President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF secretary for external affairs Didymus Mutasa were adamant that there would be no Western observers in the 2005 elections while Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and Speaker of Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa said this would be decided by an independent election commission.
The disagreements came up as Zimbabwe prepared for its first elections to be held under the Southern African Development Community guidelines for democratic elections.
In his address to the SADC conference Mugabe said that democracy “could not be transplanted from one country to another because each had its own distinct historical, cultural and socio-economic conditions.”
He said elections alone were not sufficient in developing democracy because although they could contribute to conflict resolution, they could also exacerbate conflict.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 04HARARE1313, ZIMBABWE AND THE SADC ELECTION AGENDA
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Reference ID |
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
301049Z Jul 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001313
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2009
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE AND THE SADC ELECTION AGENDA
REF: (A) PRETORIA 3339 (B) HARARE 1250 (C) HARARE
1157 (D) HARARE 1067 (E) HARARE 751
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5 b/d
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A proliferation of meetings relating to
election standards in the run-up to next month’s scheduled
SADC summit in part reflects Zimbabwean and regional efforts
to lower domestic and international tensions associated with
Zimbabwe’s political crisis. Central to the effort are draft
“SADC Principles and Guidlines Governing Democratic
Elections”, which draw from a host of other sources. The
latest draft (faxed to AF/S) is very general in terms of
affirmative responsibilities imposed on member governments
and lacks specific prescriptions for correcting gross
imbalances in Zimbabwe’s electoral playing field. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) According to press reports, SADC foreign and defense
ministers approved principles for free and fair elections at
a two-day meeting that ended July 23 in Sun City, South
Africa. The document reportedly would be forwarded to heads
of state for adoption at the SADC summit scheduled to be held
next month in Mauritius.
¶3. (U) The Sun City gathering followed on the heels of the
sixth general meeting of the SADC Election Commission Forum
(ECF) in Victoria Falls earlier that week. In an address to
the conference given front page coverage by the official
media, President Mugabe emphasized that democracy “could not
be transplanted from one country to another because each had
its own distinct historical, cultural and socio-economic
conditions.” He warned against being misled by Western
countries and urged SADC members not to accept foreign funds
for election administration. He reportedly maintained that
elections alone were not sufficient in developing democracy
because although they could contribute to conflict
resolution, they could also exacerbate conflict. “Does
democracy exist when powerful nations seek to influence
political events in our countries by supporting opposition
parties or by deliberately sowing seeds of discontent? Does
unconstitutional regime change constitute a democratic
process?”, he asked the conference. Press reports indicate
that the meeting addressed the possible establishment of a
permanent ECF secretariat to replace the Electoral Institute
of Southern Africa (EISA), a donor-funded body that currently
serves as an interim secretariat.
¶4. (U) On August 2-3 in Victoria Falls, EISA and the
Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) will sponsor a
conference “Regional Initiatives for Electoral Reform in
SADC: Strengthening Democratic Transformation Through
Identified Benchmarks in the Region.” The event is scheduled
to be opened by Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs Patrick Chinamasa, with the keynote addresses to be
delivered by Speaker of the Parliament Emmerson Mnangagwa and
Speaker of the Lesotho National Assembly Nthloi Motsamai.
The conference program is slated to feature sessions on
electoral processes in the SADC region, existing benchmarks
for elections in the region, best practices, and electoral
reforms. Polchief and USAID Mission Director plan to attend
the EISA/ZESN event.
¶5. (SBU) We have not seen a copy of the instrument approved
by ministers in Sun City but have obtained a copy of the “2nd
zero draft 9 June 2004″ that we understand served as the
departure point for discussions in Sun City. We are unaware
of significant changes made to the document or of the focal
points of debate there. The draft is notable for the brevity
of obligations placed on member states in the conduct of
elections. In Section Two, members pledge to adhere to seven
“principles”: full participation of the citizens in the
political process; freedom of association; political
tolerance; equal opportunity for all political parties to
access the state media; equal opportunity to exercise the
right to vote and be voted for; independence of the judiciary
and impartiality of the electoral institutions; and voter
education. Section 5.4 commits member states to “safeguard
the human and civil liberties of all citizens including the
freedom of movement, assembly, association, expression, and
campaigning.” The instrument elaborates on obligations and
treatment of election monitors and observers but on its face
only contemplates monitoring/observation by SADC. Indeed,
the document devotes more space to constraints governing
monitoring/observation of elections than it does to member
state obligations in the conduct of elections. The
instrument stands in stark contrast to the SADC-Parliamentary
Forum’s “Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC
Region”, a much lengthier document that contained much more
detailed prescriptions on how member states were to achieve
free and fair elections. Signed on behalf of Zimbabwe by
Speaker Mnangagwa, the SADC-PF norms and standards have since
been vehemently rejected by the GOZ as an instrument of
neo-colonialists and imperialist puppets (ref E).
¶6. (C) According to ZESN Chairperson Reginald Matchaba-Hove,
the new SADC principles were drawn from the SADC-PF document,
the Principles of Election Management, Monitoring, and
Observation (PEMMO) instrument adopted by SADC election
commissions last November, and related AU principles. He
indicated that South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania had been
most engaged in the drafting of the new instrument.
¶7. (C) Matchaba-Hove confirmed that the GOZ had been closely
engaged in the SADC deliberative process. His own
communications with Chinamasa had suggested that the GOZ
wanted to stake out a fairly maximalist position on domestic
electoral reforms in “testing the waters” but intended to
have them align at least nominally with SADC principles. He
said that Mugabe clearly was opposed to reforms, but had been
pushed effectively by SADC counterparts and ZANU-PF
“mavericks”, such as Mnangagwa, Party Secretary for
Information Nathan Shamuyarira, and Politburo member Dumiso
Dabengwa. (Note: These three “mavericks” are all old guard,
but are motivated in part by a desire to reduce Zimbabwe’s
isolation and to counter the influence of younger hard-liners
(i.e. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo) who currently share
Mugabe’s confidence and more repressive inclinations. End
note.)
¶8. (C) According to Matchaba-Hove, both the SADC standards
and Zimbabwe’s reforms were still being worked out. SADC’s
Section Two principles could be expanded further before the
Mauritius Summit. Nonetheless, it was critical that the
benchmarks not be set high enough to scare off the GOZ or
other more reticent members. Better to have a generally
framed document that could be fleshed out and strengthened
over time.
¶9. (C) As to the GOZ’s proposed electoral reforms,
Matchaba-Hove said they represented meaningful improvements,
althought they did not yet address fundamental issues such as
media access, unobstructed campaigning, and political
violence. Of concern even on their own limited terms, the
electoral reforms did not encompass delimitation, and did not
include mechanisms to assure the true independence of the
election commission. He thought these issues were
negotiable. He urged the USG to be encouraging in its public
assessments of the SADC principles and proposed GOZ electoral
reforms, while recognizing the need to address the
fundamental election environment issues.
¶10. (C) Matchaba-Hove indicated that the scope of outside
observers was also open for discussion; Chinamasa had told
him it would be decided by the independent election
commission. (Note: This coincides with what Mnangagwa told
us and contradicts suggestions by Mugabe and Politburo member
Didymus Mutasa that the election would be closed to Western
eyes (ref C). End note.) Matchaba-Hove noted that the
likelihood that the proposed reforms would require a
constitutional amendment offered the opposition MDC
potentially significant leverage, which it could exploit to
wrest concessions from the ruling party. (Note: MDC sources
have advised that Chinamasa had approached MDC
Secretary-General to enlist support for
SIPDIS
passage/implementation of electoral reforms. End note.)
¶11. (C) COMMENT: The GOZ and its fellow SADC members share
an interest in regularizing Zimbabwe’s relations with the
outside world. The prospective conduct of Zimbabwe’s
parliamentary election in accordance with SADC standards for
now is a central means to this end — in large part through
an exercise in image management. From the perspective of the
GOZ and its sympathizers in the region, the establishment of
relatively easy benchmarks is crucial: first, to assure GOZ
accession, and next, to offer prospects of an an election
that can be judged somewhat positively, if not completely.
Our assessment continues to be that the ruling party will not
concede anything that will meaningfully reduce its control
over the March election results, notwithstanding its interest
in burnishing its image abroad and in offering SADC cover to
recognize the election results. We recognize some potential
utility in getting the GOZ to accede to a set of meaningful
standards but foresee risk in a scenario that offers the
region cover to approve what is expected to be a sham
election regardless of conformity to some SADC standards. We
would welcome reports from other SADC capitals on host
governments’ objectives, expectations, and engagement on the
SADC election standards and Zimbabwe.
¶12. (C) COMMENT (CONT’D): The GOZ’s electoral reform
strategy is related to the NGO Bill currently under
discussion (ref B). Some observers characterize the NGO Bill
as the means by which the GOZ would negate any balancing
effect putatively afforded by electoral reforms. In fact,
the NGO Bill conforms to the GOZ’s well-documented
comprehensive effort to hamstring or eliminate all sources of
dissent in the country; the reforms may serve as no more than
window dressing or distraction. The NGO and diplomatic
communities here are energized and coordinating significantly
on both issues. We understand that they will be engaging
their counterparts in other SADC countries. The NGO Bill has
not been officially released and circulated, so official
comment on it would be premature. However, we will be
working with NGOs, diplomats and the local UNDP office to
convey concern about the apparent direction of events and to
seek to nip the bill’s progress in the bud.
WEISENFELD
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