Goche, Chinamasa and Mnangagwa were prepared to ditch Mugabe

President Robert Mugabe’s top lieutenants, Nicholas Goche, Patrick Chinamasa and Emmerson Mnangagwa were at one time interested in a government of national unity with an interim leader who was not Mugabe, according to a cable released by Wikileaks.

 

It was, however, not very clear whether the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front was serious about a government of national unity or not.

Goche, Chinamasa and Mnangagwa represented one power centre. Central bank governor Gideon Gono represented another while the military, particularly defence forces chief Constantine Chiwenga, represented a third.

However, no deal could be negotiated without the agreement of Mugabe.

 

Full cable:

 

Viewing cable 08HARARE367, ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY–NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08HARARE367	2008-04-24 12:30	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Harare

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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE

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INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1952

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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE

RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1209

RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000367 

SIPDIS 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ZDK NUM SVC) 

SIPDIS 

AF/S FOR S. HILL 

ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 

ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS 

STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E. LOKEN AND L. DOBBINS 

STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018 

TAGS: PGOV PREL ZI

SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE STATE OF PLAY--NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE 

TUNNEL 

REF: HARARE 337 AND PREV. 

HARARE 00000367 001.2 OF 004 

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Katherine Dhanani for reason 1.4 

 (d) 

------- 

SUMMARY 

------- 

¶1. (C) The exuberance that greeted election returns over 

three weeks ago has given way to despair and fear among many 

in the wake of a seemingly interminable delay in announcement 

of election results and ZANU-PF orchestrated and pervasive 

violence. While regional and international focus has been on 

recounting in 23 constituencies and the announcement of 

results, most important now is an end to violence. Without 

this, there is no clear path to either of the two most likely 

scenarios: a runoff election or a government of national 

unity (GNU). The MDC has indicated it will not contest 

elections when its supporters are being beaten and worse by 

ruling party gangs; neither can it be expected to negotiate a 

GNU with ZANU-PF while that party is orchestrating mayhem. 

While the idea of a GNU has been floated by ZANU-PF, 

negotiation of such an agreement would not be easy. ZANU-PF 

and Mugabe would want a GNU on their terms, maintaining power 

as the dominant partner. The MDC, having won the election, 

would understandably be adverse to allow Mugabe to remain in 

power and for ZANU-PF to play the dominant role in 

government. 

¶2. (C) The fact that ZANU-PF is even discussing a GNU is a 

reflection that many in the party do not see a way out of the 

current crisis; it is also due to increasing pressure from 

the region. It is crucial that the international community 

in general and the region in particular, continue to apply 

pressure for an end to violence and an adherence to 

constitutional processes. It is also important that MDC 

leaders, who have been outside of Zimbabwe for a considerable 

time, return to lead the party and provide focus on the 

events ahead. END SUMMARY. 

--------------------------------------------- -- 

The Election Aftermath and the ZANU-PF Calculus 

--------------------------------------------- -- 

¶3. (C) ZANU-PF's apparent intent going into the March 29 

elections was to open up democratic space and allow an 

election that many would consider free and fair. ZANU-PF 

hoped in this way to secure legitimacy. Thus, it permitted 

the MDC to campaign with some access to media and allowed 

some international observers (primarily SADC). There was 

little to criticize on voting day itself which our observers 

and others said went relatively smoothly. ZANU-PF 

miscalculated, however, the degree of discontent in the 

country and the willingness of many of its former supporters 

to defy party and traditional leaders to vote for the MDC. 

Thus it was clear soon after March 29 voting that the party 

had lost its parliamentary majority and that MDC leader 

Morgan Tsvangirai had won more votes than President Robert 

Mugabe. (COMMENT: Although the MDC and Tsvangirai claim he 

won an outright majority, we have no hard evidence on this. 

END COMMENT.) 

¶4. (C) We understand from numerous conversations that in the 

10 days or so after the election ZANU-PF considered several 

options. First, was a declaration that Mugabe had won and a 

state of emergency if necessary, but this would have required 

an obvious falsification of electoral results and would have 

been unacceptable even to SADC. Second, was a negotiated 

exit for Mugabe and a GNU headed by Tsvangirai. Mugabe may 

have been amenable to this according to both ZANU-PF and MDC 

HARARE 00000367 002.2 OF 004 

sources, but some in his inner circle, including Defense 

Forces Chief Constantine Chiwenga, were insecure about their 

security and financial futures, and vetoed this approach. 

¶5. (C) The last option, ultimately adopted, was a runoff 

election, as mandated by the Electoral Act. ZANU-PF then, 

stung by the election results and determined that it would 

not lose again and give up power, apparently decided to 

create conditions that would make a victory inevitable. 

Military units were deployed to rural areas as a symbol of 

strength and as a means of intimidation. And the party 

structures in key provinces--Mashonaland East, Central, and 

West; Manicaland; and Masvingo--unleashed youth militia and 

war vets in an orchestrated and systematic reign of terror 

against opposition (mostly MDC) supporters. The goal was to 

create an atmosphere of fear so that in a runoff election, 

many of those who voted for Tsvangirai and the MDC on March 

29 would vote for ZANU-PF, or would not vote.   While the 

actual numbers of victims of abduction, beating, and rape are 

limited, the effect of course has been widespread. 

¶6. (C) We believe the original delay in announcing results 

was aimed at giving ZANU-PF time to consider options. After 

having apparently decided on a runoff election, further delay 

occasioned by recounting allowed ZANU-PF to initiate and 

continue its campaign of violence. The combination of the 

delay and violence has, in addition to fear, caused many 

Zimbabweans to doubt that there can be a fair electoral 

outcome. 

------------------ 

The MDC's Response 

------------------ 

¶7. (C) The MDC initially announced that, based on its 

electoral analysis, Tsvangirai had won and there was no need 

for a runoff election. MDC leaders added, however, that if 

official results showed Tsvangirai had not received a 

majority, he would contest a runoff under protest. 

¶8. (C) As violence escalated, the MDC national council voted 

to boycott the election and Tsvangirai told regional leaders 

that he would not participate as violence and intimidation 

made chances of a fair election impossible. In his talks 

with these leaders, Tsvangirai has urged UN and AU 

intervention to deal with the crisis. Tsvangirai also 

addressed the April 13 SADC Summit in Lusaka. 

¶9. (C) Tsvangirai is coming under increasing criticism from 

his supporters, allies, and from civil society, for remaining 

outside the country at a time of crisis and at a time when 

MDC supporters are being attacked. Momentum from the March 

29 results has dissipated. There is little internal 

leadership with Tsvangirai and secretary general Tendai Biti 

gone for the last two weeks; MDC supporters are unaware of 

the MDC's strategy and are becoming despondent. Apart from 

international intervention to end the violence, Tsvangirai 

and the MDC have not articulated what they see as the 

resolution of the crisis. Is it an internationally 

supervised election or a negotiated GNU? This is not clear. 

------------- 

Toward a GNU? 

------------- 

¶10. (C) With the crisis deepening, we understand some 

regional leaders have urged consideration of a GNU. The 

government newspaper The Herald carried an op-ed April 23 

suggesting a GNU, albeit with Mugabe remaining in power 

during a transitional period and a lifting of western 

sanctions. (NOTE: The Herald later in the day pulled the 

HARARE 00000367 003 OF 004 

op-ed from its website and a government spokesman denied the 

government was considering a GNU. END NOTE.) A business 

source with strong ties to the ruling party told us Mugabe 

insiders Nicholas Goche, Patrick Chinimasa, and Emmerson 

Mnangagwa were now interested in a GNU with an interim leader 

other than Mugabe. Last week, Simba Makoni suggested a GNU 

to the Ambassador (Reftel). And regional leaders have 

suggested a coalition government may be the best way out of 

the crisis, most recently yesterday the ANC's Jacob Zuma. 

¶11. (C) The ZANU-PF interest in a GNU appears to be the 

result of several factors. First, Mugabe and his party have 

always been able to shrug off western criticism by noting 

support from SADC and the region. Of late, however, SADC and 

the region have demonstrated their unease with the current 

situation. The fact that the April 13 Summit was called was 

a clear signal. The Summit implicitly criticized the 

electoral process by calling for enhanced participation by 

party agents and observers in future electoral processes. 

Despite South African president Thabo Mbeki's proclamation 

that there was no crisis, ANC president Jacob Zuma and COSATU 

pointedly said otherwise. Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa 

opined that the Chinese ship with armaments destined for 

Zimbabwe should not be allowed to dock and offload in 

neighboring countries. Secondly, ZANU-PF is now aware of its 

lack of support and party insiders realize the party could 

lose a runoff election. Thirdly, another election would be 

expensive and logistically difficult. Finally, many in 

ZANU-PF realize that under present circumstances it is 

incapable of governing and turning around the economy. 

¶12. (C) Whether ZANU-PF is serious about negotiating a GNU 

is as of now subject to serious question. Goche, Chinimasa, 

and Mnangagwa represent one power center, Reserve Bank 

Governor Gideon Gono another, and the military, particularly 

Defence Chief Chiwenga, a third. Finally, it is unlikely any 

deal can be negotiated without the assent of Mugabe, and his 

feelings on the matter are not known. 

¶13. (C) As highlighted in The Herald op-ed, ZANU-PF believes 

it should dominate a GNU.Q+l}QU~ppression and 

violence over the years. We expect a GNU to be a continuing 

subject of discussion both in Zimbabwe and among regional 

leaders, but as of now the concept should be viewed with at 

least a dose of skepticism. 

-------------- 

FINAL COMMENTS 

-------------- 

¶14. (C) Both apparent options are fraught with problems. A 

runoff election at this time cannot be free and fair. Yet if 

the MDC boycotts, ZANU-PF will proclaim victory and the MDC 

will be forced to attempt negotiations from a weaker position 

than it occupies now. A GNU appears difficult to achieve 

unless ZANU-PF and the MDC agree to make concessions they are 

not now willing to make. 

¶15. (C) Perhaps most important is for Tsvangirai to return 

to Zimbabwe and, with Simba Makoni, Arthur Mutambara, and 

others, establish a united front and coordinate strategy: 

Will they participate in elections and, if so, under what 

conditions? An immediate end to violence, space to campaign, 

and pre-electoral international observers? Or do they want 

to pursue a GNU, and if so, under what conditions? 

¶16. (C) Finally, the situation on the ground has 

dramatically changed. The March 29 elections went relatively 

HARARE 00000367 004 OF 004 

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