especially succession. However, party
discipline is still strong, particularly at the top, in
part because of a patronage system that, while under
stress, remains the only game in town.
¶3. (C) This report examines divisions within the ruling
party, especially as they relate to prospective leadership
succession. The party is beset by cross-cutting rifts:
personal, ethnic, and generational. Nonetheless, there are
substantial forces that hold this bunch together:
interwoven family and business connections; a sense that
“we hang together or hang separately” in the face of
growing political pressures; the bonds of shared historical
experience; and, perhaps most importantly, an undisputed
leader and his pervasive patronage system. How compelling
these centripetal forces will be in Mugabe’s absence is a
pivotal issue. For now, Mugabe chosen standard-bearer,
Vice President Joyce Mujuru, and the dominant Zezuru clique
retain the inside track, but long-term succession remains
an open question that will hinge largely on the
circumstances and timing of Mugabe’s departure from the
scene.
——————–
Mujuru vs. Mnangagwa
——————–
¶4. (C) Purges associated with the last year’s ZANU-PF Party
Congress, the sholotsho conspiracy”, and the ruling
party’s parliamentary primaries have put to bed open
discussion of leadership succession within the ruling
party. On paper, President Robert Mugabe is in charge and
Vice President Joyce Mujuru is his standard bearer. If
Mugabe were suddenly to be incapacitated or step down, few
doubt that under current circumstances Joyce Mujuru would
be the ZANU-PF candidate in a presidential election that
the constitution requires within 90 days.
¶5. (C) Nonetheless, the rivalry between the factions of
Solomon Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa remains an important
factor in Zimbabwean politics, albeit largely outside the
public view. That Mnangagwa’s “Young Turk” faction
garnered seven of the ten provincial presidium votes before
Mugabe squelched its bid for power testifies to that
faction’s continued broad support. The six pro-Mnangagwa
provincial chairpersons suspended after the Tsholotsho
meetings and other demoted Mnangagwa supporters retain
influence among rank and file. While accepted publicly,
last December’s establishment of Joyce Mujuru as Mugabe’s
heir apparent deeply rankled Mnangagwa’s forces and many
view her election as a temporary setback, not the end of
the contest.
—————————
Enduring Ethnic Resentments
—————————
¶6. (C) Historically, the Mnangagwa-Mujuru factional
conflict is associated with a struggle for intra-Shona
tribe dominance between Mugabe-Mujuru’s Zezuru clan, which
accounts for nearly 20 percent of Zimbabwe’s population,
and Mnangagwa’s more numerous Karanga clan, which accounts
for more than 30 percent of the population. The Zezuru are
centered largely around Mashonaland while the Karanga
dominate Masvingo and much of the Midlands. Many Karanga
have long felt that it would be their “turn” to rule after
Mugabe. Mugabe’s replacement of long time Karanga Vice
President Muzenda with fellow Zezuru Mujuru deeply
disappointed the Karanga, who viewed the position as
“theirs” and a springboard to national leadership in the
party’s succession exercise.
¶7. (C) Mugabe’s “siding” with the Mujuru clique represented
a watershed of sorts after carefully balancing ethnic
groups for a generation. However, ethnic rivalries and
maneuvering have been a hallmark of ruling party politics
for years. The Manyika, a third Shona sub-group accounting
for just under 20 percent of the population, have
traditionally supplied a disproportionate number of
prominent political figures and also feel they deserve a
shot at leadership. Nonetheless, the
independent-mindedness of the Manyika, who voted for the
opposition more than any other Shona group and whose number
include opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and ex-Finance
Minister Simba Makoni, make them a group to be controlled
in the eyes of many party leaders.
¶8. (C) The minority Ndebele (roughly 15 percent of the
population), who were ruthlessly suppressed during the
mid-80s, are at most a swing group in the leadership and a
box to check in cabinet-making exercises. Indeed, the
Ndebele leaders within the party are largely despised by
the Ndebele people and have proven utterly incapable of
delivering their constituency in national elections.
————————————-
Conflicting Generational Perspectives
————————————-
¶9. (C) Cutting across ethnic divides are conflicting
generational perspectives. The Old Guard in Mugabe’s
generation tend to frame the party’s legitimacy in
nationalist terms, equating liberation credentials with
entitlement to leadership. That chafes the party’s younger
generation, which attaches higher priority to economic
progress and a more open political process – inside if not
outside the party. Much of Mnangagwa’s appeal is in
playing to younger generation frustrations that transcend
ethnic allegiance.
¶10. (C) Importantly, though, most recognize that there is
little genuine ideology behind the Old Guard’s frequently
truculent, anti-western, anti-democratic fulminations.
Mugabe himself may be the country’s last true ideologue,
and many expect that all factions will quickly reorient
themselves – rhetorically at least – to the West and more
conventional development strategies once he has gone. In
the meantime, liberation rhetoric and confrontationist
posturing at the top will prevail, reflecting Mugabe’s
dominance and the regime’s inability to explain its gross
policy failures in any other terms.
¶11. (C) For its part, the younger generation’s allegiances
are shallow and prone to shift. While many have been
aligned with Mnangagwa, they are represented in both
camps. Many privately profess commitment to
democratization and economic reform; however, their actions
(or more often inaction) – largely in lockstep with
leadership dictates elie their words. Their posturing
must be taken in the context of their overarching
objectives of personal security, advancement and
enrichment. Most may be identified with one faction or
another but in fact quietly hedge political allegiances
with a view to maintaining access to dwindling perks of
patronage in an uncertain environment. Aside from Simba
Makoni, the “dissident” Politburo member historically
aligned with the Mujuru camp, and independent Jonathan
Moyo, who still professes to carry his party membership
card, no ruling party young turks stand out as potential
national figures in the foreseeable future.
¶12. (C) Traditional deference to authority in Zimbabwe will
continue to be an important political factor, at least as
long as the liberation generation survives. The party
exploits this in its relentless propaganda themes and
commitment of resources to co-opt the allegiance of
traditional chiefs and headmen. Within the party, it
favors the Zezuru faction, as reflected in the Tsholotsho
outcome: the Mujuru faction, with the Old Guard arrayed
behind it, prevailed over Mnangagwa’s group, which may have
had the numbers but not the gravitas. It helps explain why
“reformers” like Simba Makoni and Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., keep
their wagons hitched to the Mujuru wagon despite affinity
for the “moderate” posturing of the Mnangagwa camp.
————————
The Primacy of Patronage
————————
¶13. (C) Central to the contest for party leadership is the
once pervasive national patronage system. At the top end,
party favor means potentially lucrative sweetheart deals,
access to scarce resources – and impunity. At the
grassroots, it means community access to food, modest
infrastructure development, and some agricultural inputs.
It is essentially a mafia arrangement, in which potentially
everything is at risk no matter where one is
socioeconomically. Control of patronage is the key stake
in the game, and its effective manipulation will be a key
to winning, or at least surviving.
¶14. (C) Years of precipitous economic decline have eroded
the party and government resource base and cut into the
party’s ability to buy loyalty. At the same time, however,
the declining size of the economic pie has only sharpened
the stakes in the succession struggle, making it even more
of a winner-take-all scenario in which the loser will not
only be frozen out of political power but will likely lose
economically as well.
¶15. (C) The withering of patronage will likely push the
regime to rely further on repression as its key tool for
retaining its grip on power, fueling unpopularity at home
and opprobrium abroad, but enabling the party to retain its
hold on the country. A full collapse of the patronage
system would likely spell the end of the party. For now,
however, economic desperation appears to have contributed
to party discipline as there remains no alternative to
party patronage for most. Moreover, the circle that the
leadership really has to satisfy to retain power in this
historically submissive, hierarchical society may be quite
small, possibly assuring the primacy of patronage for some
time.
————————
Security Forces a Factor
————————
¶16. (C) ZANU-PF’s deep-seated public unpopularity magnifies
the critical importance of security forces’ loyalties in
intra-party conflict. As the patronage system continues to
erode, repression becomes a more important tool for
maintaining control. Both Mnangagwa, a former head of the
intelligence apparatus, and Solomon Mujuru, former head of
the defense forces, retain strong personal ties within the
“securotocracy”. However, appointments in the military and
the CIO since last December, particularly at the
mid-levels, appear to have advanced Zezuru influence at the
expense of Mnangagwa supporters.
¶17. (C) The military and CIO continue to execute GOZ
directives faithfully and as institutions seem likely to
remain loyal to whoever wins the succession struggle (as
long as that is a ZANU-PF figure). In that regard, the
chances of a military coup in support of one or the other
contender seems remote. The military and the CIO have
traditionally avoided overt involvement in factional
politics.
————————————
Mujuru Faction Consolidating Control
————————————
¶18. (C) The Mujuru faction’s moves to fortify its position
in the security apparatus have been mirrored in other areas
as well. Confident in the President’s backing, it has
successfully supplanted most of Mnangagwa’s people at the
top of the party’s provincial structures, a key to assuring
control of the presidium under the party constitution.
Moreover, GOZ anti-corruption efforts have been directed
principally against key Mnangagwa partners, and regulatory
authorities have frequently thwarted the expansion of his
partners’ business interests.
¶19. (C) At the same time, Vice President Mujuru is being
aggressively groomed for potential higher office. Rarely a
day passes without her face or words being featured
prominently in the state media – usually pounding populist
themes such as corruption and economic efficiency. Her war
record and nickname Teurai Ropa (Comrade Spill-blood)
afford her liberation credentials that still play well in
the countryside and are a prerequisite to leadership under
the current regime. Visibly active in church and Salvation
Army activities throughout her career, she has grassroots
appeal as a self-made woman who projects compassion.
Indeed, she had a much higher profile than Mugabe in the
last national parliamentary campaign, reflecting her
faction’s recognition that it must re-orient itself to
retain loyalties and market itself more effectively.
¶20. (C) In this vein, the Mujuru faction is also grooming
its own stable of young turks, who quietly stand on a more
reformist platform. They do not hold sway today but may be
more influential with the passage of time, especially after
Mugabe’s departure from the scene. Indeed, figures like
Simba Makoni, Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., and Walter Mzembi will
likely be given higher profile as fixing the party’s
fractured domestic and international image becomes a higher
priority.
——————-
Mnangagwa Lying Low
——————-
¶21. (C) Against this backdrop, Mnangagwa has maintained a
low profile. His ministry – Rural Housing and Social
Amenities – is a new one that essentially is without
funding or responsibility. He is relatively absent in
media coverage although he does attend public events. He
reportedly has spoken up in cabinet meetings but has
elicited little open backing from colleagues – underscoring
the cautious nature of players in this environment.
Mnangagwa historically has preferred to operate largely
behind the scenes, and the extent and nature of his efforts
to protect or advance his interests at this juncture remain
unclear. His health – he reputedly is HIV-positive –
remains a wild card and it is unclear who would assume his
factional leadership mantle were he absent.
¶22. (C) In any event, the abject failure of ZANU-PF’s
policies and the party’s associated growing unpopularity
under the Mujuru/Zezuru leadership may provide Mnangagwa
tools with which to chip away at their continued
dominance. We are already seeing pushback by ZANU-PF’s
backbenchers against GOZ (read: Zezuru Old Guard)
policy-making – notably on energy policy, the education
bill, and certain features of the constitutional amendments
so far. Like many discarded in the past year’s purges, new
MPs and provincial officials are closer than the leadership
to their constituencies. On personal and political levels,
they identify with the real world plight of constituents
much more than the insulated leadership. Many MPs won
their seats in part by subtly distancing themselves from
party policy, and Restore Order has only deepened their
discomfort with party leadership.
¶23. (C) The resignation of Mnangagwa ally and relative
Pearson Mbalekwa appeared to be an effort to provoke a
reaction by party faithful against the leadership – a
preview perhaps of additional efforts to exploit emotional
policy differences to isolate the Zezuru clique. Mbalekwa
is also a prime mover behind the idea of a hird force,
which has waxed and waned over the past six months. Most
of its advocates are associated with Mnangagwa and it is
therefore widely viewed as a stalking horse for his
faction’s aspirations, especially if they fail to secure
the succession. To that end, Mnangagwa has personally kept
his distance from the “third force,” despite its ties to
his faction.
——————-
Third Force Factor?
——————-
¶24. (C) The third force may also take on a life of its
own. Some of its adherents appear impatient with
Mnangagwa’s cautious, non-confrontational approach and
could be open to alternative leadership, such as the
mercurial, amoral, but talented Jonathan Moyo. Moyo was
also closely linked to the Mnangagwa faction, but could
very well have ambitions of his own for the presidency.
The third force so far has failed to emerge as promised by
some of its principal exponents, though. Indeed, it has
little ideological territory to stake out for itself and
seems likely to be used as a foil by others with designs on
power. In any event, its rise would likely draw more from
the MDC than from ZANU-PF, thus ultimately benefiting
whichever faction controls the ruling party.
———-
Conclusion
———-
¶25. (C) With the MDC’s decline since the March elections,
the Mujuru-Mnangagwa contest is the central one in
Zimbabwean politics today. Will it remain so and, if so,
how will it play out? The key variables for now remain
Mugabe’s own timetable and intentions and the quickening
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy. Although his energy
and attention span appear to be flagging, his word still
goes, and he is allowing the Mujuru/Zezuru clique to
continue to consolidate control of the party. If Mugabe
goes out on top, his word will likely control the immediate
succession, bequeathing factional and ethnic tensions to
the next generation. However, if he were to die or
suddenly become enfeebled all bets are off. The continued
failure and growing unpopularity of the leadership’s
policies (assuming they stay the course) will fuel support
within the party for change. This will induce both
factions, indeed all aspiring ruling party politicians, to
project themselves as the most credible agent of change,
even as they try to exploit a crumbling patronage system
that remains a key to success. Ironically, the party
unpopularity may
even force its leadership and their
respective supporters to rally around whoever emerges on
top since their hold on power would be more tenuous should
cracks appear in the fagade of unity. At the same time the
countervailing pressures – a shrinking economy and
patronage pie, ethnic and personal rivalries, and the
generational gulf opening up – all suggest that ZANU-PF is
a party under stress and the cracks are beginning to show.
In the long term this as much as anything else may shape
Zimbabwe’s politics.
DELL
(120 VIEWS)
