Movement for Democratic Change Shadow Minister for Justice David Coltart said the party would impose conditions on inter-party talks and boycott flawed elections after the government had announced more than a year in advance that the 2005 parliamentary elections would be held March.
He also took donors to task for extending certain assistance to the government and for their indulgence of “quiet diplomacy”.
The United States embassy, however, said that for the MDC the elections were a Hobson’s choice.
The party feared that its participation in a flawed election would confer greater legitimacy on President Robert Mugabe’s party while a boycott would marginalise the MDC in the eyes of its electorate and the international community, particularly within the region.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE298, GOZ SETS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR MARCH AS
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000298
SIPDIS
NOFORN
AF/S FOR SDELISI, LAROIAN, MRAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER, DTEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR CGURNEY
PARIS FOR CNEARY
NAIROBI FOR TPFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2009
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI ZANU PF
SUBJECT: GOZ SETS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR MARCH AS
PLAYING FIELD TILTS STEEPER FOR RULING PARTY
REF: (A) HARARE 268 (B) HARARE 249 (C) HARARE 199 (D)
HARARE 188 (E) HARARE 174 (F) HARARE 73
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d)
¶1. SUMMARY: The GOZ’s February 19 announcement that
parliamentary elections would be conducted in March 2004
follows a series of setbacks to prospects that their conduct
would be free and fair. During the past week, the GOZ
withdrew its request for UN involvement in elections;
extended the permissable period of detention without charge
to a month; and continued to prevent The Daily News from
publishing. The ruling party gives no indication that it
will brook a fair election contest next year, leaving the
frustrated opposition contemplating an election boycott.
Instead, the message is that ZANU-PF is prepared to run
elections in its own flawed manner and intensify internal
repression while defying any international reaction this
provokes. END SUMMARY.
March Election Date
——————-
¶2. (C) State radio announced on February 19 that President
Mugabe had stated that parliamentary elections would be held
in March 2005. The constitution requires that elections be
conducted by June 2005. The announcement appeared to squelch
rumors that the government would declare snap elections in
the coming months. Minister for Justice, Parliamentary and
Legal Affairs (and principal inter-party interlocutor)
Patrick Chinamasa announced that voter registration would
begin in May. No mention was made of the timing of
presidential elections, which are scheduled for 2006 but have
been the subject of inter-party talks on talks (refs A and
D), or of any potential electoral reforms.
¶3. (C) UN officials confirmed to the Embassy press reports
that the GOZ had withdrawn its request for UN assistance in
the parliamentary election’s administration. They indicated
that the GOZ may reconsider but that the visit of a UN
election assessment team scheduled to begin March 3 had been
cancelled.
Due Process Further Curtailed
—————————–
¶4. (U) The GOZ on February 13 promulgated by executive fiat
the “Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Amendment of
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act” (text e-mailed to AF/S),
which permits police to hold individuals for seven days
without charge pending investigation of a crime, and for an
additional 21 days if the state produces prima facie evidence
of a crime. The measure prohibits a court from granting bail
in such instances. The GOZ trumpeted the measure as
necessary for its counter-corruption agenda and, indeed, the
measure has first been employed against a ZANU-PF politburo
member, James Makamba, in connection with alleged illegal
forex dealings.
¶5. (U) According to initial state media reports and
officially circulated summaries of the new measure, it was to
apply only to “economic” crimes, such as foreign exchange
“externalization” and trading in controlled items such as
grains or minerals. However, the measure’s annexes include a
host of non-economic offenses, including those under the
Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the law that often
serves as a pretext to arrest those criticizing the
government.
¶6. (U) The MDC and Zimbabwe’s legal community have vocally
condemned the new act in forceful terms. Objections include:
— The measure violates a constitutional provision limiting
detention of an individual without charge to 48 hours.
— It violates separation of powers principles as an
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority by the
executive.
— It represents an unconstitutional usurping of judicial
prerogative on bail by the executive.
Courts Temporizing
——————
¶7. (U) We are reporting via septel on the recess of
opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s treason trial and
deferral of decision on the consolidated appeal of issues
relating to operation of The Daily News (TDN). In the
meantime, TDN, the country’s only independent daily, has not
published since the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act (AIPPA) on February 5 (ref E).
MDC to Sit Out?
—————
¶8. MDC Spokesperson Paul Themba-Nyati reiterated on SW Radio
Africa February 18 that the party was seriously weighing a
boycott of the parliamentary elections if the GOZ did not
undertake meaningful reforms, including the establishment of
an independent electoral commission and significant curbs on
intimidation. MDC Shadow Minister for Legal Affairs David
Coltart circulated to diplomats and civil society
representatives the same day a missive (e-mailed to AF/S) in
which he suggested that the party impose conditions on
inter-party talks and boycott a flawed electoral process. He
also took donors to task for extending certain assistance to
the GOZ and for their indulgence of “quiet diplomacy”.
COMMENT
——-
¶9. (C) The GOZ’s withdrawal of its solicitation of UN
electoral assistance is just the most recent, though perhaps
most telling, indication that ZANU-PF has no intention of
countenancing a fair election contest or even a South
African-sponsored dialogue leading to presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2005. If ZANU-PF cannot entice
the MDC into a government of national unity (which still
seems unlikely), it will be content to have the opposition
participate in an election it will not be permitted to win.
The ruling party is unlikely to be moved by MDC threats to
boycott the election; it probably calculates on a quiescent
response to a flawed (even uncontested) election from enough
neighbors and developing countries to meet its low threshhold
of desired respectability. We see no evidence that the party
is considering the balancing — even superficially — of a
heavily tilted playing field to mollify its critics, as it
appears to fear the risks of a level field more than it does
any diminution of international assistance. The
non-substantiveness of the recent cabinet shuffle (ref B)
offers little hope of new perspectives in GOZ thinking;
indeed, it reflects a circling of wagons and preparation for
a campaign to crush the opposition electorally.
¶10. (C) For the MDC leadership, the election is a Hobson’s
choice: it fears that the opposition’s participation in a
flawed process will confer greater legitimacy on Mugabe’s
party while a boycott will simply marginalize themselves in
the eyes of their electorate and many in the international
community, particularly within the region. The detention
measure may significantly complicate prospects for mass
action by the MDC or civil society. In the past, arrested
demonstrators could effectively count on being released
within 48 hours; they must now weigh the costs to job and
family of a month’s detention. The MDC’s growing frustration
is likely to sharpen their appeals for international support.
¶11. (S/NF) Why did the GOZ implement its controversial new
measure via executive fiat instead of through a parliament it
thoroughly controls? Speed was important; sensitive
reporting indicates that Mugabe personally wanted to engineer
a quick, legal, and onerous sanction to shackle Makamba. In
addition, the ruling party wanted to avoid another brouhaha
like the one instigated by the opposition in parliament over
the recent Land Acquisition Act Amendments (ref C). Finally,
the party leadership may been nervous about the reaction of
its own MPs over the measure: several had been outspokenly
critical of the lengthy police detention without charge of
ZANU-PF MP Philip Chiyangwa (ref F), a practice effectively
legalized by this measure and one that can now be employed
against each of them.
¶12. (U) The coming months will offer a number of litmus
tests for government intentions toward individual liberties,
democratic processes, and the opposition. The MDC awaits a
response to its various proposals, including key electoral
reforms, in the inter-party talks on talks. The Supreme
Court has deferred a decision on TDN’s consolidated appeals,
which may decide the paper’s fate, until March 3. Nomination
filings for the Zengeza parliamentary by-election, often an
occasion for intimidation of opposition candidates, are
scheduled for February 20, with the by-election set to be
held March 27-28. A by-election for a formerly MDC-held
parliamentary seat in the rural district of Lupane will
follow at a date to be announced.
SULLIVAN
(22 VIEWS)
