Waiting for President Robert Mugabe to die was an imperfect solution but both the United States and the Dutch had been rebuffed by South African President Thabo Mbeki when they advocated a more aggressive South African posture on Zimbabwe.
Peter de Gooijer of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs speculated that the South Africans would, as a matter of principle, prioritise regional solidarity over political pragmatism in dealing with Harare.
Theresa Whelan of the United States said Washington was shifting its position regarding the South African Development Community in terms of Zimbabwe.
The US would work with the SADC as an element of the African Union concept and with Zimbabwe as a member of the SADC, but would not engage Harare bilaterally.
Ed: That was seven years ago. Mugabe is still alive but a solution was found three years later by the same Thabo Mbeki.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2973, NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DASD WHELAN’S VISIT TO THE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002973
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR DASD WHELAN
STATE FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND S/CRS
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/UBI/REITER
USEU FOR LERNER AND BRENNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PREL MCAP NL XA MASS MARR PGOV
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DASD WHELAN’S VISIT TO THE
HAGUE
REF: THE HAGUE 02756
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).
¶1. (U) SUMMARY. On October 14, DASD for African Affairs
Theresa Whelan met with several representatives of the Dutch
MFA and MOD. Discussion during the two meetings included
GONL and USG involvement in SSR and DDR initiatives in South
Africa, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, as well as
mutual commitment to combating HIV/AIDS and violence against
women. Participants shared interest in approaching
post-conflict situations holistically, perspectives on the
future roles of NATO and the EU in Africa, and concerns about
weapons destruction initiatives. END SUMMARY.
SOUTH AFRICA: FIRST WORLD INFRASTRUCTURE, THIRD WORLD TALENT
——————————————— —————
¶2. (C) Dutch interlocutors agreed with DASD Whelan’s
assessment that the South African military is the sole force
on the continent that has the potential to operate on the
brigade level and is thus the most likely candidate to play a
significant role in African peace and security.
Consequently, the Dutch share the USG’s view that building
the capacity of the rapidly crumbling South African military
forces is crucial. Peter de Gooijer (Deputy Director
General, Political Affairs, MFA) pointed to FM Bot’s Oct.
10-11 visit to Johannesburg as evidence of Dutch interest in
building a strategic partnership with the South Africans.
During his visit, Bot signed an agreement giving the South
Africans 5 million euros for SSR/DDR activities in the DRC
and another allowing the South Africans to make more use of
Dutch military training capabilities and exercise
opportunities.
¶3. (C) The Dutch share the USG’s opinion that South Africa
can play a key role in counter-terrorism initiatives. DASD
Whelan suggested that joint Dutch – U.S. action to combat
bogus South African passports, which are relatively easy to
counterfeit and have considerable clout on the continent,
would make a significant contribution to the war against
terror in Africa.
¶4. (U) Dutch interlocutors agreed that the GONL and the USG
should continue to explore avenues of cooperation in building
the capacity of the South African military. DASD Whelan
agreed to lay the groundwork for a joint project during
working-level meetings with the South Africans on November 7
and 8. Dutch counterparts agreed to continue the momentum
during meetings planned in South Africa in December and
January.
¶5. (C) Both the Dutch and the U.S. have advocated a more
aggressive South African posture vis-a-vis Zimbabwe, and both
have been rebuffed by President Mbeki. De Gooijer speculated
that the South Africans will, as a matter of principle,
prioritize regional solidarity over political pragmatism in
dealing with Harare. Though DASD Whelan and De Gooijer
agreed that waiting for Mugabe to die was an imperfect
solution, DASD Whelan explained that the USG is shifting its
position regarding the South African Development Community
(SADC) in terms of Zimbabwe. The USG will work with the SADC
as an element of the AU concept and with Zimbabwe as a member
of the SADC, but will not/not engage Harare bilaterally.
¶6. (U) The South Africans have approached both the U.S. and
the Dutch with a proposal to build a facility to destroy
small weapons not only from South Africa but also from
conflict regions such as the DRC. De Gooijer explained that
the Dutch find the proposal illogical, since small weapons
can be destroyed easily enough in conflict zones without a
dedicated facility to do so. De Gooijer also pointed to the
logistical hurdles in moving arms confiscated in the DRC, for
instance, to South Africa for destruction. DASD Whelan
responded that the Swedes committed to financing in part the
construction of a small weapons confiscation center for the
South Africans as an offset of the South Africans’ purchase
of 28 Gripen fighters. The South Africans have appealed to
the USG to pay their share of the construction costs.
SUDAN: DUTCH DO NOT SUPPORT BLUEHATTING AMIS TROOPS
——————————————— ——
¶7. (U) Dutch counterparts agreed that the recent kidnapping
of military observers by a faction of the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) seriously undermined AMIS’s
credibility. Given shared interest in building the capacity
of the AU to address security problems in Africa, USG and
GONL participants agreed that delegating AMIS authority to
UNMIS in the short term may be a blow from which the AU could
not recover. DASD Whelan expressed conviction that handing
over control to UNMIS in the long term is nevertheless
inevitable. The Dutch, however, do not support bluehatting
AMIS troops. Hans Docter (Deputy Head of the Sudan Task
Force, MFA) explained that the GONL will continue efforts to
build the capacity of AMIS troops with the expectation that
AMIS will be able to sustain supervision of SSR/DDR
activities in Darfur.
¶8. (U) The Dutch do not fully understand USG prioritization
of SPLA integration over the creation of the Joint Integrated
Units (JIUs) pursuant to the IMAT paradigm. Dutch officials
were stunned by DASD Whelan’s assertion that the SPLA intends
to hedge its bets on the success of the Government of
National Unity (GNU) by maintaining a separate standing army
of approximately 60-140 thousand troops subsidized by the
SPLM’s share of projected oil revenues.
¶9. (U) The Dutch made a strong pitch to DASD Whelan for U.S.
cooperation on initiatives to combat violence against women,
particularly in Sudan, where the Dutch have expressed
interest in joint initiatives and have a one million euro
fund dedicated to such initiatives.
RWANDA
——
¶10. (C) The U.S. and the Dutch share an interest in using
Rwandan military forces in external peacekeeping missions and
agree that a necessary first step toward realizing this
objective is intensive troop training. DM Kamp recently
signed an MOU in Kigali on bilateral military cooperation
that will assist Rwandan military forces in carrying out
crisis management operations in Africa. Dutch peace and
stability projects could serve as excellent complements to
USG training efforts in the region. USG Just In Time
Training (JITT) for Rwandan troops destined for AMIS service
faces resistance from Congress; DASD Whelan encouraged Dutch
interlocutors to continue the program or present a
sustainable troop-training alternative.
BURUNDI
——-
¶11. (U) The Dutch see Burundi as an important priority; they
have contributed 103 million euros for SSR/DDR initiatives
and to the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB). DASD
Whelan suggested the Dutch collaborate with the USG on a
language lab project, explaining that perhaps the Dutch could
construct the lab facility and the USG could provide the
necessary materials (computers, language books).
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC): A LONG WAY TO GO
——————————————— ———–
¶12. (C) The USG is prepared to provide brigade-level support
for SSR/DDR initiatives in the DRC. DASD Whelan lamented
that it will nonetheless be at least a decade before the
FARDC is more than an army in name only. The USG is
interested in making a substantive contribution to the
multilateral effort in the DRC, but has yet to identify where
in particular; DASD Whelan suggested that perhaps the USG
would do so at the level of the Ministry of Defense.
¶13. (U) The Dutch are considering projects to improve the
intelligence capability of MONUC. DASD Whelan explained that
the impediments to intelligence sharing in the DRC are
fundamental, largely consisting of tactical challenges to
collecting information at the human level. DASD Whelan put
forth the DOD’s tripartite intelligence fusion cell
initiative as a method of facilitating the flow of
information from the field to MONUC. Dutch interlocutors
agreed to continue exchanging views and expertise with regard
to building the capacity of the intelligence regime in the
DRC.
EU AND NATO: WORKING TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE
——————————————-
¶14. (U) While reactions were not unanimous in the subject,
most interlocutors enthusiastically greeted DASD Whelan’s
suggestion that the EU and NATO work complementarily in
Africa. Robert de Groot, (Director of Security Initiatives,
MFA) and Major General Cobelens (Director of Operations, MOD)
embraced DASD Whelan’s suggestion that NATO’s expertise in
SSR/DDR and capacity-building could buttress the AU’s
operational efforts in Sudan and elsewhere. DASD Whelan
underscored the vital role NATO could play in realizing the
concept of an African Standby Force. Col. Langdorf added
that the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative could be
adapted to Sub-Saharan Africa.
¶15. (U) Hans Horbach (Deputy Director of Security
Initiatives, MFA) praised NATO’s SSR/DDR capabilities and
lamented a tension between NATO and the EU that he saw as
more perceived than real, pointing to the press as the
instigator of the perception. Whether real or perceived,
DASD Whelan argued that the working relationship between the
two entities was flawed, as evidenced by the disappointing
results of the MAPEX activities in Sudan in September.
Docter and De Groot, acknowledging the EU-NATO relationship
in Sudan is dysfunctional, suggested that the EU assume more
responsibility for logistics, management, and policing and
leave SSR/DDR activities to NATO.
¶16. (U) De Groot expressed enthusiasm for the prospect of
Dutch involvement in NATO capacity-building initiatives on
the regional level, suggesting that the GONL and USG take a
year to come up with a joint “blueprint” of NATO
capacity-building initiatives in Africa. Though USG efforts
in capacity-building on the regional level have been focused
in the West, DASD Whelan was enthusiastic about other
regional opportunities, despite logistical hurdles. She
explained that prior USG cooperation with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was largely a
result of the fact that ECOWAS has a system that facilitates
direct engagement, unlike SADC. Dutch interlocutors shared
DASD Whelan’s interest in engaging SADC through NATO.
THINKING HOLISTICALLY
———————
¶17. (U) The Dutch are keenly interested in taking a holistic
approach to post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in
Africa. DASD Whelan explained that the DOD Strategy
Department is working on a pilot project that approaches
“ungoverned space” holistically in an effort to avoid
stovepiping. She suggested that perhaps the Dutch could
inform the DOD’s analysis of the way forward in synthesizing
the tripartite command structure — CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM
— currently in force in Africa. Joint Dutch – U.S
initiatives in holistic thinking may be particularly
pertinent to Africa’s troubled maritime space, rife with
fishing conflicts, smuggling, and piracy. Major General
Cobelens was enthusiastic about the prospect of combating
Somalian pirates with CENTCOM. Dutch counterparts agreed
with DASD Whelan’s suggestion that the South African Navy be
included in joint GONL-USG maritime security initiatives in
Africa and in Task Force 150 operations, provided the scope
of the Task Force could be expanded.
¶18. (U) While conceptual common ground was found on myriad
topics, DASD Whelan and De Gooijer were especially engaged in
sharing their views on the sequencing of point-conflict
reconstruction. Whelan and de Gooijer agreed that security
is a necessary element of development and that development
therefore cannot commence until security has been
established. De Gooijer added that the South African’s
shared opinions on this subject figured prominently in the
Dutch decision to identify South Africa as a key ally on the
continent.
HIV/AIDS
——–
¶19. (U) Dutch interlocutors shared their interest in
combating HIV/AIDS in Africa and urged the U.S. to consider
joint initiatives. Dutch Parliament, they said, is always
interested in HIV/AIDS projects in Africa. DASD Whelan
explained that implementation of all USG HIV/AIDS initiatives
involving the military comes from the Naval Health Research
Center (NHRC) in San Diego. She invited Dutch counterparts
to the NHRC for an information exchange and consultations.
In the alternative, NHRC officials perhaps could come to the
Netherlands. DASD Whelan further suggested that the Dutch
and the U.S. explore possibilities of working as implementing
partners on AIDS initiatives in Africa, particularly in South
Africa, where estimates of HIV infection in the military run
as high as 45 per cent.
SCHOFER
(25 VIEWS)
