The good, the bad and the alarming: Hichilema’s first 100 days in Zambia

Undermining the fight against corruption

When it became clear that Lungu had lost the elections this August, the incumbent had initially planned to challenge the results in the Constitutional Court, which was widely seen as biased in his favour. It was only after an unexpected closed-door meeting with Hichilema that he switched tack. In a short, televised address, a visibly subdued Lungu conceded and congratulated his soon-to-be successor.

Moments later, Hichilema delivered his own speech. He welcomed his election victory before addressing Lungu, saying “do not worry; you will be okay, sir”. He later tried to walk back these words, but this remark was widely seen as the public expression of the two men’s private political settlement; namely, that Lungu would drop his planned legal challenge in exchange for immunity after stepping down.

If this is the case, this deal would be deeply inappropriate. It would undermine the Director of Public Prosecutions and law enforcement agencies whose responsibility it is to decide who should be investigated and prosecuted. And it would bypass the National Assembly, the body with the power to remove a former president’s immunity in the face of clear evidence presented by the sitting president.

Failure to reflect diversity

One key criticism of Lungu’s rule was that he marginalised Zambians from Southern, Western and Northwestern provinces – regions that have historically voted for Hichilema. 26 of his 32 cabinet ministers, for instance, were either from the Chewa-speaking Eastern province or from one of three Bemba-speaking provinces. This preference was also seen clearly in the top leadership positions of the police, army, air force, national service, and office of the president.

Hichilema promised to do things differently if elected but has barely delivered. All five heads of Zambia’s security services as well as the top positions in the National Assembly and judiciary are held by people from the regions that have traditionally voted for him. His 27-person cabinet is relatively representative of Zambia’s ten provinces, but areas that have historically voted for PF are grossly underrepresented while 16 ministers come from ethnic groups that have typically formed the core of Hichilema’s base.

The new president’s record on other forms of inclusion is even worse. Even though the constitution calls for equal gender representation in public offices, just five cabinet ministers are women, which is half the figure under Lungu. To address electoral imbalances, the constitution allows the president to nominate eight persons to parliament, but Hichilema filled all the slots with men except one. Only one of Hichilema’s ten provincial ministers is female. He has further made no appointments of either youth, constitutionally defined as someone between the ages of 18 and 35, or persons with disabilities – a clear violation of the constitution.

Looking ahead

For someone elected on the promise to restore constitutionalism and the rule of law, Hichilema’s first 100 days provide little inspiration. Nonetheless, his political position seems secure, for now.

The new president remains popular, though his continued approval will depend on how he navigates the tough conditionalities that could come with an IMF deal. His central bank governor recently announced plans to remove subsidies on electricity, fertiliser, and fuel. If these moves are not carefully phased or strategically communicated, they could lead to urban discontent. This will especially be the case if a public sector wage freeze comes next and Hichilema’s administration is unable to provide employment for the many young people who voted for him.

Unless Hichilema incorporates more figures from underrepresented regions and women into his government, he also remains vulnerable to a political rival that could combine populist policies in urban centres with promises to rural areas that feel marginalised. This effective opposition, however, does not yet exist. The PF is in disarray while other opposition parties are mostly led by elitists without grassroots support or the language to connect with ordinary voters.

By Sishuwa Sishuwa for African Arguments

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