Mujuru found Tsvangirai more acceptable than Mnangagwa

Former army commander Solomon Mujuru found Movement for Democratic Change leader Morgan Tsvangirai more acceptable than Emmerson Mnangagwa his main rival within the Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front, according to a cable released by Wikileaks.

This was said by Tsvangirai when he briefed diplomats about the possible signing of a memorandum of understanding between his party, the smaller faction of the MDC and ZANU-PF which would pave way for talks.

He said the leader of the smaller faction of the MDC Arthur Mutambara, President Robert Mugabe and himself were expected to sign the MOU by 16 July.

Mujuru appeared to want a quick solution to the Zimbabwe crisis because he wanted his assets to be unfrozen. He had reportedly told United States embassy officials that the US had frozen US$7 million of his money.

Tsvangirai said that there were three possible outcomes to the negotiations:

• A coalition government led by ZANU-PF;
• A power-sharing government based on the Kenyan model;
• and a transition government led by the MDC.

He was firm that only the third outcome would be acceptable to the MDC but noted that this might well include a role for Mugabe, and asked understanding from the international community should that come to pass.

 

Full cable:

Viewing cable 08HARARE607, ZANU-PF–MDC PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08HARARE607	2008-07-14 10:21	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Harare

VZCZCXRO6232

OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN

DE RUEHSB #0607/01 1961021

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 141021Z JUL 08

FM AMEMBASSY HARARE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3170

INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE

RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 2142

RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2262

RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0798

RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1539

RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1897

RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2318

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4749

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1408

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000607

 

SIPDIS

 

AF/S FOR S. HILL

ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS

STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS

STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI

SUBJECT: ZANU-PF–MDC PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS

 

REF: HARARE 605

 

Classified By: CDA Khatherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 (d)

 

——-

SUMMARY

——–

 

¶1. (C) MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai briefed diplomats

from the U.S., UK, Sweden, and Australia July 12 on the

ZANU-PF–MDC negotiation process. He said representatives

from his faction (MDC-T), the MDC Mutambara faction (MDC-M)

and ZANU-PF had concluded a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for

negotiations. He anticipated the MOA would be signed by

himself GOZ president Robert Mugabe and MDC-M leader Arthur

Mutambara on July 16 with negotiations to begin a week later.

Tsvangirai was emphatic that he would not accept an ultimate

agreement that did not leave the MDC in control of

government, but acknowledged that a best-achievable scenario

might leave Mugabe as part of the government. Tsvangirai

also expressed appreciation for efforts to pass the UN

sanction resolution and said the most effective sanctions

effort now would be to target children of sanctioned

individuals. END SUMMARY.

 

—————————————-

Memorandum of Agreement and Negotiations

—————————————-

 

¶2. (C) Tsvangirai said the MOA was intended to define a

framework for negotiations between ZANU-PF and the two MDC

factions. Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma represented MDC-T,

Welshman Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga

represented MDC-M, and Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche

represented ZANU-PF. Talks occurred on July 10 and July 11.

 

¶3. (C) Tsvagirai expected the African Union to appoint a

mediator to work with South African president Thabo Mbeki,

although South Africa was taking the position that it should

be the sole mediator. Names that had been mentioned included

former UN secretary-general Bhutros Bhutros Ghali, former

Tanzanian presidents Joseph Warioba and Benjamin Mpaka, and

South African businessman and ANC heavyweight Cyril

Rhamaposa. Tsvangirai was confident someone–not necessarily

those mentioned–would be identified and that South Africa

would accept a co-mediation role.

 

¶4. (C) Tsvangirai stated that Mugabe’s role in the mediation

would have to be agreed upon. The MDC, according to

Tsvangirai, would recognize Mugabe as the head of ZANU-PF,

one of the parties to the negotiation, but would not

recognize him as head of government. Additionally, one of

the pre-conditions to negotiations was an end to violence,

and a mechanism for monitoring violence would have to be

addressed.

 

¶5. (C) The South African-drafted MOA would be presented to

the parties on July 14, according to Tsvangirai. Mugabe,

Tsvangirai, and Mutambara would then sign it on July 16.

Negotiations would begin one week later. Tsvangirai stated

that ZANU-PF wanted to conclude the negotiations within two

weeks; the MDC thought a month was a more reasonable period.

Tsvangirai noted that he expected to have a one-on-one

meeting with Mugabe before the MOA was signed.

 

¶6. (C) Tsvangirai opined that there were three possible

outcomes to the negotiations: 1) a coalition government led

by ZANU-PF; 2) a power-sharing government based on the Kenyan

model; and 3) a transition government led by the MDC. He was

firm that only the third outcome would be acceptable to the

MDC. He noted that this might well include a role for

Mugabe, and asked understanding from the international

 

HARARE 00000607 002 OF 002

 

 

community should that come to pass.

 

¶7. (C) South Africa, according to Tsvangirai, was amenable

to an MDC-led transitional government. General Solomon

Mujuru would also willingly accept such an outcome. Mujuru

found Tsvangirai and the MDC more acceptable than Emmerson

Mnangagwa; also, Mujuru was looking for a way out of the

current crisis that would result in an unfreezing of his

assets. (NOTE: Mujuru previously told us that the U.S. had

frozen $7 million of his money. END NOTE.) Despite

acceptance of MDC leadership by South Africa and Mujuru,

Tsvangirai, recalling past ZANU-PF perfidy, cautioned against

getting hopes up.

 

—————————

A Note on the UN Resolution

—————————

 

¶8. (C) Tsvangirai expressed appreciation for efforts to pass

the UN sanctions resolution. He believed that, more than

additional sanctions, ZANU-PF heavyweights were worried about

ending up at The Hague. Passage of the resolution would have

been a step in that direction and useful in exerting more

pressure on the regime. At this point, to exert more

pressure, he suggested targeted sanctions against the

children of sanctioned individuals to prevent them from

traveling to and studying in the U.S., UK, and Australia.

 

——-

COMMENT

——-

 

¶9. (C) ZANU-PF is a fractured party and there are those like

the Mujurus who would like to see the end of a Mugabe-led

government. Having observed what ZANU-PF was willing to put

Zimbabwe through in the last several months in order to

maintain power, we find it difficult to believe, however,

that the party will willingly cede power to Tsvangirai. We

need to make clear to all parties that the USG will accept

only an MDC-led government and that reengagement is dependent

upon actions as defined by our principles–concrete steps

toward political and economic reform. A ZANU-PF–MDC

agreement by itself is not enough.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dhanani

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