The US had it cut out for a Tsvangirai or Mugabe victory

The United States already had it cut out for a Morgan Tsvangirai or Robert Mugabe victory in the 2002 presidential elections three months before the poll.

A victory for the Movement for Democratic Change meant that Tsvangirai would have to work with existing Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and security service contacts so that he could garner enough support to govern.

The US and other international actors were to support Tsvangirai’s efforts to consolidate his victory and to encourage ZANU-PF and the security forces to accept the outcome.

It would therefore be critically important to provide rapid humanitarian and fast-disbursing economic support to the new government.

A Mugabe victory, which the embassy had written off as being only possible by the flagrant use of violence, intimidation and electoral manipulation, was a formula for permanent transition crisis.

The United States was to immediately impose personal targetted sanctions and ensure Zimbabwe’s exclusion from “AGOA, Cotonou, IFI largesse and other benefits”.

“We would make it clear that the US will do nothing to help Zimbabwe emerge from that crisis until a new round of credible elections is held,” the embassy said.

Full cable:

Viewing cable 02HARARE44, LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING

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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

070443Z Jan 02

CONFIDENTIAL     PTO7739

PAGE 01       HARARE 00044 01 OF 03 070547Z

ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00   NP-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00 INL-00   USNW-00 DODE-00

DS-00   EUR-00   VC-00   TEDE-00 INR-00   IO-00   LAB-01

VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00

EPAE-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02   NFAT-00 SAS-00     /005W

——————540795 070548Z /38

FM AMEMBASSY HARARE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0647

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000044

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER, P/DAS BELLAMY AND AF/S

NSC FOR SR DIR FRAZIER

LONDON FOR GURNEY

PARIS FOR NEARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2012

TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI

SUBJECT: LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING

CLASSIFIED BY JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN FOR REASONS 1.5B/D

1.(C ) SUMMARY: WITH THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY ACT NOW IN

PLACE, ZIMBABWE FIRMLY ON THE COMMONWEALTH’S CMAG AGENDA

AND THE ELECTION DATE LIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED BY JANUARY

10, WE ARE APPROACHING A KEY MOMENT IN THE LEAD-UP TO

ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR

THAT PRESIDENT MUGABE WILL BE DETERRED BY PRESSURES FROM

THE US, THE EU, THE COMMONWEALTH OR SADC FROM HIS

DETERMINATION TO WIN THE ELECTION BY WHATEVER MEANS

NECESSARY. IT IS INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT

ZANU-PF VIOLENCE AND INTIMIDATION, ELECTORAL

MANIPULATION AND POPULIST USE OF THE LAND ISSUE WILL

DELIVER A MUGABE’S VICTORY IN THE FACE OF A DISASTROUS

ECONOMIC SITUATION AND GROWING FOOD SHORTAGES.

MOREOVER, AS LONGTIME ZANU-PF STRONGMAN EDDISON ZVOBGO

TOLD US, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT ZIMBABWEANS CAN BE BEATEN

INTO VOTING FOR MUGABE WHEN THEY NOW HAVE ANOTHER VIABLE

ALTERNATIVE.

2.(C ) GIVEN THIS NEXUS OF DEVELOPMENTS, IT IS VERY

IMPORTANT THAT WE BEGIN TO EXAMINE VARIOUS SCENARIOS IN

THE PRE- AND POST-ELECTION PERIODS AND PREPARE POLICY

TOOLS CALIBRATED FOR THE APPROPRIATE MOMENTS. END

SUMMARY

¶3. (C ) CURRENT SCENARIO AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS

(A) THE GOZ: NOTWITHSTANDING DOUBTS AMONG SOME SENIOR

ZANU-PF FIGURES AND QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS OWN HEALTH,

PRESIDENT MUGABE SEEMS DETERMINED TO COMPETE FOR AND TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03       HARARE 00044 01 OF 03 070547Z

WIN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. HE WILL UTILIZE

VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND ELECTORAL MANUEVERS DESIGNED

TO REDUCE THE VOTE FOR THE OPPOSITION. ZANU-PF,

NONETHELESS, WANTS THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL

LEGITIMACY WHICH NORMALLY STEMS FROM AN ELECTION AND IS

PLANNING TO MAINTAIN THE APPEARANCES OF A CREDIBLE

PROCESS, INCLUDING LIMITED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND

ELECTION DAY OR WEEK NORMALITY.

(B) MDC AND CIVIL SOCIETY: UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS, THE

OPPOSITION MDC DEFINITELY INTENDS TO STAY IN THE RACE

AND THINKS IT CAN WIN DESPITE THE OBSTACLES. MOST CIVIL

SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO REMAINING

FULLY ENGAGED IN THE LEGAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PUBLIC

EDUCATION FIGHTS TO MAKE THE ELECTION AS FAIR AS

POSSIBLE.(IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT LEGAL APPEALS TO

EXTEND VOTER REGISTRATION PERIOD AND TO FORCE THE

REGISTRAR TO TURN OVER REGISTRATION LISTS HAVE BEEN WON

AND MORE LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE AMENDED CITIZENSHIP LAW

AND OTHER POTENTIAL ELECTION MANUEVERS ARE PLANNED.)

(C ) INTERNATIONAL ROLE: THE US AND MANY EUROPEANS ARE

PROVIDING CRITICAL SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER

INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWEAN FORCES, INCLUDING LABOR, THE

INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND ELECTION WATCHDOG

GROUPS. THE GOZ IS UNLIKELY TO PERMIT EU OR US

OBSERVERS, BUT COMMONWEALTH AND SADC-PF OBSERVERS COULD

STILL PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IF THEY CAN GET ON THE GROUND

AT LEAST THREE-TO-FOUR WEEKS PRIOR TO ELECTIONS. APART

FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SADC PARLIAMENTARY FORUM, IT

APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT SADC AS AN INSTITUTION, NIGERIA OR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04       HARARE 00044 01 OF 03 070547Z

THE AU WILL PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN PRESSING FOR FREER

ELECTIONS.

(D) POLICY INSTRUMENTS: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN

THE PRESSURE SO THAT ELECTION CONDITIONS NOT DETERIORATE

FURTHER, BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE GOZ TO ALTER ITS

COURSE AS A RESULT OF ANY ADDITIONAL PRESSURES WE CAN

REALISTICALLY BRING TO BEAR. JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, THE

US, OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, AND ZIMBABWEAN CIVIL

SOCIETY MUST DO NOTHING TO UNDERMINE THE PROSPECTS OF

THE MDC FOR WINNING DESPITE THE OBSTACLES PLACED IN ITS

WAY. FOR INSTANCE, ANY PRELIMINARY JUDGMENT WE RENDER

ON ELECTION CONDITIONS SHOULD NOT PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR

THE GOZ TO SHUT DOWN THE ELECTION PROCESS. SIMILARLY,

WE NEED TO AVOID ANY MEASURES WHICH COULD GIVE THE GOZ

BASIS TO SHUT DOWN OUR SUPPORT FOR CSO’S, INCLUDING

VISAS FOR TRAINERS, EXPERTS AND EMBASSY STAFF. WE WILL

WISH TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THE COMMONWEALTH, SOUTH

AFRICA AND THE EU SO THAT WE ACT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN

HARMONY. WE NEED TO ENGAGE WITH SADC AND NIGERIA TO

PREVENT THEM FROM UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL     PTO7741

PAGE 01       HARARE 00044 02 OF 03 070548Z

ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00   NP-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00 INL-00   USNW-00 DODE-00

DS-00   EUR-00   VC-00   TEDE-00 INR-00   IO-00   LAB-01

VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00

EPAE-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02   NFAT-00 SAS-00     /005W

——————5407A4 070548Z /38

O 070443Z JAN 02

FM AMEMBASSY HARARE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0648

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 000044

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER, P/DAS BELLAMY AND AF/S

NSC FOR SR DIR FRAZIER

LONDON FOR GURNEY

PARIS FOR NEARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2012

TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI

SUBJECT: LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02       HARARE 00044 02 OF 03 070548Z

THE GOZ TO REDUCE VIOLENCE AND TO ORGANIZE A MINIMALLY

CREDIBLE ELECTION.

4.(C ) SCENARIO FOR SHARP DETERIORATION AND POLICY

RESPONSES

(A) GOZ: IT IS NOT LIKELY, BUT POSSIBLE THAT THE CURRENT

SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE SHARPLY PRIOR TO ELECTIONS,

MOST LIKELY IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT

STOOD TO LOSE, OR IF LOOMING FOOD SHORTAGES WERE TO

PRODUCE PUBLIC DISTURBANCES. THE GOVERNMENT COULD

IMPOSE A STATE OF EMERGENCY, ALTHOUGH, EVEN THEN, THERE

IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FOR PRESIDENT MUGABE

REMAINING IN OFFICE BEYOND APRIL 1. THE GOZ COULD ALSO

SHUT DOWN THE OPPOSITION MDC OR ARREST ITS LEADERSHIP ON

THE PRETENSE OF ITS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES OR EVEN COMMISSION OFF-LINE ASSASSINATION OF

OPPOSITION LEADERS. IN THE COURSE OF THE ELECTION

COUNT, THE ZANU GOVERNMENT COULD REACT TO AN APPARENT

OPPOSITION VICTORY BY INERRUPTING OR SHUTTING DOWN THE

PROCESS ON ONE OF A NUMBER OF PRETEXTS, NONE OF WHICH

WOULD BE CREDIBLE.

(B) OPPOSITION, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC: OPPOSITION

AND CIVIL SOCIETY WOULD LIKELY BE FORCED UNDERGROUND

UNDER THESE SCENARIOS. PENT-UP PUBLIC FRUSTRATIONS

WOULD LIKELY LEAD TO CIVIL DISTURBANCES. THE WILLINGNESS

OF SECURITY FORCES TO PUT DOWN THESE DISTURBANCES

VIOLENTLY WOULD BECOME THE KEY ISSUE.

(C ) INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: THE INTERNATIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03       HARARE 00044 02 OF 03 070548Z

COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE EU, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE US

WOULD NEED TO RESPOND RAPIDLY AND HARSHLY TO SUCH A

SCENARIO WITH THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT

CANNOT STAND. IF THE SITUATION REMAINED FLUID, WE WOULD

WISH TO COMMUNICATE TO SECURITY OFFICIALS THE

UNACCEPTABILITY OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL

REGIME AND ENCOURAGE THEIR COOPERATION IN A RETURN TO

LEGALITY. IT WILL ALSO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO HAVE

SOLID AND STRONG RESPONSE FROM SOUTH AFRICA, SADC AND

NIGERIA, AS WELL AS FROM UN SYG ANNAN AND THE UNSC.

UNDER THIS SCENARIO, FULL AND PUNITIVE PERSONAL

SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY AND SELECTED

ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

5.(C ) POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS

(A) MDC VICTORY: IN THE EVENT OF AN MDC VICTORY, THE MDC

IS LIKELY TO WORK THROUGH EXISTING ZANU-PF AND SECURITY

SERVICE CONTACTS TO SEEK TO ASSURE THAT TSVANGIRAI CAN

TAKE OFFICE AND THAT HE WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPORT IN

THE PARLIAMENT AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE TO GOVERN. MUGABE

HARD-LINERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO BLOCK THIS BY

WHATEVER MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. WE AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS WILL WANT TO SUPPORT TSVANGIRAI’S

EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE HIS VICTORY AND TO ENCOURAGE

ZANU-PF AND THE SECURITY FORCES TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME.

IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FOOD CRISIS, IT WILL

BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE RAPID HUMANITARIAN

AND FAST-DISBURSING ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE NEW

GOVERNMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04       HARARE 00044 02 OF 03 070548Z

(B) A MUGABE VICTORY IN A SERIOUSLY FLAWED ELECTION: A

MUGABE VICTORY, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS ONLY POSSIBLE BY THE

FLAGRANT USE OF VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION AND ELECTORAL

MANIPULATION, IS A FORMULA FOR PERMANENT TRANSITION

CRISIS — ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL. REGARDLESS OF LIKELY

POLICY REVERSALS INTENDED TO APPEAL TO DOMESTIC

INVESTORS AND INTERNATIONAL DONORS, THERE IS LIKELY TO

BE NO REVERSAL OF ZIMBABWE’S DECLINE. UNDER THIS

SCENARIO, WE SHOULD PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT THE PERSONAL

TARGETTED SANCTIONS ENVISIONED IN ZDERA AGAINST A WIDE,

BUT CAREFULLY SELECTED LIST OF REGIME LEADERS, INCLUDING

THOSE WHO HAVE MANIPULATED THE A-2 LAND GRAB TO THEIR

PERSONAL BENEFIT. WE SHOULD SEEK TO MAINTAIN A WORKING

RELATIONSHIP HERE, PARTICULARLY FOR THE ABILITY IT GIVES

US TO WORK WITH OTHER ZIMBABWEANS AND CONTINUE SOME

PROGRAMS OF SUPPORT FOR THE ZIMBABWEAN PEOPLE, E.G.

HIV/AIDS. WE AND OTHER INTERNATIONALS — THE

COMMONWEALTH, THE EU AND US — SHOULD ALSO ASSURE

ZIMBAWE’S EXCLUSION FROM AGOA, COUTONOU, IFI LARGESSE

AND OTHER BENEFITS. ZIMBABWE AND THE ZANU-PF WILL

REMAIN IN CONTINUING CRISIS IN THIS SCENARIO AND WE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL     PTO7742

PAGE 01       HARARE 00044 03 OF 03 070548Z

ACTION AF-00

INFO LOG-00   NP-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00 INL-00   USNW-00 DODE-00

DS-00   EUR-00   VC-00   TEDE-00 INR-00   IO-00   LAB-01

VCE-00   M-00     NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02   SSO-00   SS-00

EPAE-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02   NFAT-00 SAS-00     /005W

——————5407A8 070548Z /38

O 070443Z JAN 02

FM AMEMBASSY HARARE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0649

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 000044

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S KANSTEINER, P/DAS BELLAMY AND AF/S

NSC FOR SR DIR FRAZIER

LONDON FOR GURNEY

PARIS FOR NEARY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2012

TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI

SUBJECT: LIKELY SCENARIOS; POLICY TOOLS AND TIMING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02       HARARE 00044 03 OF 03 070548Z

WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP

ZIMBABWE EMERGE FROM THAT CRISIS UNTIL A NEW ROUND OF

CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IS HELD.

SULLIVAN

CONFIDENTIAL

>

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