US wanted EU to extend sanctions on Mugabe lieutenants

The United States urged the European Union to expand its list of targeted sanctions of individuals and state-owned enterprises in Zimbabwe following the controversial presidential elections run-off of 2008 which Robert Mugabe won unchallenged after Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai had pulled out because of increased violence.

In a call ahead of the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, the US urged the EU to consider listing all of the individuals and entities subject to the US Zimbabwe sanctions programme.

It also urged the EU to support the US draft resolution which would impose a comprehensive arms embargo as well as an asset freeze and travel ban on those designated as having engaged in or provided support for actions or policies to undermine democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe, including having ordered, planned, or participated in acts of politically motivated violence.

“We need your support for getting the AU, UN, and members of SADC, especially Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, to help to mediate negotiations between Mugabe and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai,” the US said.

Full cable:

Viewing cable 08STATE75702, APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 075702

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 07/14/18

TAGS: EUN PHUM PREL PGOV IR SO SU CD ZI UP

SIPDIS

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

¶1. (U) Classified by Jeffrey Giauque, Senior Political

Officer, EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 12.

¶3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their

next General Affairs and External Relations Council

(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on July 22-23. We expect the

formal agenda to include: Somalia, Chad/Sudan/Darfur,

Zimbabwe, and Ukraine. Although Iran is not on the formal

agenda, we expect that it will be discussed. A background

section covering some of these issues is provided prior to

a section containing talking points. Points are to be

delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level to

EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver these

points. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS caption

on their response cables and to reference this cable.

BACKGROUND

———-

IRAN

¶4. (C) For several months, we have urged the EU to take

three key steps on Iran: 1) designate a list of additional

entities (including Bank Melli) and individuals associated

with Iran's nuclear and missile programs under existing EU

policy, 2) Adopt UNSCR 1803 into EU policy, and 3) adopt a

series of truly new autonomous measures that go beyond

existing EU policy. On June 23, the EU took the first of

these steps, adding 12 prominent individuals and 14

entities, including Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, to

its existing designation list for travel bans and asset

freezes.

¶5. (C) Although the EU has already implemented some parts

of UNSCR 1803 (including the ban on Nuclear Suppliers

Group-controlled dual-use items and by designating all of

the names in the resolution's annex), it has not yet

formally incorporated other parts into EU policy and

regulations, including the calls for additional vigilance

on Iranian banks and inspections of cargo transported by

two specific Iranian shipping and aviation lines involved

in proliferation activities. We had expected the EU to

take these remaining steps on 1803 at its monthly foreign

ministers meeting July 22-23, but the fact that Iran is

not currently on the GAERC agenda suggests this may not

happen.

¶6. (C) Beyond implementing 1803 in a robust manner, we

would like the EU to implement the broadest possible

package of additional autonomous measures on which it can

reach consensus. This could include such steps as a ban

on new export credits or a ban on new investments in

Iran's oil and gas sector. Ideally, the EU would

implement these autonomous measures at the same time it

adopted 1803 into EU policy, but if consensus cannot be

reached to act on the autonomous measures so quickly, then

we want the EU to implement the autonomous measures as

soon as possible after it adopts 1803.

¶7. (C) If consensus on strong new EU actions cannot be

reached expeditiously, we hope individual EU Member States

or groups of Member States (a "coalition of the willing")

will take action. We have stressed to the EU that other

key states, including Asian and Middle Eastern countries,

look to the EU to show leadership on Iran. We are hopeful

that others will follow the EU lead on both the June 23

designations and any future steps the EU may take in order

to increase the pressure on Iran as much as possible.

¶8. (C) Pursuing sanctions is entirely consistent with and

supportive of the P5+1 dual track policy. HR Solana

delivered the updated P5+1 incentives package to the

Iranians June 14 and Tehran formally responded to Solana

on July 4. While the Iranian response is still being

studied, we must maintain and increase the pressure until

Iran complies with its obligations. Solana is set to

travel to meet again with Iranian officials to discuss our

offer on July 19; sending an EU signal that it will

STATE 00075702 002 OF 005

SOMALIA

¶9. (SBU) The United States continues to support the

transitional political process outlined by Somalia's

Transitional Federal Charter, which provides the mandate

for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and outlines

a process leading to national elections in 2009, as the

best framework for achieving lasting peace and stability

in Somalia. We fully support the June 9 agreement between

the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation for Somalia

(ARS) and will continue to work closely with the United

Nations (UN) Special Representative of the Secretary

General (SRSG), Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, and our

international partners to ensure the agreement is fully

implemented. To ensure that the agreement is successful,

the international community must move quickly to provide

support, including continuing our efforts to improve the

security environment inside Somalia by supporting the

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), moving towards

deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and

undertaking longer-term security sector reform efforts.

We also continue to focus on the issue of piracy and armed

robbery off the coast of Somalia and are working with our

Security Council partners in this regard.

ZIMBABWE

¶10. (SBU) The political, economic and humanitarian

situations remain in flux in Zimbabwe. Since the March 29

national election, at least 100 people have lost their

lives, 30,000 have been driven from their homes, and

hundreds have sought medical attention because of

political violence. Prior to the June 27 runoff

presidential election, the Mugabe regime also suspended

activities of many NGOs, compounding an already delicate

humanitarian situation. Hyperinflation and a crumbling

economy, fueled by the regime's unwillingness to follow

rudimentary financial protocols and practices, have put

Zimbabwe on the brink of complete collapse. The situation

is complicated by a regional response that has been slow

and ineffective to date in mediating a political solution.

As a precursor to return to the negotiating table,

opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai has stated

unequivocally that he will not negotiate with the Mugabe

regime until the African Union (AU) becomes involved, the

violence ends, and the Movement for Democratic Change

(MDC) party officials and supporters are released from

jail.

UKRAINE

¶11. (SBU) The Ukrainian government has emphasized its

intention for further integration into European and Euro-

Atlantic institutions. Despite significant efforts in

advance of the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Ukraine was not

offered a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), but the

Allies agreed in the Summit Declaration that Ukraine "will

Become" a member of NATO, with Foreign Ministers empowered

to make a decision at the December Ministerial. While MAP

is not a guarantee of membership, this key step will help

solidify democratic gains, civilian accountability and

promote further reform in Ukraine. EU membership remains

a longer term project, however, as several EU member

states have resisted further integration with Kyiv beyond

plans for a free trade agreement and the EU's proposed

"Eastern Partnership." Ukraine's relations with the EU

are currently governed by a Partnership and Cooperation

Agreement (PCA) in force since 1998. Kyiv sees the

document as outdated and politically insufficient, and

negotiations to replace the PCA began in March 2007. To

date, eight rounds of talks – mainly focusing on a free

trade agreement – have taken place. The most recent talks

on June 2-4 saw the launch of a discussion on the general

principles and framework of a new "enhanced agreement."

The French EU Presidency hopes to finalize this part of

the negotiations by the time of the EU-Ukraine Summit on

September 9 in Evian, France. Energy issues will likely

be a significant component of those discussions.

¶12. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following

points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as

possible (in advance of the July 22-23 GAERC).

STATE 00075702 003 OF 005

IRAN

–We appreciate the EU's June 23 adoption of a list of

additional designations of individuals and entities

associated with Iran's nuclear program for travel bans and

asset freezes. We hope that all EU Member States will

implement these designations rapidly and effectively.

–We look forward to the EU's adoption of UNSCR 1803 into

an EU Common Position in the most robust manner possible.

This could include making mandatory those provisions left

as voluntary in the resolution, such as the calls for

additional vigilance on Iranian banks and inspections on

cargo transported by Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic

Republic of Iran Shipping Line. We strongly urge the EU

to act on 1803 at the July 22-23 foreign ministers meeting

(GAERC).

–Beyond 1803, we urge the EU to develop a strong package

of autonomous measures to increase the pressure on Iran to

negotiate. Effective steps could include a ban on new

export credits and a ban on new investments in Iran's oil

and gas sector.

–In order to maximize the impact of new EU action and to

build on the momentum created by the June 23 designations,

such autonomous measures would ideally be adopted at the

same time the EU implements 1803. However, if consensus

cannot be reached on this, then we would like the EU to

implement the autonomous measures as soon as possible

after completing the implementation of 1803.

–Pursuing autonomous sanctions and implementing those

mandated by the UNSC is entirely consistent with and

supportive of the P5+1 dual track policy. We hope that

Iran will agree to suspend its proliferation sensitive

nuclear activities, but we must continue to ratchet up the

pressure on Iran until Iran complies with its

international obligations.

–Many states in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere are

looking to the EU for leadership on Iran, and are likely

to follow its lead, either in taking decisive action or in

allowing Iran to continue to stall for time.

–Time is of the essence. Although sanctions take time to

work, they are a critical tool for international pressure;

meanwhile, Iran is advancing in its uranium enrichment and

other sensitive nuclear activities in a bid to present the

international community with a perception of progress –

real or symbolic – that we cannot accept.

SOMALIA

–The United States fully supports the June 9 agreement

between the TFG and ARS reached in Djibouti and fully

supports the efforts of the UN SRSG, Ahmedou Ould-

Abdallah, to ensure the full and effective implementation

of this agreement. We continue to encourage all Somali

parties to adhere to the terms of the agreement and to

work together in a process of peaceful dialogue to resume

the transitional process as outlined by the Transitional

Federal Charter.

–While we continue to support the ongoing political

dialogue process, we urge the European Union (EU) and its

member-states to provide financial support for the African

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is already

playing a key role on the ground in helping to create the

conditions for lasting peace and stability.

–At the same time, we must begin to quickly move towards

deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia in

response to the request contained in the June 9 agreement

to authorize and deploy an international stabilization

force.

–The United States also remains deeply concerned about

the increasing number of acts of piracy and armed robbery

off the coast of Somalia, and strongly supports regional

efforts to strengthen maritime security.

–Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution

1816, we are seeking confirmation from those countries

STATE 00075702 004 OF 005

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER

interested in participating in joint interdiction

operations with the multi-national Combined Task Force

(CTF) 150 off the coast of Somalia.

–In addition, we urge all countries, particularly those

with the legal capacity to do so, to commit to take into

custody, investigate, and prosecute, as feasible and

permitted by national laws, persons detained in the course

of interdiction operations, in support of implementation

of UNSCR 1816. Detained persons may include victims,

suspects, or witnesses.

SUDAN/DARFUR

–The United States and the EU must continue to push for

robust implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA), particularly resolution of the Abyei boundary

dispute. The recent military confrontation between

northern and southern troops in Abyei, resulting in

extremely dire humanitarian circumstances, underscores the

importance of permanently resolving key areas of impasse

under the CPA.

–Continued U.S. and EU efforts to train and equip troop

contributing countries for their participation in the

UN/African Union hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) are

crucial to that mission's success.

–The Darfur peace process needs robust reinvigoration.

The U.S. and EU must jointly continue support for the

UN/AU led process, including the recent appointment of

Burkinabe Foreign Minister Djibril Bassole as the Joint

Chief Mediator, while pushing for forward movement.

CHAD

–Both the U.S. and EU need to support the regional

contact group created out of the Dakar Accord and the

African Union's efforts to urge both Chad and Sudan to

repair diplomatic relations immediately and commit to

bringing peace to the region.

–The U.S. and EU should also support the Contact Group's

efforts to establish a security force with a mandate to

secure the border, also laid out in the framework of the

accord.

–The crisis in Darfur has extended beyond the borders of

Sudan into Chad, resulting in an estimated 400,000

Sudanese refugees and IDPs living in Chad. Renewed

tensions between Sudan and Chad threaten humanitarian

operations and the success of EUFOR and MINURCAT

operations.

ZIMBABWE

–We welcome EU attention to the situation in Zimbabwe and

urge the EU to expand its list of targeted sanctions of

individuals and state-owned enterprises. We urge the EU

to consider listing all of the individuals and entities

subject to the U.S. Zimbabwe sanctions program. The

United States would welcome further information sharing

with the EU on this matter.

–The U.S. draft resolution contains Chapter VII measures,

which would impose a comprehensive arms embargo as well as

an asset freeze and travel ban on those designated as

having engaged in or provided support for actions or

policies to undermine democratic processes or institutions

in Zimbabwe, including having ordered, planned, or

participated in acts of politically motivated violence.

–We need your support for getting the AU, UN, and members

of SADC, especially Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South

Africa, to help to mediate negotiations between Mugabe and

MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai.

UKRAINE

–We should work together to promote government stability

in Ukraine and stress the need to put the good of the

country above individual interests. We encourage the EU

to recognize Ukraine's westward orientation and to remain

open to cooperation and partnership whenever possible.

Signaling to Ukraine that membership is possible upon

fulfillment of proper conditions would reinforce and

STATE 00075702 005 OF 005

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE JULY 22-23

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAER

accelerate political and economic reform. Conversely, a

closed door would likely have a negative effect on

Ukraine's development and its westward orientation.

–We welcome Ukraine's continued work with the EU, and we

look forward to coordinating with Brussels on actions to

advance economic reforms and promote domestic stability.

In particular, we hope to work in tandem with the EU to

encourage greater attention to battling corruption,

promoting transparency, and improving the investment

climate in Ukraine.

–We also look forward to working with the EU on

developing a trilateral energy dialogue with Ukraine that

promotes greater transparency, efficiency, diversification

of energy sources and routes, the elimination of

middlemen, and market principles.

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