United States ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell, arguing that sanctions against Zimbabwe were working and there were increasing signs that President Robert Mugabe’s regime was crumbling and fragmenting, proposed to add more than 200 names to the United States sanctions list.
The list already contained most of President Robert Mugabe’s top lieutenants, their wives and children.
Dell proposed to add the names of senior members of the Zimbabwe Election Commission, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, ZANU-PF provincial chairpersons, the senior leadership of the security forces, including the police, military, and intelligence branches.
He also proposed to include the heads of key state-owned enterprises because this would serve to limit the government’s ability to use these parastatals as a tool of oppression and revenue-generation.
The ambassador, however, also wanted some senior moderate and reform-minded ZANU-PF officials to be excluded from the sanctions.
“Progressive individuals whom we have been able to cultivate should not be subject to the sanctions as it would jeopardize our ability to influence these individuals to work toward reforming the GOZ (government of Zimbabwe) and ZANU-PF from the inside,” he said.
“Moreover, granting exceptions would encourage more insiders to embrace reform and further wedges within the regime. This is consistent with past policy of excluding selected individuals from the financial and visa sanctions.”
Full cable:
Viewing cable 07HARARE232, RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL AND VISA
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Reference ID |
Created |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO0079
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0232/01 0791125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201125Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1274
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1528
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1386
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1532
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0205
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0794
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1158
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1587
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3991
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1357
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2015
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1749
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000232
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S. HILL
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS EFIN PGOV PHUM PINR PREL ZI
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL AND VISA
SANCTIONS
——–
Overview
——–
¶1. (SBU) U.S. sanctions have played a key role in putting
pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ). Post believes
that now is the time to deepen and expand the financial and
visa sanctions, and to apply further pressure on the regime
as it increasingly shows signs of crumbling and fragmenting.
We propose to aggressively target senior GOZ and ZANU-PF
officials by adding more than 200 names of individuals to the
sanctions lists who meet the current criteria for inclusion
in the sanctions regime. Post also recommends an amendment
to the current Executive Order on visa sanctions to add the
children of Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) to the
list. Many SDNs send their children abroad, including the
U.S., to study while at the same destroying the educational
opportunities for other Zimbabwean children. (Note. The
current Executive Orders already permit children’s inclusion
on the financial list. End Note.) To account for rapidly
unfolding events, Posts recommends that the sanction process
be streamlined so that we can more rapidly add new names as
information arises. End Overview.
————
The Criteria
————
¶2. (SBU) In his Zimbabwe Proclamation of February 22, 2002,
the President laid out criteria for barring particular
Zimbabweans from entry into the United States. The criteria
included senior members of the government of Robert Mugabe
and other Zimbabwean nationals who formulate, implement, or
benefit from policies that undermine or injure Zimbabwe’s
democratic institutions or impede the transition to a
multi-party democracy; persons who through their business
dealings with Zimbabwe government officials derive
significant financial benefit from policies that undermine or
injure Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions or impede the
transition to a multi-party democracy; and the spouses of
persons described above.
¶3. (SBU) In his Executive Order of November 23, 2005, the
President laid out criteria for blocking the property of
individuals found undermining Zimbabwe’s democratic processes
and institutions. The criteria includes individuals or
organizations found to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic
institutions and processes; have assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support to
these entities; to be owned, controlled, or acting on behalf
of a sanctions target; or to be an immediate family member of
a sanctions target.
——————–
Post’s Proposed List
——————–
¶4. (SBU) Over time Post has developed a detailed list of
individuals that we judge worthy of adding to the financial
and visa sanctions lists. Below is an overview of the
categories of individuals we suggest adding to the lists. We
have posted a detailed Excel spreadsheet of the suggested
revisions to our classified website and emailed a copy to
AF/S. Our classified website can be accessed at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/af/harare/
¶5. (SBU) With the exception of the extension to spouses (in
HARARE 00000232 002 OF 004
the visa criteria) and to immediate family members (in the
financial criteria), the criteria are nearly identical. Post
therefore recommends that the two lists be made identical, to
the extent possible, and that individuals subject to one form
of sanction be automatically be added to the other form of
sanction.
—————–
Names To Be Added
—————–
¶6. (SBU) As the ruling party for the past 26 years, ZANU-PF
has placed its firm imprint onto the decision-making
processes of the GOZ. For example, any policy decisions are
first discussed by the party structures of Central Committee
and Politburo and then passed on to the Cabinet (consisting
of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Provincial Governors) for
comment and approval. In this process, any member of the
Central Committee, Politburo, or Cabinet has an opportunity
to suggest, support, and/or oppose particular policies
brought before each body. As such, each member of the
Central Committee, Politburo, and Cabinet has a direct hand
in GOZ policy formulation. Therefore, we propose that all
Central Committee, Politburo and Cabinet members that are not
currently on the financial and visa sanctions lists be added.
¶7. (SBU) In addition, we propose inclusion of the most
senior officials of key GOZ institutions not already on the
lists. The senior members of the Zimbabwe Election
Commission, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and ZANU-PF
provincial chairpersons merit inclusion for their role in
suborning the integrity of Zimbabwean elections. The senior
leadership of the security forces, to include the police,
military, and intelligence branches, should also be included
for their decisions to apply Zimbabwean law in a manner that
violates human rights, and undermines democracy and the rule
of law.
¶8. (SBU) Post further recommends that heads of key
state-owned enterprises be added to the lists. Parastatal
heads are government employees, and are among the most
corrupt and venal of the civil servants. Targeting
parastatal heads would also serve to limit the GOZ’s ability
to use these parastatals as a tool of oppression and
revenue-generation. Consistent with prior policy decisions
we do not propose extending sanctions against parastatals
more broadly to avoid the dilemma that doing so might harm
the people of Zimbabwe. But there is great symbolic value in
including the senior executives as individuals.
———————————-
Inclusion of Children on Visa List
———————————-
¶9. (SBU) The GOZ and ZANU-PF have systematically crippled
Zimbabwe’s once-promising educational system, and have shown
a callous disregard for the plight of the country’s most
unfortunate schoolchildren, who do not have the same
opportunity to travel abroad for schooling as the children of
elites. At the same time, a significant number of senior GOZ
and ZANU-PF officials avoid the consequences of their
depredations by sending their children to the U.S. and
foreign destinations for education.
¶10. (SBU) A significant number of Zimbabwean critics of the
GOZ, while praising U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe, have
lamented that children of ZANU-PF officials have not been
HARARE 00000232 003 OF 004
included. These critics have told us that nothing would
catch the attention of ZANU-PF officials more quickly than
including their children on the sanctions lists. Denying
visas to children of these officials and refusing to renew
the visas of these children already in the U.S., in addition
to placing these children on the financial sanctions list,
would send a powerful message to the GOZ and ZANU-PF
hierarchy.
¶11. (SBU) We therefore recommend an amendment to the current
Executive Order on visa sanctions to add the children of SDNs
to the list. Our consular section already has the names and
identifying information of more than 30 children of SDNs who
are believed to have traveled to the U.S. and is working to
expand the list. Nine of these children are studying in the
U.S. and our consular section has heard reliable information
that additional children are studying in the U.S. under
tourist visas, leading us to believe that there are
additional children of SDNs studying in the U.S. We will
continue to work on updating this information. U.S.
leadership on this question could convince the U.K. and the
Australians among others, to also sanction the leadership’s
children.
¶12. (SBU) We also recommend revoking the visas of children
currently in the U.S., in addition to refusing to issue
future visas. Those currently in the U.S. tend to be the
children of ZANU-PF’s old guard, who are most opposed to
reform. Meanwhile, if the sanctions are not applied to those
who currently have visas, the measure would primarily affect
the families of the younger generation of ZANU-PF leaders,
who are not as resistent to reform.
———-
Exceptions
———-
¶13. (SBU) Among the categories of individuals listed above
who deserve inclusion in the financial and visa sanctions
list, there are a number of moderate and reform-minded
individuals for whom Post recommends that exceptions be made.
Progressive individuals whom we have been able to cultivate
should not be subject to the sanctions as it would jeopardize
our ability to influence these individuals to work toward
reforming the GOZ and ZANU-PF from the inside. Moreover,
granting exceptions would encourage more insiders to embrace
reform and further wedges within the regime. This is
consistent with past policy of excluding selected individuals
from the financial and visa sanctions.
——————-
Names To Be Deleted
——————-
¶14. (SBU) We also recommend removing individuals from the
lists who no longer meet the criteria of the sanctions
regimes. Many individuals were initially added for
association with former activities in the DRC and the flawed
parliamentary election in March 2005, but have no current,
significant political or financial role in the GOZ. These
individuals should be removed.
¶15. (SBU) Post recommends that deceased sanctioned
individuals remain on the financial sanctions list to prevent
family members from benefiting from the ill-gotten estate,
but that they be removed from the visa list.
HARARE 00000232 004 OF 004
————————
Streamlining The Process
————————
¶16. (SBU) Since the inception of the financial and visa
sanctions against targeted Zimbabwean officials an ad hoc
process of suggesting and approving revisions has developed.
As the lists have grown, however, this process has created
confusion and led to an increasing divergence between the two
lists. Moreover, this method is cumbersome, making it
difficult to cope with the increasingly rapid pace at which
we are collecting new names for consideration. To formalize
this process and to make the addition of new names more
nimble, Post recommends that AF/S maintain the authoritative
list for both the financial and visa sanctions. Post also
recommends that AF/S be charged with leading the inter-agency
process of reviewing the suggested revision. Post will
continue to collect names of individuals who merit inclusion
on the list and will then forward these names to AF/S for
consideration.
DELL
(27 VIEWS)
