Now, this program is old, and it’s in part because of the difficulties in Zimbabwe have gone on for a long time. So we keep looking at our program, as we do with all our sanctions programs, but we’ve been actively reviewing this and we’re also consulting closely with our partners in the region. So the concerns – SADC has spoken out, the AU, a number of African governments have spoken about what the right approach is to Zimbabwe. And my colleagues who work on policy towards Zimbabwe are in regular conversation with them. But we also use those as an opportunity to look at the sanctions program itself.
So earlier this year we delisted 11 people, and we’re continuing to look carefully at the program. And so I think you will see us on a regular basis take a look and see who’s appropriate and who’s not.
And just a note on the scope, we are not engaged in a comprehensive effort to close the Zimbabwean economy. We don’t sanction banks. We aren’t stopping certain kinds of transactions. We’re aware that because of the depth of the problems and the duration of this program, there probably are a lot of companies who believe that doing business in Zimbabwe is just too difficult. And that does cost opportunities for the people of Zimbabwe. Whether that’s the result of the underlying mismanagement and corruption, or whether our sanctions add to it, that’s something we’re willing to talk with companies about, because we do want legitimate businesses to be able to do legitimate business in places. And that’s true anywhere around the world, including in Zimbabwe.
So if there are specific examples, they’re things we’re happy to take back and discuss, but it’s important for me to end where I started: We are focused on the people who benefit from corruption and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. That’s the behavior we are attempting to change. Our sanctions are only one part of a policy to improve the situation there, and we’ll keep evaluating them with our partners as part of the policy going forward.
So that’s what I have to say by way of introduction. Jim Mullinax, do you want to say something now, and then, Andrea, we’ll come back to you all for the questions.
MR MULLINAX: Yeah, thank you very much, Jim. I really appreciate the opportunity to join you here today to talk about this really important program.
Just quickly, as an introduction, my name is Jim Mullinax. I’m the director of the Office of Sanctions Policy and Implementation at the State Department. And my team works with our embassies around the world and the U.S. Department of Treasury to actually implement U.S. sanctions, specifically country-specific sanctions, which is the kind of program that Zimbabwe – Zimbabwean individuals face sanctions underneath.
Zimbabwe, as Ambassador O’Brien said, Zimbabwe is one of probably close to 30 different countries around the world in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in Latin America, in the Middle East, who are sanctioned under specific country programs. And we use these sanctions programs to disrupt corrupt individuals, to disrupt the activities of human rights abusers, terrorists, and other bad actors’ ability to undermine democracy, to stoke instability, and to provoke violence.
The ultimate goal of our sanctions, I have to say, is not to punish these individuals but to bring about a positive change in behavior, and of course to support our policy objectives within the broader framework of U.S. Government strategy.
With respect to our Zimbabwe sanctions program, we are targeting individuals and entities who have been actively involved in actions that violate human rights of individuals, who have facilitated corruption, and who undermine democracy. And our sanctions impose a cost on their behavior. By restricting their use of the U.S. financial system, we cut off the access to resources that they may use to further their bad actions. We also use sanctions to prevent them from using the United States as a safe haven for any ill-gotten gains that they may receive from their corrupt activities.
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