Mugabe blamed Chinamasa for poor showing in 2008

President Robert Mugabe blamed his negotiators Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche for the poor showing in the 29 March 2008 elections because their negotiations with the Movement for Democratic Change had opened up the electoral process.

This was the opinion of the secretary-general of the smaller faction of the MDC, Welshman Ncube.

Ncube was also his party’s negotiator and had been involved in negotiations with Chinamasa long before the MDC split.

Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front lost narrowly to the MDC in the lower house but won more seats in the upper house.

Mugabe himself lost to MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai in the presidential elections but Tsvangirai did not win an outright victory which necessitated a run-off from which he pulled out because of violence.

Ncube said that stung by Mugabe, Chinamasa decided to make an example of the secretary-general of the larger faction of the MDC Tendai Biti, who was also the lead negotiator for his party by allowing him to be arrested on treason charges.

Ncube said Goche, on the other hand, tried to help Biti.

Full cable:

Viewing cable 08HARARE582, HARARE: WELSHMAN NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000582

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI

SUBJECT: HARARE: WELSHMAN NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) Welshman Ncube briefed PolEcon chief July 2 on SADC

negotiations, Tendai Biti, and the state of violence in

Zimbabwe.

—————-

SADC Negotiations

—————–

¶2. (C) PolEcon Chief met with Ncube immediately after a

meeting he had had with South African negotiators Mufamadi

and Gumbi. According to Ncube, Zimbabwean president Mugabe

and ZANU-PF negotiator Patrick Chinamasa told Mbeki at the

African Union summit in Sharm El Sheikh that they would

return MDC secretary-general Tendai Biti’s passport so that

he could travel to South Africa as early as July 3 for

SADC-sponsored negotiations. Ncube said negotiators would be

Nicholas Goche and Chinamasa representing ZANU-PF, Biti and

Elton Mangoma representing the MDC Tsvangirai faction

(MDC-T), and Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga for

the MDC Mutambara (MDC-M) faction.

¶3. (C) Ncube said that before the June 27 election, then

negotiators Goche, Chinamasa, Biti, and Mangoma had agreed to

a negotiating framework which contained four options for

discussion:

–The 1980 model with a ceremonial president and executive

prime minister. The MDC favored this option with Morgan

Tsvangirai as prime minister;

–Mugabe continuing as president with Tsvangirai as vice

president. This was favored by ZANU-PF;

–The Kenyan model with an executive president and executive

prime minister;

–A transitional authority to take effect before the June 27

election.

¶4. (C) Negotiations ended with the arrest of Biti on June

¶12. Nevertheless, Tsvangirai subsequently spoke to Mbeki and

agreed to the 1980 model. Mbeki presented Tsvangirai’s

position to Mugabe, according to Ncube, but Mugabe avoided

further contact with the South Africans before the June 27

election and did not respond. According to Ncube, the South

Africans were not advocating the 1980 model or any other

formulation, but rather acting as messengers.

¶5. (C) Ncube said that he, Biti, and Goche had met on June

30 to discuss further negotiations. They agreed that, since

the election had taken place, negotiations would begin from

“square zero,” although Ncube said it was likely the four

options described in paragraph 3 would be on the table.

¶6. (C) Ncube said Mbeki would conduct the negotiations. He

said there was no interest at this time on the part of the

AU, SADC, or individual African leaders in becoming involved

in the process. (NOTE: In a diplomatic and press briefing

today (Septel), Tsvangirai said the MDC would not proceed

with negotiations absent an AU mediator to complement Mbeki.

END NOTE.)

¶7. (C) Ncube expressed pessimism about a successful outcome

to the negotiations. Tsvangirai was willing to accept Mugabe

as a ceremonial president, but wanted the real power for

himself; Mugabe’s initial negotiating position was for

ZANU-PF to maintain power with a junior role for the MDC —

and perhaps no role for Tsvangirai. Ncube thought one

possible compromise could be the Kenyan model with Mugabe and

Tsvangirai sharing power. This would require compromises,

however, which neither of the two had demonstrated a

willingness to make.

HARARE 00000582 002 OF 002

————–

A Note on Biti

————–

¶8. (C) Ncube said Biti had emerged from jail bitter and

angry, particularly toward Chinamasa. He thought that Mugabe

had blamed the results of the March 29 elections on Chinamasa

and Goche because their negotiations with the MDC had opened

up the electoral process. Ncube opined that Chinamasa, stung

by Mugabe, had decided to make an example of Biti by allowing

him to be arrested and collaborating in his interrogation.

On the other hand, said Ncube, Goche had tried to help Biti.

———————-

Trajectory of Violence

———————-

¶9. (C) According to Ncube, violence had subsided since the

June 27 election. The process of dismantling many of the

ZANU-PF “reeducation” camps was continuing.

——-

COMMENT

——-

¶10. (C) ZANU-PF stole the election in order to, inter alia,

be able to negotiate with the MDC from a position of

strength. The MDC does, however, have leverage. It can

simply refuse to participate in a government with ZANU-PF,

and leave it to ZANU-PF to deal with Zimbabwe’s myriad

problems. This might eventually force ZANU-PF to deal

realistically with the opposition. ZANU-PF knows, despite

its apparent state of denial, that at the end of the day it

needs MDC support and western engagement to fix the economy.

¶11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Violence does seem to have

subsided, particularly since the pre-election peak. We have

received some reports that police in urban areas are rounding

up the ZANU-PF renegade youth responsible for attacks on the

opposition. Nevertheless, we also continue to receive

reports of assaults and deaths from around the country. We

will continue to track and assess the situation. END COMMENT.

McGee

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