Jonathan Moyo said Mnangagwa was too loyal to Mugabe

Former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo told United States ambassador Christopher Dell that Emmerson Mnangagwa, considered one of the front-runners to succeed President Robert Mugabe, was too loyal to Mugabe to upset the cart.

He even cited a joke that was doing the rounds in Harare that when Vice-President Joseph Msika told Mnangagwa that he and Mugabe were stepping down, Mnangagwa told him he would step down too.

“A few months ago, Moyo reported, Vice President Msika advised Mnangagwa that Mugabe and Msika were preparing to step down; Mnangagwa responded that he would step down too,” Moyo told Dell according to a diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks.

“Stressing his loyalty to Mugabe, Mnangagwa told Msika his continued presence would be a distraction to any successor and a disruption to party unity. Msika countered that Mnangagwa’s prospects to succeed Mugabe were good and convinced him to remain,” Moyo told the ambassador according to the cable dispatched on 23 March 2006.

Moyo said Mnangagwa still believed that Mugabe could still confer the presidency on him, but his prospects were doubtful.

Mnangagwa’s association with the Tsholotsho affair, the Col Dyck affair, the 1980s Gukuranhundi massacres in Matabeleland, and ruling party financial skulduggery all gave Mugabe or Mujuru tools with which to undermine Mnangagwa privately and publicly, he said.

Moyo also said although the security forces originally supported Joice Mujuru they were now doubting her ability to hold things together.

He maintained that the securocrats – together with the black middle class – viewed Mnangagwa as more capable than Mujuru of turning the economy around and of relating to the West.

 

Full cable:

Viewing cable 06HARARE372, MOYO ON POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, AVENUES FOR CHANGE

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06HARARE372	2006-03-24 12:44	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Harare

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000372

 

SIPDIS

 

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AF/S FOR B. NEULING

NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE

AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN

COMMERCE FOR BECKY ERKUL

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2011

TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI

SUBJECT: MOYO ON POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, AVENUES FOR CHANGE

 

 

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

 

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Summary

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¶1. (C) Independent MP Jonathan Moyo told poloff March 22

that the growing proximity of Mugabe’s departure and economic

collapse were increasing a national impetus for political

change. In this uncertain environment, securocrats were the

only ones focusing on policy and stability, and they were

losing confidence in the capacity of Vice President Mujuru’s

capacity to hold the party together after Mugabe’s departure.

Moyo expressed disappointment with the timidity of Emmerson

Mnangagwa and his camp, who he said were inclined to posture

and hedge until a succession event was close. To hasten

ruling party fractures and improve Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional

political environment, according to Moyo, the MDC factions,

civil society and Mnangagwa’s camp should agitate for

harmonized presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008,

an effort he urged the West to support. End summary.

 

——————————————-

Lame Duck Presidency, Economy Propel Change

——————————————-

 

¶2. (C) On the porch of his relatively modest Borrowdale West

suburban home, Moyo acknowledged he had been out of the

limelight for months but said he was enagaging with players

from all political groups constantly. He assessed that the

country’s political horizon remained clouded but that the

next few months would see significant developments. Two

factors — Mugabe’s lame duck status and the economy —

assured that a course for change would be set by year’s end.

 

¶3. (C) The controversial ex-Information Minister and former

Mugabe confidant maintained that ZANU-PF was incapable of

reforming itself in the foreseeable future. Even if the

patronage pie were contracting, the threat of losing one’s

job and outside business interests for “straying” remained

decisive for all in the absence of credible alternatives.

Although most recognized the need for international

assistance and wanted better relations with the West, there

was absolutely no consideration underway of reforms necessary

to secure international assistance. Succession dynamics

meant that nobody would take on Mugabe over policy. On the

economic front, the cabinet lacked the human resources to

even understand, much less debate policy alternatives, even

if Mugabe were not an obstacle.

 

¶4. (C) Moyo said both ruling party factions recognized that

the economy could not weather the political status quo much

longer and wanted Mugabe to step down. Moyo said Mugabe

stood no chance of winning another election were he to run.

The Mujuru faction banked on having Vice President Mujuru

succeed Mugabe in 2008, giving the party time to turn around

the economy sufficiently to win an election in a presidential

election postponed until 2010 by constitutional amendment.

This assumed that the international community would re-engage

with Zimbabwe upon Mugabe’s stepping down.

 

¶5. (C) Mujuru did not command sufficient support to assume

the presidency, according to Moyo. Only four of ten

provincial party structures supported her. Moreover, any

plan to delay a presidential election until 2010 would

provoke a backlash from the public, particularly among the

most numerous Karanga ethnic group. Mujuru’s effort to rally

Karanga behind the clique’s “man in Masvingo”, Obert Mpofu,

was doomed. (N.B. He did not mention other more popular

 

HARARE 00000372 002 OF 004

 

 

Mujuru allies in Masvingo, such as Eddie Zvobgo, Jr., and

Dzikamayi Mavhaire.) If the Mujuru faction agreed to a

national election in 2008, Mnangagwa’s group would either

prevail over her in an intra-party ZANU-PF race or bolt the

party.

 

¶6. (C) As for Mnangagwa’s faction, Moyo lamented their

continued low profile and unwillingness to break with or even

challenge the ZANU-PF Old Guard so far. The stakes of

patronage and succession made them hang on to their moribund

party even though they were emotionally ready to leave.

Their strategy was consciously geared to a “sprint” while

Moyo had embarked on a “marathon.” He explained that few

could afford economically or politically to break from the

party for more than a couple of months. Given ZANU-PF’s

unchallenged authority, they would wait until within months

of an election event to break from the party – if they

assessed that a new entity would overwhelm ZANU-PF’s remants.

Moyo opined, however, that delay until too late by Mnangagwa

himself could cost him politically as a sign of leadership

failure.

 

—————————-

Mnangagwa Preserving Options

—————————-

 

¶7. (C) Moyo said that the Mnangagwa faction was further

constrained by Mnangagwa’s continued strong personal loyalty

to Mugabe.   He assessed that Mnangagwa did not intend to

overtly or implicitly challenge Mugabe as long as Mugabe

remained in office, and that Mnangagwa believed that Mugabe

could yet confer the presidency to him. The former heir

apparent continued to have the President’s ear. Moreover,

Mugabe wanted to keep Mnangagwa in the game, as evidenced by

his personal intervention to keep Mnangagwa from being

arrested on at least one occasion. In the same vein, Moyo

reported that Mugabe had approached Mnangagwa at the December

party conference to amend the party’s recent constitutional

requirement that a woman be included in the top three

positions, a provision that had triggered Mujuru’s

supplanting Mnangagwa as that heir apparent. Mnangagwa

declined because it would be too overtly self-serving, and

Mugabe agreed to have the amendment of the amendment advanced

later by the politburo.

 

¶8. (C) Moyo further corroborated another Mnangagwa anecdote

floating around Harare of late. A few months ago, Moyo

reported, Vice President Msika advised Mnangagwa that Mugabe

and Msika were preparing to step down; Mnangagwa responded

that he would step down too. Stressing his loyalty to

Mugabe, Mnangagwa told Msika his continued presence would be

a distraction to any successor and a disruption to party

unity. Msika countered that Mnangagwa’s prospects to succeed

Mugabe were good and convinced him to remain.

 

¶9. (C) Moyo said he was increasingly doubtful about

Mnangagwa’s prospects. Mnangagwa’s association with the

Tsholotsho affair, the Col Dyck affair, the 1980s

 

SIPDIS

Gukuranhundi massacres in Matabeleland, and ruling party

financial skullduggery all gave Mugabe or Mujuru tools with

which to undermine Mnangagwa privately and publicly.

Moreover, despite his reputation for ruthlessness, Mnangagwa

was proving too confrontation-averse and vacillating in

internecine combat with the Mujuru faction. Nonetheless,

Mugabe was a bigger liability to Mujuru than to Mnangagwa,

with Mnangagwa benefiting from public attribution of economic

collapse to the political status quo.

 

——————————

 

HARARE 00000372 003 OF 004

 

 

Securocrats Pivotal, Uncertain

——————————

 

¶10. (C) Moyo emphasized the pivotal importance of the

security forces’ joint operations command (JOC) in the

succession game. The JOC were the only ones in power to

identify policy alternatives and weigh their consequences.

Nonetheless, they could not get sufficient purchase on policy

issues with political players given the centrality of

succession politics. Moyo suggested that the senior

securocrats had originally blessed the Mujuru succession plan

but were now doubting her ability to hold things together.

Moyo maintained that the securocrats – together with the

black middle class – viewed Mnangagwa as more capable than

Mujuru in turning the economy around and in relating to the

West. The JOC’s assessment and intentions was likely

evolving but would have to come to a head soon given their

concerns about the unsustainability of the economic crisis.

 

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Opposition Needs Reorientation

——————————

 

¶11. (C) Moyo said that each ZANU-PF faction continued to

court elements of each of the inwardly absorbed MDC factions.

The security apparatus had driven and exploited the MDC

rift, and hoped eventually to draw elements of the “Welshman

faction” (N.B. perhaps tellingly, Moyo never referred to it

as the Mutambara faction) into the government to better

market the GOZ to the international community.

 

¶12. (C) Moyo asserted that the rift nonetheless opened

opportunities for the opposition, which could now redefine

itself and reorient itself strategically. The country was

more ready for change than it was in 2002; the opposition

needed to catch up with the people in identifying and

demanding solutions to the national crisis. Most imporantly,

the factions needed to collaborate on tactics, and join

together more definitively with business, labor, local NGOs,

the separate white and black dominated farmers unions,

churches, and disaffected elements of ZANU-PF to fuel an

atmosphere that impelled constructive change.

 

——————————–

Harmonized Elections a Key Wedge

——————————–

 

¶13. (C) Moyo maintained that the timing of the next

presidential election was a flashpoint for the ruling party’s

factional strife. A vast majority of Zimbabweans, including

within the ruling party, wanted change and saw a 2008

harmonized election as a key. Thus, the issue that was

splitting the ruling party apart could force disparate

players to join together to enhance the atmospherics and

build momentum for change. Public outcry could overcome

ZANU-PF Old Guard intransigence on the issue. Moreover,

deliberation over the constitutional amendment to authorize a

harmonized election would “open a Pandora’s Box” of potential

political reforms to remedy much of Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional

political environment. Moyo said the issue nonetheless

lacked any forceful or organizing advocate and urged the West

to work quietly with its civil society partners, with

churches perhaps coordinating public efforts, to advance it.

 

 

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Comment

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HARARE 00000372 004 OF 004

 

 

¶14. (C) Even putting aside the galling irony of courting

support from a USG he vilified for years as Information

Minister, Moyo’s comments need to be filtered for personal

ambition and his continuing (albeit perhaps weakening)

alignment with Mnangagwa. His ellipses and contradictions

reflect difficulties he has playing a weak political hand in

a shifting and uncertain succession game. In that vein, for

example, he never mentioned his United People’s Movement, a

not-so-covertly Mnangagwa-aligned vehicle that has had

problems getting purchase with civil society and the public

at large. Although Moyo may have burned too many bridges to

be an overtly influential player with any of the major

political groupings in the foreseeable future, he remains a

pot-stirrer and keen observer of the political landscape able

to proffer telling insights into the internal workings of

ZANU-PF.

DELL

(192 VIEWS)