Several delegates to the G-8 meeting in Tokyo, a day before the presidential elections run-off in Zimbabwe, were angered at United Nations and European Union violations of the travel ban on President Robert Mugabe and his lieutenants but did not state who the culprits were.
They said the violations were being perpetrated at a time when British and United States diplomats were being detained in Zimbabwe.
US secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that Harare’s behaviour would not be tolerated elsewhere in the world, and that the time had come to stop thinking of Zimbabwe as a problem of backwards Africans incapable of democracy.
The Russians were the only delegation to oppose the mention of UN sanctions in a separate G8 document on Zimbabwe. They argued for a sober, “balanced approach” to language about Zimbabwe.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 08PARTO8, U) Secretary Rice’s June 26-27 Participation in
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Reference ID |
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DE RUCNAI #0008/01 1941210
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O 121210Z JUL 08
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TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 000008
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2018
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PHUM KNNP KWBG
KPAL, G8, BM, PK, AF, NK, IR, IS, ZI, SU, LE, UK, RS, FR,
CA, IT, JA
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Rice’s June 26-27 Participation in
the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Kyoto, Japan
¶1. (U) Classified by: Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State, Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
¶2. (U) June 27, 2008 at 18:00, and June 28, 2008 at
09:30; Kyoto, Japan.
¶3. (U) Participants:
U.S.
The Secretary
U/S Bill Burns
A/S Christopher R. Hill, EAP
Lt. Gen. William Fraser
Evan Reade (Embassy Notetaker)
Phil Cummings (Embassy Notetaker)
JAPAN
Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura
Kenichiro Sasae, Deputy Foreign Minister for Political
Affairs
Makita Shimokawa, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Takehiro Funakoshi, Principal Sr. Foreign Policy Advisor
GERMANY
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
Dr. Volker Stanzel, Director General for Political Affairs
Jens Plogner, Deputy Head of Foreign Office
Daniel Kriener, Deputy Division Head
FRANCE
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner
Gerard Araud, Dep. Sec. General and Political Director
Philippe Errera, Advisor for G-8
Philippe Faure, Ambassador to Japan
UNITED KINGDOM
Foreign Minister David Miliband
Mark Lyall-Grant, Director General for Political Affairs
Paul Williams, Head of Europe Global Group
David McFarlane, Minister’s Private Secretary
ITALY
Foreign Minister Franco Frattini
Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata, Political Director
Alain Maria Ecomomides, Chief of Cabinet
Mario Boba, Ambassador to Japan
CANADA
Foreign Minister David Emerson
Colleen Swords, Assistant Dep. Minister, Political Dir.
Barrett Bingley, Assistant to Foreign Minister
Ron Jarson, Director of Foreign Policy Planning Div.
RUSSIA
First Vice Minister Andrei Denisov
Sergei Kislyak, Deputy Foreign Minister
SLOVENIA (EU Presidency)
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrij Rupel
Matjaz Sinkovec, State Secretary
EU COUNCIL
Robert Cooper, Dir. Gen. for External and Pol-Mil Affairs
Bruno Scholl, Coordinator of Political and Security
Committee
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Karel Kovanda, Dep. Dir. General for External Relations
David Tirr, Head of Unit, European Correspondent
Stefan Huber, Minister Counselor
Dominic Al-Badri, Political Analyst
¶4. (C) SUMMARY: The G8 Foreign Ministers met in Kyoto on
June 26-27. At a working dinner on June 26 attended by
Principals plus Political Directors, the topics of Burma,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan were discussed. The next
morning the issues of North Korea, Iran, the Middle East
Peace Process, and Lebanon were taken up. The meeting
closed with a working lunch during which Zimbabwe and
Sudan were covered. The Chairman’s Statement, as well as
the G8 Foreign Ministers Statement on Zimbabwe and the G8
Foreign Ministers Statement on Afghanistan, can be found
on the Japanese MOFA’s website at
mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/f_kyoto08/in dex.html.
END SUMMARY.
—–
BURMA
—–
¶5. (C) In the Japanese-led discussion on Burma, G8
members noted the lackluster cyclone response by the
Burmese government, which led to an unnecessary loss of
life, in order for the Burmese regime to preserve the
illusion that the country did not need international help.
Several members, including Italy, pushed for a formal UN
statement on the regime’s lack of transparency in
accounting for its use of international humanitarian aid,
stating the international community was facing a
credibility test. Japan called for incentives to promote
change by the Burmese regime.
¶6. (C) Secretary Rice, the Canadians, and the British
favored adding stronger language to the G8 chair?s
statement addressing long-term political reforms and the
regime?s failure to provide an adequate response to the
cyclone. The Japanese noted concern with the growing
influence of China and India, neither of which promoted
democratic governance in Burma. Secretary Rice, the
French, the Russians, and the British proposed reaching
out to ASEAN and China to apply pressure on the regime.
The Russians were alone in calling for limited UN actions
and “balance” in the G8 statement by noting a small but
significant trend of improvement in the regime’s disaster
relief response.
——————–
PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN
——————–
¶7. (C) Participants were united in their concern over the
rise of extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATAs) along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and
over increasing political instability in Pakistan. There
was general agreement on increasing G8 member state
assistance in healthcare, education, border security, and
economic stabilization. The UK called for action to
weaken the pervasive role of the military in the Pakistani
government and to strengthen the role of civil society.
The Italians were strongly in favor of reviving the
Potsdam Process, where the leaders of both Afghanistan and
Pakistan were invited to the G-8 to foster cooperation on
economic development in the border region. Participants
expressed support for greater dialogue between Afghanistan
and Pakistan in order to diffuse growing political and
military tensions. The Canadians proposed more aid and
training to combat the narcotics trade, and together with
Russia warned that short-term accommodation of extremists
in Afghanistan ultimately destabilized both Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
¶8. (C) The British also proposed enlisting Saudi Arabia
and China, both of which had strengthened business,
military, and grassroots ties, to jointly promote G-8
priorities in the region. The Italians and Canadians
called for strengthening the rule of law in Afghanistan by
introducing programs to reduce judicial corruption.
Secretary Rice also noted problems with police corruption.
Several members expressed frustration with President
Karzai for slow progress on many reform fronts, and for
the corruption of members in his inner circle, but
Secretary Rice and others noted that Afghanistan had come
a long way in its civil and political development since
¶2001. The EU Council proposed distributing more official
direct assistance through local institutions rather than
international NGOs to boost the standing of local
governments.
———–
NORTH KOREA
———–
¶9. (C) Japanese FM Koumura led the discussion on North
Korea by noting the resolution of the North Korea nuclear
issue was an important challenge for the international
community and called for continued support for the Six-
Party Talks process. He welcomed the North’s declaration
of its nuclear programs but cautioned that a verification
regime must now be crafted and implemented. As for Japan-
North Korea relations, Koumura reported negotiations had
resumed on investigating the cases of Japanese citizens
abducted by the North.
¶10. (C) Secretary Rice concurred that while the
submission of the North’s declaration was an important
step, the creation of a verification protocol was even
more important. She predicted that Phase III of the Six-
Party Talks would be difficult as we must be certain that
the North accounted for, declared, and disabled its
nuclear program. Other important issues also remained,
she added, noting missile proliferation, the ongoing
humanitarian crisis, and the abduction issue, which was
not just an issue between Japan and North Korea, but an
issue between the United States and the North, as well.
She reminded the other participants that North Korea
remained the most closed and dangerous regime on earth and
that there must be a concerted effort to make it clear to
the North that we expected them to fulfill their
obligations and that everyone was watching.
¶11. (C) Following the Secretary’s remarks, FM Koumura
invited EAP Assistant Secretary Hill to report on recent
developments. A/S Hill stated the process had been a long
one and that much difficult work remained ahead.
Verification principles must be established and fashioned
into a process; the North must grant access to nuclear
materials, sites, and personnel. He said we were not
playing a game of trust with the North. Rather, we were
playing a game of serious verification. He predicted that
Phase III would see much more multilateral negotiations,
rather than bilateral talks with the North, and said that
once the abandonment stage was reached, the other nuclear
powers would also need to be involved. The Secretary then
touched on the recent measures taken by the United States
to rescind North Korea?s designation as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism (SST) and lift the application of the Trading
with the Enemy Act. She explained that very little had
been given up and that means of pressure remained.
¶12. (C) The EU Presidency commended A/S Hill and said the
progress achieved to date was a great success for the
international community. He stressed this success was the
result of engagement rather than isolation. With regard
to the humanitarian crisis, he noted the need to focus on
“small items,” such as leniency for North Koreans crossing
into China in search of food, in addition to the “big”
nuclear issue. French FM Kouchner focused on the
humanitarian dimensions of the situation in the North,
highlighting the lack of food, the resulting starvation,
malnutrition, and disease, and said that even if hospitals
existed to treat the sick, there were no means to
transport the ill to them. He said that North Korea must
agree to grant access to international aid organizations,
particularly those associated with the UN. In addition,
efforts must be made to inform the North Korean population
that our intention was to help them, not to hurt them. He
decried DPRK propaganda that made its people believe that
international food aid was poisoned. EC Representative
Kovanda pointed out that the EU maintained a small
technical cooperation office in the North but agreed with
Kouchner that international aid organizations lacked
access and that there was no information available on crop
production nor an assessment of the overall situation.
¶13. (C) Responding to an inquiry from Germany about
whether scholarships for North Korean students should be
offered, Secretary Rice said that none of us would feel
comfortable as long as the North remained closed as the
last Stalinist regime in the world. Efforts to promote
cultural, educational, and sporting exchanges should be
promoted, even though it was very doubtful the regime
would let its citizens participate. Russia indicated it
strongly supported Japan’s desire to resolve the abduction
issue and urged the Chair’s statement be strengthened to
include using President Bush’s language that this issue
must be resolved. VM Denisov also called for stronger
language on the North’s need to fully participate in the
verification process. FM Koumura thanked Russia and
others for their support on the abduction issue and again
urged the members of the G8 to support the on-going work
of the Six Parties.
—-
IRAN
—-
¶14. (C) French FM Kouchner led off the discussion by
stating all members of the G-8 shared concerns about
Iran’s nuclear program. The most recent report by IAEA
Director El Baradei and the outcome of the most recent
Board of Governors meeting strongly indicated Iran
continued to work toward the development of a nuclear
weapons capability. This, coupled with Iran’s continued
work on ballistic missile technology, could lead to a
worst-case possibility: a nuclear armed Iran. The P5-
plus-one had been trying to make progress with the
Iranians, but Tehran did not seem to want to hear that we
were not opposed to the development of a peaceful nuclear
program. As a result, the dual-track approach —
combining sanctions and incentives — was the only
approach open to us. The recent visit to Tehran by Javier
Solana and five of the six political directors meant we
were in a more delicate situation now, said Kouchner, who
commented that “we’d received Iran’s answer to our new
proposal before we arrived when the Iranians announced
they planned to bring 6,000 more centrifuges on line.”
Our central objective must continue to be to convince the
Iranians, both the public and the political elite, that we
were not opposed to a civil program and that sanctions
would continue to mount unless they ceased their uranium
enrichment activities.
¶15. (C) The Secretary concurred and said she was hopeful
we had done a better job of getting through to the Iranian
people with the publication of our latest offer. However,
the fact was that the Iranians continued to advance their
program, and others in the region were becoming more and
more nervous. There was a real danger that the Israelis
would soon become convinced that we could not halt Iran’s
program through diplomatic means. She stressed that if
Iran obtained a nuclear weapons capability, a difficult
region would become a chaotic region. Iran, she said, is
the most difficult issue facing the international
community.
¶16. (C) German FM Steinmeier agreed that Iran’s nuclear
program was not just a concern to the G8 but to the
neighbors as well. He suggested that Iran was also afraid
that perhaps its influence in other parts of the region
would wane if, for example, the Syrians and Israelis
reached an accord, or if Hamas and Fatah reconciled, or if
the situations in Lebanon and Iraq became more stable.
Accordingly, this gave Iran an incentive to continue its
nuclear program in order to maintain influence. Germany,
he said, was skeptical about what Iran’s response would be
to the P5+1 offer; if the response ultimately received was
not positive, further steps by the Security Council would
have to be considered.
¶17. (C) EU High Representative Solana did not expect a
breakthrough from Tehran, said EU Council Representative
Cooper, who pointed out that the Iranian default position
to any offer was to reject. “Rejecting offers is easier
than responding or agreeing in a consensus-based system.”
However, both the government and the media were clearly
impressed by the presence of the political directors,
particularly those from China and Russia, and by the fact
that the Secretary had also signed the letter conveying
the offer. Hopefully, a debate within Iran would be
launched as a result. Italian FM Frattini agreed that it
was easier for Iran to simply reject all offers because
once it accepted, it must negotiate and then fulfill
commitments. Italy, he said, supported taking a resolute
and firm approach and sanctions that were effective and
achievable. However, our contacts with Iran must be
calibrated to avoid conveying the message to a
nationalistically-sensitive populace that the world was
somehow out to get them. Italy understood Israel’s
concerns, but believed an attack on Iran would be
catastrophic and ultimately ineffective and urged that
voices be raised against this option.
¶18. (C) British FS Miliband said that although we had not
achieved a breakthrough on Iran, the conveyance of the
latest offer had at least established a bridgehead. Two
things must now be done, he said: increase the
international consensus against Iran and tighten the
screws. The first should involve widening the
international consensus against Iran’s nuclear ambitions
by bringing in other countries as well, such as India,
South Africa, and Brazil. Our ambassadors in these and
other countries should be engaged in joint demarchis and
public diplomacy events to stress the consensus. We must
also continue to build consensus in our own countries and
also within Iran using cultural, diplomatic, and sporting
events to convince the Iranians that “their other vital
interests are being harmed by immovable and stubborn
officials,” a phrase he quoted from an interview recently
given by a former deputy in Iran’s nuclear program. As
for tightening the screws, increased IAEA involvement was
called for. At the September meeting of the Board of
Governors it must be clear that we were all standing
together. In addition, we must build on the actions taken
already by the UNSC. Resolution 1803 should be enforced
and built upon.
¶19. (C) The Russian delegation said it had always
stressed to the Iranians that the P5-plus-one were
standing firmly together. Japanese FM Koumura reported
briefly on Prime Minister Fukuda’s recent meeting with
President Ahmadinejad, at which Fukuda conveyed the will
of the international community that Iran comply with the
Security Council resolutions and cease its uranium
enrichment activities.
—————————
MIDDLE EAST PEACE – LEBANON
—————————
¶20. (C) The Secretary led this session by confirming that
the Annapolis conference had launched three important
tracks. The first track involved improving the daily
lives of the Palestinians, particularly those in the West
Bank. There had been some progress in Jenin, where
security responsibilities had passed from the Israelis to
the Palestinian police. The Fayyad government was
dedicated to this process, whereby Palestinian police
stepped in, the Israelis stepped back, increased economic
activity followed, and access improved. She acknowledged
the process had seen some ups and downs involving Israeli
incursions and less freedom of movement than we would
like. The second track involved intensified efforts to
implement the Roadmap Agreement. We were monitoring how
the parties were meeting their Roadmap obligations. There
was a long way to go before the Palestinians could meet
their security obligations, and perhaps even a longer way
to go with regard to Israeli settlement activities. The
Secretary said she had held several trilateral meetings
with Prime Ministers Olmert and Fayyad to discuss the
Roadmap obligations in great detail. The third track, she
explained, was the negotiations track. Abu Alaa and FM
Livni had agreed these negotiations must be held in
private as they were discussing the most sensitive of
issues, including settlements, territory, borders, water,
security, and ultimately, Jerusalem. They had held
serious discussions and serious expert-level work was
taking place. The Secretary said she still held out hope
that a peace agreement could be achieved by December. The
difficulty was to convince others, and particularly the
Arabs, that real progress was being made.
¶21. (C) With regard to Gaza, the Secretary acknowledged
that the Palestinian Authority was not in control, and
this presented a problem. However, the Egyptian-
negotiated “calm” showed promise and could be built upon.
The Syrian-Israeli track, which was being moderated by the
Turks, at the very least gave a more comprehensive view of
the process. The most important thing to do at this time,
said the Secretary, was to maintain momentum. The
Annapolis conference, followed by meetings in Paris,
Bethlehem, Berlin, and a coming meeting in Moscow, would
keep the international community focused on the goal. The
parties remained committed to making progress, and despite
the difficult internal political situations faced by both,
continued to push ahead toward an agreement that would be
popular with both Palestinians and Israelis.
¶22. (C) Italian FM Frattini reported that the recent
Lebanese presidential election was a turn for the better
and it was necessary to take advantage of this as we
concentrate on the future. Prime Minister Siniora had yet
to form a government, but he was committed to the process
despite the difficulty in selecting ministers. The Doha
Agreement would be difficult to implement, but needed the
support of the international community, which must see it
as a package. We could not talk about disarming the
militias without concurrently strengthening the Lebanese
armed forces. Daily living conditions must be improved,
particularly in the Palestinian camps. The UNIFIL mission
was important and should be continued, but its
effectiveness on the ground could be improved with better
understanding on the rules of engagement and other issues.
Frattini urged the G8 to encourage Israel to show
readiness to discuss the Sheba Farms issue. Their
continued presence in this area gives Hezbollah a pretext
for its existence as a force to resist Israeli occupation,
adding that it seemed all agreed this small area was not
Israeli territory and that UN supervision of this issue
was called for.
¶23. (C) Russian Deputy FM Denisov said he agreed with the
above assessments and stressed that Russia was working
with its Quartet partners to overcome the negative trends
in the peace process. He noted an upcoming ministerial in
Tokyo between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians as a
positive development. The Slovenian minister said the EU
had been encouraged by the Annapolis process, the
activities of the Quartet, the Israel-Syria talks, and the
election in Lebanon, but not by the situation in the
Palestinian territories. He said the G8 must encourage
the Israelis to take a better attitude toward the building
of a viable Palestinian state; settlement activities and
roadblocks must stop. The Palestinians must be permitted
to develop the institutions of a state, including
healthcare institutions. German FM Steinmeier said his
country recognized the positive developments mentioned but
was not overly optimistic about the situation in Lebanon.
¶24. (C) The French view was that no one should be lulled
into forgetting the fact that “progress” was made in
Lebanon because Hezbollah took Beirut by force and over 60
people died. It was important to support the Siniora
government and to try to extend the agreement between
factions that led to the presidential elections. But the
facts that an “over-armed and dangerous” Hezbollah
remained a force to be reckoned with and that the
Christian camp was divided portended difficult times
ahead. Likewise, we should not get too carried away by
the fact that Israelis seemed to be willing to discuss
easing access to Gaza. Kouchner reported that President
Sarkozy had been very tough with the Israelis on the issue
of settlements during his recent visit, but was encouraged
that it was now at least possible to speak of Jerusalem as
the capital of two states without having members of the
Knesset walk out on him. Kouchner also expressed concern
that current Israeli decisions were being taken against
the backdrop of internal political uncertainties. He was
afraid that if the Israeli government fell, we would be
back to square one. He noted with some optimism the
existence of a bill in the Knesset to give financial
incentives to Israeli settlers to leave their homes and
said he believed a significant number of settlers would be
willing to do so.
¶25. (C) British FS Miliband touched upon three points.
First, the Palestinian financial crisis was an urgent
issue. Steps must be taken to ensure the government could
continue to function beyond July. Second, while the Jenin
model was key to furthering development in the West Bank,
continued steps to reform and strengthen the Palestinian
security sector were essential. Third, the process of
opening the crossings into Gaza must continue and the G8
must provide support for this.
¶26. (C) FM Koumura wrapped up the discussion by
explaining Japan’s “Corridor for Peace and Prosperity”
initiative and confirmed that Tokyo planned to host a
ministerial between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians
on July 2-3.
——————
CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE
——————
¶27. (C) On the day of contested by-elections,
participants made impassioned statements of dismay over
the escalating political and economic collapse of
Zimbabwe, once the breadbasket of southern Africa.
Secretary Rice, the British, and others forcefully spoke
of the threats to regional stability posed by President
Mugabe?s increased harassment, torture, and killing of the
political opposition. Several delegates expressed anger
at recent UN and EU violations of the travel ban imposed
on the Zimbabwean regime, even while UK and U.S. diplomats
were being detained in Zimbabwe.
¶28. (C) The foreign ministers broadly supported
publishing a separate statement on Zimbabwe with strong
language on imposing sanctions on the country should
Mugabe conduct a fraudulent by-election. Secretary Rice
stated that Harare?s behavior would not be tolerated
elsewhere in the world, and that the time had come to stop
thinking of Zimbabwe as a problem of backwards Africans
incapable of democracy. The Secretary said the United
States had run out of patience with South Africa?s “quiet
talks” and insisted on language in the G8 statement
referring to the GOZ as “illegitimate.”
¶29. (C) The Russians were the only delegation to oppose
the mention of UN sanctions in a separate G8 document on
Zimbabwe. They argued for a sober, “balanced approach” to
language about Zimbabwe. Although they did not object to
a separate statement by the G8, the Russians preferred
using the UN for action on Zimbabwe. In response,
Secretary Rice said she would consider bringing the matter
up in the UNSC on Tuesday.
—–
SUDAN
—–
¶30. (C) Participants underscored the difficulty in
finding solutions to the ongoing conflict in Sudan, as
well as the potential for regional spillover. Canada
requested G8 support in the UN for a renewal of the UNAMID
hybrid Africa Union/UN peace keeping operation mandate,
which is up for review in July, and for more member
states to participate in the mission. The Japanese added
their support to UNAMID and the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). The UK called for an improvement in the
quality, not just the quantity, of UNAMID support.
Secretary Rice underlined our support for the economic
reconstruction in southern Sudan, and our backing of the
SPLM, which has made the government of Sudan more
efficient. Secretary Rice and FS Miliband warned that the
unraveling of the CPA could lead to civil war and
emphasized the importance of Chinese cooperation on Sudan.
France drew attention to the 400,000 IDPs in Sudan, adding
to the general criticism of Khartoum. Japan said it was
considering a dispatch to UMAMID if Sudan neglected to
comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
RICE
(45 VIEWS)
