Is China ready for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe

According to Chinese official statistics, Zimbabwe consistently ranks as one of the top three destinations for Chinese investment in Africa. An estimated 10,000 Chinese nationals work in Zimbabwe.

As Zimbabwean opposition figures have expressed virulent opposition to China’s economic hegemony over Zimbabwe, Chinese business interests in Zimbabwe could be jeopardized if the ZANU-PF falls from power. Many of Mugabe’s opponents believe that China is propping up the ZANU-PF to make Zimbabwe a de facto colony of Beijing.

Representatives of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) vehemently oppose China’s crackdowns on collective bargaining rights in Zimbabwe. The ZCTU also opposes China’s policy of dumping cheaper goods into Zimbabwe’s markets, as this policy makes Zimbabwean goods uncompetitive.

In addition, the ZCTU has drawn attention to China’s alleged human rights abuses against Zimbabwean workers and flagrant violations of Zimbabwean pollution laws by Chinese steel companies.

According to Zimbabwean journalist John Karumbidza, ethnic tensions between Chinese expatriates and black Zimbabweans have risen markedly in recent years. To crack down on crimes perpetrated against Chinese nationals, Mugabe established a Chinese-language desk at Harare’s central police station and appointed a Minister of Chinese Affairs to his Cabinet.

These efforts have not ameliorated ethnic tensions in Zimbabwe. Some Zimbabwean police officers have reacted with derision at the prospect of learning Mandarin. Opposition activists have also scapegoated affluent Chinese-Zimbabweans for Zimbabwe’s economic plight.

Many Zimbabwean nationalist groups contend that Mugabe has encouraged Chinese immigration to Zimbabwe to further his own political interests, as Chinese expats are an economically influential support base for the ZANU-PF Party.

To counter popular perceptions that Beijing is firmly committed to the ZANU-PF’s retention of power at any cost, China has refused to provide unconditional support for Mugabe. Beijing’s reluctance to publicly support Mugabe during Zimbabwe’s recent protests demonstrates that China has learnt lessons from its conduct during the 2011 Libyan civil war.

Allegations that China had offered Muammar al-Gaddafi military support against Libyan rebel groups in September 2011 strained Beijing-Tripoli relations after Gaddafi’s demise. This is an outcome that China is keen to avoid if Mugabe succumbs to mass popular unrest.

China’s investments in Zimbabwe and diplomatic overtures with Mugabe regime officials suggest that the Beijing-Harare alliance remains largely intact. But tensions over Zimbabwe’s indigenization laws and China’s unwillingness to unconditionally support Mugabe against his domestic opponents reveal latent strains in the China-Zimbabwe relationship. It remains to be seen if reduced Chinese support for Mugabe weakens the ZANU-PF’s stranglehold on power and if China can increase its soft power in Zimbabwe enough to maintain its current leverage over Harare in the post-Mugabe era.

By Samuel Ramani. This article is reproduced from The Diplomat

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