US urged EU to list all Zimbabweans on its list

The United States urged the European Union to expand its sanctions on Zimbabwean individuals to include everyone that was on its own list and welcomed the EU’s decision to include central bank governor Gideon Gono.

It made the request five days before the three major political parties in Zimbabwe signed the Global Political Agreement that ushered the inclusive government that has been running the country since February 2009.

In a briefing aimed at EU Foreign Ministers who were scheduled to meet on 15 and 16 September, the US said: “We believe it is important to keep the United Nations focused on Zimbabwe and hope that the UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios will brief the UNSC as soon as he returns from his travels to southern Africa. We encourage the EU to support such a briefing and any appropriate follow up UN action.”

Zimbabwe’s three major political parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change, signed the GPA on 15 September.

 

Full cable:

 

Viewing cable 08STATE96598, APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER

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Reference ID	Created	Classification	Origin
08STATE96598	2008-09-10 02:34	CONFIDENTIAL	Secretary of State

VZCZCXRO9090

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DE RUEHC #6598/01 2540238

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O R 100234Z SEP 08

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 2952

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 9113

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2994

RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 8616

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4327

RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0668

RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1476

RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 9778

RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 5728

RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 2016

RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 4600

RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5651

RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 8594

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 096598

 

SIPDIS, BELGRADE PASS TO PODGORICA

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: ASS: 09/09/18

TAGS: EUN PHUM PREL PGOV ZL ZI SO YI TU GG RS

SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE SEPTEMBER

15-16 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC)

 

¶1. (U) Classified by Bill Lucas, Office Director,

EUR/ERA. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

 

¶2. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 14.

 

¶3. (SBU) Summary: EU Foreign Ministers will hold their

next General Affairs and External Relations Council

(GAERC) meeting in Brussels on September 15-16. We

expect the formal agenda to include: Zimbabwe, Somalia,

Serbia, Turkey, and Georgia. A background section

covering all of these issues except Georgia is provided

prior to a section containing talking points. Georgia

will be addressed in a separate cable. Points are to be

delivered as soon as possible at the appropriate level

to EU members only. Other posts should not/not deliver

these points. Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS

caption on their response cables and to reference this

cable.

 

 

BACKGROUND

———

 

ZIMBABWE

 

¶4. (SBU) On July 24, Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the

Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and Robert Mugabe

entered into negotiations mediated by South African

President Thabo Mbeki under the auspices of the Southern

African Development Community. The talks have since

stalled over the central question of the division of

executive authority, including control of the security

forces. On August 25, the lower house of Parliament

selected an MDC speaker, energizing the opposition to

continue to hold the line in negotiations.   The

economic and humanitarian situations remain in flux in

Zimbabwe. Since the March 29 national elections, at

least 171 people have lost their lives, 30,000 have been

driven from their homes, and hundreds have sought

medical attention because of political violence.

Hyperinflation and a crumbling economy, fueled by the

regime’s unwillingness to follow rudimentary financial

protocols and practices, have put Zimbabwe on the brink

of complete collapse. Prior to the June 27 runoff

presidential election, the Mugabe regime also suspended

activities of many NGOs, compounding an already delicate

humanitarian situation; on August 29, the regime

announced a lifting of the ban, but imposed new

administrative requirements that could still impede

delivery of aid.

 

SOMALIA

 

¶5. (C) The U.S. and several Allies are engaged in

looking at, both bilaterally and in EU and NATO

frameworks, possible naval responses to the recent sharp

increase in pirate attacks off Somalia and in the Gulf

of Aden. In June, the UN Security Council passed

resolution 1816, which expires in December, calling upon

states and organizations to use any assets to repress

piracy in the area. In light of the current situation,

the EU is examining the possibilities for deploying an

ESDP maritime anti-piracy presence off of Somalia to

deter these attacks.

 

SERBIA

 

¶6. (SBU) On August 15, the Government of Serbia formally

submitted to the UN General Assembly a request to seek

an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion

on the legality of Kosovo’s February 2008 declaration of

independence. State 91908 provided “if asked” guidance

on our ICJ strategy and pulsed capitals for potential

voting trends; initial results indicate widespread

ambivalence. Although the advisory opinion would not be

 

STATE 00096598 002 OF 004

 

 

legally binding, its impact is likely to be substantial.

Once the matter is referred to the ICJ, the Court could

take many months to issue its opinion. During the

interim, states and institutions may hesitate to

recognize Kosovo or move forward with cooperation on

Kosovo. Uncertainty also risks undermining the

effectiveness of the Government of Kosovo (GoK) as well

as international missions on the ground in Kosovo which,

in turn, could encourage extremists on both sides.

Furthermore, the Court’s advisory opinion could have an

adverse impact beyond the Kosovo question and create

uncertainty in other states where secession and

territorial integrity are under debate.

 

¶7. (U) Serbian President Tadic, accompanied by PM

Cvetkovic and FM Jeremic, met with European Commission

President Barroso and High Representative Solana in

Brussels on September 3. Speaking afterwards, President

Barroso stated it was “possible” that Serbia could get

EU candidate status in 2009 if all requirements were

met. President Tadic stressed Serbia’s determination to

do everything possible to speed up the process and

expressed hope for a positive report from ICTY Chief

Prosecutor Brammertz following his September 10-11 visit

to Belgrade.

 

¶8. (SBU) Over 300 EULEX personnel are now deployed in

Kosovo. The MOU governing asset-sharing by UNMIK has

been signed, and further deployment of EULEX personnel

(approximately 80 to 100 per week) is scheduled to re-

commence in mid-September. The EULEX presence in

northern Kosovo, however, remains nominal at best, and

the EU’s readiness to fully deploy north of the Ibar

River and in other Serb enclaves remains in doubt. UN-

EU cooperation on the ground is good, and senior leaders

on both sides are confident there will be no security

“gaps.”

 

TURKEY

 

¶9. (SBU) Turkey and the EU signed an Association

Agreement in September 1963 aimed at bringing Turkey

into the customs union and eventual membership, but the

GOT’s efforts to join have been stymied by geographic,

cultural, and economic differences. The EU and Turkey

finally opened negotiations on accession in October

¶2005. Since then, the EU has been internally deadlocked

over Turkish accession issues by Cyprus, as well as

objections by members like France and Austria, who are

skeptical whether Turkey belongs in the EU. France is

home to the largest Muslim population in the EU (5

million, most of whom are Arab).

 

¶10. (SBU) In November 2006, the European Commission

suspended eight of the 32 Acquis chapters until Turkey

meets obligations to open ports in Northern Cyprus to

Republic of Cyprus ships and aircraft. Turkey has said

it will do so only in conjunction with the EU opening of

commercial access for Turkish Cypriot goods and people.

To date only one chapter has been provisionally closed

(ie. completed).

 

¶11. (SBU) The Commission’s November 2007 accession

report on Turkey said the process was “on track” noting

free and fair elections in 2007 and urged more rapid

political reforms regarding Article 301 of the penal

code (insulting Turkishness), religious freedom, and

corruption. The Turkish Parliament amended Article 301

on April 30. It was symbolically published in the

Official Book on May 9, date of the “Day of Europe” in

the 27 EU member states.

 

GEORGIA

 

¶12. (SBU) Updated guidance on Georgia following the

visit of President Sarkozy, President Barroso, and High

Representative Solana to Moscow will be provided Septel.

 

¶13. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Please deliver the following

points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as

 

STATE 00096598 003 OF 004

 

 

possible (in advance of the September 15-16 GAERC).

 

BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT

 

ZIMBABWE

 

— We welcome the EU’s expansion of its list of targeted

sanctions of individuals including Gideon Gono and

state-owned enterprises. We urge the EU to consider

listing all of the individuals and entities subject to

the U.S. Zimbabwe sanctions program. The United States

would welcome further information sharing with the EU on

this matter.

 

— We believe it is important to keep the United Nations

focused on Zimbabwe and hope that the UN Assistant

Secretary General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios

will brief the UNSC as soon as he returns from his

travels to southern Africa. We encourage the EU to

support such a briefing and any appropriate follow up UN

action.

 

— We need your support in urging the AU and UN to work

closely with SADC to help the parties reach a political

solution in Zimbabwe.

 

SOMALIA

 

— We applaud the EU’s intention to launch a naval

operation to protect the flow of humanitarian aid and

help deter piracy and defend commercial shipping. The

EU member states possess sufficient naval forces to

deploy and sustain a capable force without detracting

from other commitments in the region, so we welcome this

mission as a positive step forward for ESDP.

 

— We encourage EU planners and decision makers to

pursue coordinating the unique assets and capabilities

that might be made available to them through the agreed

NATO-EU framework.

 

SERBIA

 

— The U.S. is committed to help Serbia move along the

path to Euro-Atlantic integration, and we strongly

support Serbia’s democratic future in Europe. We view

the arrest and extradition of Radovan Karadzic in July

as a very positive step forward for the Government of

Serbia (GoS.) We look to Serbia now to apprehend

remaining fugitives Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic to

close this ugly chapter in the region’s history.

 

— We have expressed to the GoS our regret at the

unhelpful public statements against EULEX by some

Serbian leaders and explained that threats, intimidation

and violence against EU personnel in Kosovo will have

consequences. We have also stressed that EULEX will

help ensure the safety of all communities in Kosovo;

limiting the EULEX mission can only increase insecurity

among Kosovo Serbs.

 

— Many in the Kosovo Serb community are ready for

dialogue with Pristina but look to Belgrade for a

signal. Therefore, some accommodation may be possible

if Belgrade is prepared to be constructive. However, we

believe any compromise must be acceptable to the GoK and

consistent with EULEX’s role in implementing the

Ahtisaari Plan, and must not harden partition.

Accommodation must not come at the cost of EULEX’s

authority or credibility, especially with the Kosovar

Albanian majority.

 

— We recognize the need for “technical” discussions

with Belgrade over customs and other modalities in

supervising northern Kosovo. However, the EU does not

need Belgrade’s permission to deploy in the north or

elsewhere. Any such “approval” by Belgrade would

undoubtedly come with unacceptable conditions, such as

requiring a new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR),

permitting ethnic Serbs in the Kosovo Police Service or

 

STATE 00096598 004 OF 004

 

 

local courts to serve under a separate chain of command,

or establishing Serbian rather than Kosovo law in Serb

enclaves and the north.

 

— Belgrade’s proposal of requiring a new UNSCR for

EULEX (calling for a “status neutral” EULEX reporting to

the UN) is a non-starter. UNSYG Ban welcomed EULEX

deployment in his June 22 statement to the UNSC, and no

further action is warranted, or feasible.

 

— We believe Serbia’s pursuit of an ICJ advisory

opinion request from the UNGA is counterproductive. It

will only delay the inevitable in the region and

threatens to muddle Serbia’s attempts to move forward on

Euro-Atlantic integration. While we are confident that

the recognition of Kosovo’s independence – and the steps

the international community has taken in response – were

lawful, we are concerned that a challenge could delay

progress on the ground, foster division rather than

promote Serbia’s and Kosovo’s common future within

Europe, and cede the discourse to extremists on both

sides.

 

— Introducing this new element of delay or uncertainty

could upset the current balance in the Balkans at this

sensitive time. Instead, we wish to encourage both

parties to work together to establish practical

cooperation and improved relations.

 

TURKEY

 

–The United States strongly supports Turkey’s candidacy

for European Union membership. While this is a decision

for the EU to take, we have and will continue to

encourage the EU and Turkey to reach this goal.

 

–Turkish membership in the EU would strengthen our

transatlantic community, anchor Turkey to the West, and

build bridges between the West and the Islamic world.

 

–The prospect of EU membership has helped encourage

important economic and political reforms in Turkey, and

has set a trajectory for still-needed reforms that will

bring Turkey fully into line with European standards of

democratic governance.

 

–We recognize that the accession process is lengthy and

challenging and that, as part of the accession process,

Turkey will also have to normalize relations with

Cyprus.

 

–Turkey also has critical near-term objectives with the

EU in the security arena, which remain unfulfilled and

affect U.S. interests. Turkey is seeking a greater role

in planning ESDP missions, membership in the European

Defense Agency, and an EU information-sharing

agreement. We continue to urge the EU to work with

Turkey to address its concerns, as lack of progress on

these issues hinders EU-NATO cooperation on Kosovo and

Afghanistan. Likewise, on items where Cyprus has

difficulty with NATO cooperation because of Turkish

objections, we urge Turkish cooperation with the same

objective in mind.

 

–We note a renewed sense of optimism for the UN

settlement process for Cyprus. We strongly support the

resumption of full-fledged negotiations between Greek

Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives to achieve a

bi-zonal, bi-communal federation

 

 

END NON-PAPER TEXT

RICE

 

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