How Mugabe clipped Mujuru’s wings

President Robert Mugabe replaced four provincial governors thought to be allied to former general Solomon Mujuru to intimidate and quiet internal opposition from within his Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front, former politburo member Simba Makoni told United States embassy officials.

Makoni said there had been internal opposition to Mugabe within ZANU-PF for more than 10 years. This opposition was now at its peak but Mugabe had been able to hold on because of fear.

Makoni saw no immediate threat to Mugabe, but noted that a potential coalition between the Mujuru faction and ex-ZAPU ZANU-PF members from Matabeleland could leave Mugabe without a working majority in the ZANU-PF Politburo and Central Committee.

Makoni said Mugabe was aware of his problems and was seeking to intimidate and quiet his internal opposition.

Full cable:

Viewing cable 08HARARE757, AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH SIMBA MAKONI

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018

TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC PHUM ZI

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH SIMBA MAKONI

REF: HARARE 747

Classified By: Ambassador James D. McGee for reason 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on August 28, Simba

Makoni gave his anlysis of the current political situation.

While Makoni acknowledged that he is not now a political

player, as someone who has been involved in Zimbabwean

politics and government over the years, his views are worth

noting.

¶2. (C) After MDC Tsvangirai (MDC-T) triumphed in Monday’s

election for House of Assembly speaker, Makoni said there was

“less and less” of a chance of a deal between ZANU-PF and

MDC-T. Morgan Tsvangirai had demonstrated his strength and

would dig in his heels. Although difficult to predict,

Makoni did not see an early end toQimbabwe’s crisis.

¶3. (C) With both Mugabe and Tsvangirai insisting on holding

the lion’s share of executive power, the Ambassador asked

Makoni how a deal could be possible between their two

parties. Makoni said it would be important for the U.S. to

try to influence Mugabe’s closest supporters–the military

leaders and Emmerson Mnangagwa. He agreed with the

Ambassador that contact with the Zimbabwean generals by a

senior U.S. military leader could be productive if a way were

found to arrange this.

¶4. (C) Makoni said there had been internal opposition to

Mugabe from within ZANU-PF for over 10 years. This

opposition was now at a peak. Nevertheless, Mugabe had been

able to hold on to power through fear. Makoni saw no

immediate threat to Mugabe, but noted that a potential

coalition between the Mujuru faction and ex-ZAPU ZANU-PF

members from Matabeleland could leave Mugabe without a

working majority in the ZANU-PF Politburo and Central

Committee. Makoni said Mugabe was aware of his problems and

was seeking to intimidate and quiet his internal opposition.

Illustrative of this was his recent appointment of governors;

he replaced four governors thought to be allied to Solomon

Mujuru.

¶5. (C) On the subject of the MDC, Makoni said Tsvangirai

continued to make the mistake of operating regionally and

internationally, rather than consolidating his support in

Zimbabwe. He noted that after the March elections,

Tsvangirai almost immediately left Zimbabwe rather than

working to marshal support within the country. More

recently, after the SADC Summit in South Africa, Tsvangirai

traveled in the region rather than returning to Zimbabwe to

explain why he had not signed an agreement with Mugabe.

Makoni recommended that Tsvangirai make Zimbabwe his

priority, then the region, then the wider international

community.

¶6. (C) As we have suggested (reftel), Makoni said that

within Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai, as the principal opposition

leader, needed to do a much better job of reaching out to

civil society and non-MDC leaders such as himself. Makoni

pledged he and others would willingly work with Tsvangirai,

but Tsvangirai had to indicate his interest in being

inclusive.

MCGEE

(23 VIEWS)