Masiyiwa said Ncube was slippery

Exiled businessman Strive Masiyiwa who was trying to broker an agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change, after the indecisive 2008 elections, said he thought that the secretary-general of the smaller faction of the MDC Welshman Ncube was slippery and would not stand up to ZANU-PF.

He also thought that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was weak because he had begun negotiations without even securing the return of his passport which had been seized by the government after his return to Zimbabwe.

Tsvangirai had also publicly renounced violence, but President Robert Mugabe had not done so.

Tendai Biti, Tsvangirai’s lead negotiator, had been broken during his time in custody and could be manipulated by ZANU-PF.

Masiyiwa said he warned Tsvangirai that he could be picking up a “poison chalice” if he entered into an agreement that was not satisfactory to the United States and the European Union because a transitional government needed Western support and would fail without it.

Full cable:

Viewing cable 08PRETORIA1632, MASIYIWA FLOATS MDC-ZANU-PF POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT

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TAGS: PREL KDEM ZI SF

SUBJECT: MASIYIWA FLOATS MDC-ZANU-PF POWER-SHARING AGREEMENT

PRETORIA 00001632 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Raymond L. Brown. Reason

s 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. South African businessman and unofficial

MDC advisor Strive Masiyiwa told Harare PolEconChief and

Pretoria PolOffs July 24 that he believed a power sharing

agreement would be signed between ZANU-PF and the MDC within

two weeks. Masiyiwa has drafted a proposed agreement under

which Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe would remain as

ceremonial president. MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai would

become Prime Minister, and there would be a division of

government ministries. According to Masiyiwa, the draft was

presented to Mugabe who approved it in principle. Masiyiwa

is concerned, however, that South African President Thabo

Mbeki may attempt to impose his own agreement which would be

more advantageous to ZANU-PF. He urged the U.S. and EU to

impress upon South Africa the importance of reaching a

“quality” agreement that would satisfy criteria for

reengagement. END SUMMARY.

————————–

Masiyiwa’s Draft Agreement

————————–

¶2. (C) Under Masiyiwa’s agreement, the 1980 Zimbabwean

Constitution would be used as a basis for constituting

power-sharing transitional government with a life of two

years. Mugabe would become head of state (ceremonial) and

Tsvangirai would be head of government as Prime Minister.

ZANU-PF and the MDC would each appoint one Deputy Prime

Minister. ZANU-PF’s Deputy Prime Minister would be in charge

of defense, and the MDC’s would head home affairs (police).

The Prime Minister, the Deputies, and an additional ZANU-PF

minister would constitute a national security council to

which the Central Intelligence Organization would report.

Additionally, ZANU-PF would select eight ministers, MDC

Tsvangirai would select eight ministers, and MDC Mutambara

would select one. The parties would select five independent

ministers, presumably technocrats, to head the Ministries of

Finance, Justice, Land Resettlement, Agriculture, and State

Enterprises (parastatals). (A copy of the agreement sent to

AF/S and Embassy Harare.)

————————

MDC and ZANU-PF Reaction

————————

¶3. (C) According to Masiyiwa, Tsvangirai supported the

agreement. Masiyiwa also said that an intermediary had

presented the draft agreement to Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Governor Gideon Gono who had in turn presented it to Mugabe.

Gono told the intermediary that he had discussed it with

Mugabe and Mugabe’s wife, Grace. Both Mugabe and Grace

reportedly were agreeable to the agreement with several

amendments, including that Mugabe would be allowed to serve

as President indefinitely and would not have to retire at a

certain time.

¶4. (C) Masiyiwa thought Mugabe was willing to enter into an

agreement which ended ZANU-PF power because Gono had

convinced him the economy was almost beyond repair and

something had to be done. Also, Mugabe had been stung by

African criticism; he could no longer claim it was only the

West that was opposed to him. He therefore felt it necessary

to bring an end to the crisis that would win support from the

region and staunch his growing isolation.

¶5. (C) Although the military was not part of the

negotiations, Masiyiwa thought that Mugabe was still in

control of the government and could win military support for

Qcontrol of the government and could win military support for

an agreement, as long as an amnesty provision was included to

protect them from possible prosecution. Masiyiwa was

concerned that Emmerson Mnangagwa would resist an agreement,

but thought that if an agreement appeared likely Mnangagwa

would angle for a significant position in the new government.

——————————————-

South African and Pressure for an Agreement

——————————————-

¶6. (C) Masiyiwa said Mbeki was anxious to secure a prompt

agreement before he assumed the SADC Presidency and to ensure

PRETORIA 00001632 002.2 OF 002

his legacy. He understood there was also pressure from

Russia and China following the UNSC vote; the ANC had

promised Russian and China an agreement would occur before

the Olympics.

¶7. (C) Because of this pressure, Masiyiwa was concerned that

Mbeki would press for a quick agreement that was less

favorable to the MDC than his draft agreement. Mbeki was not

concerned about a good agreement, he averred, but only one

that would pass muster with other African leaders.

¶8. (C) Masiyiwa expressed a lack of confidence in the MDC’s

resolve to hold firm and negotiate a good agreement along the

lines of his draft. He noted that Tsvangirai had begun

negotiations without even securing the return of his passport

which had been seized by the government after his return to

Zimbabwe in June. Also, after the signing of the Memorandum

of Understanding between ZANU-PF and the MDC on July 22,

Tsvangirai had publicly renounced violence, but Mugabe had

not done so. Masiyiwa thought that Tendai Biti, Tsvangirai’s

lead negotiator, had been broken during his time in custody

and could be manipulated by ZANU-PF. He believed the

Mutambara faction’s lead negotiator, Welshman Ncube, was

“slippery” and would not stand up to ZANU-PF.

————————————–

International Support for an Agreement

————————————–

¶9. (C) Masiyiwa said he warned Tsvangirai he could be

picking up a “poison chalice” if he entered into an agreement

that was not satisfactory to the U.S. and the EU. A

transitional government needed Western support and would fail

without it. Relatedly, Masiyiwa urged the U.S. to impress

upon Mbeki and his mediation team that a “quality agreement”

was necessary; otherwise there would be no Western economic

support and an agreement would be hollow.

———————-

Embassy Harare Comment

———————-

¶10. (C) Although Masiyiwa has definite ideas on what the

ultimate agreement should be, we don’t know whether Mugabe

and ZANU-PF will ultimately accept Masiyiwa’s draft agreement

or whether the South Africans will present (or have already

presented) something else. Regardless, it is increasingly

likely that there will be a power-sharing agreement reached

between ZANU-PF and the MDC, quite possibly sooner rather

than later. The parties are now working out the details of

the agreement. ZANU-PF and Mugabe are not willing to cede

power to Tsvangirai, and it appears that the MDC will accept

a government that includes a substantial role for Mugabe and

ZANU-PF. The MDC is tired and has apparently calculated that

it is better to try and to bring peace and stability now

through an agreement, with the promise of elections in two

years, than for Zimbabwe to continue to suffer violence, much

of it targeted at the MDC.

¶11. (C) If an agreement comes to pass, the new government

will undoubtedly ask for U.S. UK, and international financial

institution assistance. In fact, Tsvangirai may make the

request on behalf of the government.

¶12. (C) Ambassador will speak with Tsvangirai over the

weekend to reiterate to him that a substantive role for

Mugabe is a non-starter for the USG.

¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Harare.

BOST

(15 VIEWS)