The Movement for Democratic Change tried to lure Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front politicians purged at the 2004 Tsholotsho debacle which saw six provincial leaders suspended from the party for attending the meeting at which they allegedly planned to stage a smart coup against Joice Mujuru, John Nkomo and Joseph Msika.
MDC secretary general Welshman Ncube told United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell that the party was talking “quietly” to the politicians who had been purged after the Tsholotsho debacle and those who had been sidelined in the ZANU-PF primary elections.
Ncube believed these individual would have no real interest in joining forces with the MDC but out of vengeance might be induced to influence their supporters to stay away from the polls in order to demonstrate to ZANU-PF just how valuable they were to the party’s fortunes.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE113, MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL ON TSVANGIRAI TRIP, ELECTIONS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000113
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE, D. TEITELBAUM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2010
SUBJECT: MDC SECRETARY-GENERAL ON TSVANGIRAI TRIP, ELECTIONS
REF: (A) PRETORIA 223 (B) HARARE 83 (C) HARARE 2090
AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on January
18, MDC Secretary-General Welshman Ncube reported that MDC
President Morgan Tsvangirai planned to lead an opposition
delegation to Washington February 6-9. Ncube noted that
ZANU-PF’s internal turmoil was opening space for opposition
election preparations and could provoke a backlash among
resentful ruling party figures “bent on revenge.” He
asserted that the opposition’s electoral success would depend
on many factors over which it had little control, but as
things stood now he expected the party to win 45-55 seats.
He reported that a SADC delegation expected to visit Zimbabwe
soon would include only lawyers evaluating the legal
framework of elections, not more important election
environment issues. END SUMMARY.
Tsvangirai Visit
SIPDIS
——————–
¶2. (C) According to Ncube, Tsvangirai, Shadow Minister of
Foreign Affairs Priscilla Misihairabwa-Mushonga and he
planned to arrive in Washington on Sunday, February 6. They
would seek meetings there with representatives from the
Administration, civil society, and the Congress February 7-9,
after which they would leave for meetings in Canada enroute
to Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai also hoped to meet with UN SYG Annan
in New York on his way to or from Washington. Ncube
requested the Embassy’s assistance in arranging meetings for
the delegation with Administration officials. The MDC has
sought assistance from NDI and IRI in making appointments
with Congress.
Ruling Party Turmoil
————————–
¶3. (C) Ncube said the opposition was enjoying the spectacle
of the intra-ZANU PF fight. More practically, the MDC was
talking quietly to ruling party figures purged in the recent
Tsholotsho debacle and primaries process (refs B and C). He
SIPDIS
believed these individual would have no real interest in
joining forces with the MDC but out of vengeance might be
induced to influence their supporters to stay away from the
polls in order to demonstrate to ZANU-PF just how valuable
they were to the party’s fortunes. He noted that victims of
recent developments included not just hard-liners and
moderates seen to be deviating from the party line, but even
some of the most loyal followers (e.g. NGO Bill architect and
Minister of Social Welfare Paul Mangwana) who lost out in
primary contests.
¶4. (C) Ncube said he was continuing his informal dialogue
with Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
Patrick Chinamasa on election and constitutional issues (they
were to meet later that day on an unspecified agenda).
However, Chinamasa had told him that he was resigned to
playing very little role in the next Government. Chinimasa
thought he might lose his ministry in a cabinet reshuffle
before the elections and, if not, would certainly lose it
after the elections. (Note: Chinamasa has retained his seat
in the Central Committee but lost his slot in the Politburo
and is not running for a parliamentary seat. End note.)
Ncube said that if Chinamasa departed, Security Minister
Nicholas Goche, who already had been involved in the
confidential unofficial dialogue, would likely become his
SIPDIS
principal ZANU-PF interlocutor. Ncube added that he had
heard current Speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa might take
Chinamasa’s place in the cabinet.
Opposition Election Preparations
——————————————
¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s question about
Zimbabwe’s election environment, Ncube said he was pleased
that “a lot of space” had opened up for the opposition while
the ruling party was absorbed with its internecine combat.
The tone and substance of official media reporting had
improved, and Ncube joked that even he was reading the
government-controlled Herald these days. Nonetheless, many
of the usual constraints continued: authorities kept finding
excuses not to approve meetings requested by the opposition
in Chinhoyi, for example, and one MDC MP was threatened with
arrest for letting a member of his audience speak without
authorization at an otherwise authorized meeting. Moreover,
the MDC fully expected conditions to worsen quickly when the
dust settled in ZANU-PF and it turned its attention to the
opposition again.
¶6. (C) Ncube reported that the opposition did not have the
funds with which to conduct national primaries but that its
candidate selection process was nearly complete. The party’s
organization down to the grassroots continued to improve,
although a few local structures that had seen disagreement
over selecting a candidate remained dysfunctional. Ncube
made no prediction about when the party might lift its
“conditional suspension of participation” in the
parliamentary elections, but reported that the party’s
campaign was in an advanced stage of planning. The party was
finalizing its communications strategy, which nonetheless
would likely evolve to meet changing circumstances during the
campaign.
¶7. (C) Ncube asserted that how the MDC fared in elections
would depend on several factors beyond its control, e.g.,
access to the media, freedom of assembly, and police action
against perpetrators of violence. The party’s ability to
overcome voter apathy and voter fears on voting day would be
keys to maintaining seats in traditional MDC strongholds. To
do so, it was organizing “voting clubs” to project safety in
numbers, and would coordinate with authorities and observer
groups to try to address circumstances at the local level.
Ncube said estimates within the party for seats it will win
if it participates range from 10 to 65 — each extreme being
unrealistic in his estimation. Reiterating the uncertainty
of key variables, he said that he nonetheless expected the
party to win 45-55 seats. (Note: The parliament has 150
seats, 120 of which will be contested and 30 of which are
selected by the President. The MDC won 57 seats in 2000.
ZANU-PF will need to win 70 seats to gain a two-thirds
majority in parliament and amend the constitution at will.
End note.)
South Africa/SADC Issues
———————————-
¶8. (C) Regarding the ruling party/government espionage
scandal, Ncube said the opposition had seen court documents
that indicated the involvement of not only the South African
agent in GOZ custody, but the director-general and assistant
director-general of the South African National Security
Service. Asked by the Ambassador about the ANC’s recent
public statement taking the GOZ to task on election
conditions, its strongest to date (ref A), Ncube suggested
that it indicated that the spy affair had not given the GOZ
decisive leverage over the SAG.
¶9. (C) Ncube reported that the next SADC group to visit
Zimbabwe on elections was not likely to be at a high-level.
He said a group of SADC lawyers was scheduled to visit
Zimbabwe this week to review the country’s election-related
legal infrastructure, but had been advised that the GOZ would
only be prepared to receive them at an unspecified date next
week. The group was not prepared to address the most
important election environment issues, including media
access, freedom of assembly, and political
violence/intimidation.
Comment
———–
¶10. (C) We urge that serious consideration be given to
affording Mr. Tsvangirai access to the highest levels during
his visit, including a possible meeting with the President.
There are pros and cons for affording Tsvangirai such
exposure. First, this is an opportunity for the
Administration to underscore its commitment in Zimbabwe at
the outset of President Bush’s second term and soon after Dr.
Rice’s confirmation hearings in which she stressed our view
of Zimbabwe as an “an outpost of tyranny.” From his
perspective, Tsvangirai has concluded that such meetings
would do him more good than harm politically and we see no
reason to second guess the conclusion of the man closest to
the politics. The MDC President has been meeting African
heads of state — a rare honor for an opposition leader by
culture and tradition on the continent. He also was received
at the highest levels in Europe in December, including a
meeting with Prime Minister Blair. Such a gesture in
Washington will bolster Tsvangirai’s stature with domestic
and regional audiences.
¶11. (C) However, there are also potential downsides to such a
high visibility visit. It could provoke a backlash within a
ruling party that has been markedly moderating its posture
toward the U.S. and the opposition. It might also play into
the hands of GOZ propagandists in portraying the MDC as
Western lackeys. From our perspective, the risks can be
mitigated by public and private reiterations to the GOZ of
our priority on the election process and the prospects for
improved relations should the GOZ embark decisively on a path
to advancing rule of law, human rights, and democracy. While
there are good arguments to be made for and against an Oval
Office meeting and a meeting with the Secretary, on balance
we believe they would be constructive and recommend that the
requests be given favorable consideration.
DELL
(19 VIEWS)
