Britain planned investment ban on Zimbabwe after 2008 elections- Wikileaks

Britain planned to tighten sanctions on Zimbabwe including an investment ban immediately after the controversial elections of 2008. Although the Netherlands supported further sanctions, it felt hat an investment ban would be difficult to implement because Britain and the United States had too many investments in Zimbabwe.  Instead it urged creativity in pursuing these additional sanctions saying governments could, for example, use “moral suasion”.

These were the views of the Netherlands Director for Sub-Saharan Africa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wepke Kingma, contained in a cable from the Hague filed by the United States political-economic counsellor Andrew Mann in July 2008.

The Dutch felt that the public did not fully appreciate the situation in Zimbabwe and was worried that ZANU-PF leader Robert Mugabe might buy the support of rival political parties and set a coalition government which would be acceptable to the West but under which Mugabe would still be in control.

They also felt that Mugabe was just buying time by taking part in the negotiations that were being mediated by South Africa. The Dutch were therefore looking at what sanctions would truly hurt the Mugabe regime.

This was in line with what the European Union wanted. Britain was also pushing for further sanctions and wanted to implement an investment ban by September.

The Dutch, however, felt it would be difficult to implement an investment ban because there were too many British and American investments in Zimbabwe. They even wondered whether the US was working with non European states on sanctions or contemplating action by the Human Rights Council.

The Netherlands also felt that though South Africa had voted against United Nations sanctions on Zimbabwe together with China and Russia, it was better for the Dutch to work with South Africa to find a “graceful way out” for Mugabe.

Full cable below:

 

 

VZCZCXYZ0000

RR RUEHWEB

 

DE RUEHTC #0625/01 2060856

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

R 240856Z JUL 08

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1773

INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0457

RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0088

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0134

RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0075

RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0134

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0440

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000625

 

SIPDIS

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018

 

TAGS: PREL EAID NL SO SU XW ZI

 

SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DUTCH VIEWS ON SUDAN,

ZIMBABWE, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA.

 

REF: A. THE HAGUE 587

¶B. BRUSSEL…

 

 

 

163331,7/24/2008 8:56,08THEHAGUE625,”Embassy The

Hague”,CONFIDENTIAL,08BRUSSELS1098|08THEHAGUE587,”VZCZCXYZ0000

RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0625/01 2060856

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

R 240856Z JUL 08

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1773

INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0457

RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0088

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0134

RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0075

RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0134

RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0440

“,”C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000625

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2018

TAGS: PREL EAID NL SO SU XW ZI

SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFRICA: DUTCH VIEWS ON SUDAN,

ZIMBABWE, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA.

REF: A. THE HAGUE 587

¶B. BRUSSELS 1098

Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew Mann, Reasons 1.5 (b

,d)

 

¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Wepke Kingma, MFA Director of the Sub-Sahara

Africa Department recently discussed the Dutch position on

Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the Horn of Africa. END SUMMARY.

 

Sudan

—–

 

¶2. (C) Regarding the recent ICC indictment of Sudanese

President Omar al-Bashir, the Dutch have expressed public

support for the ICC, but Kingma believes the timing for the

indictment is poor. Though Kingma made it clear the Dutch

would not publicly state this, he believes that pursuing the

indictment for Bashir will prove costly to any negotiations

and likely backfire. Plans for a Dutch contribution to

UNAMID will be “”pushed back”” because a group of Dutch

legislators returned from the region “”foaming at the mouth””

with concerns about the security situation.

 

Zimbabwe

——–

 

¶3. (C) The Dutch government continues to be an engaged and

concerned observer of Zimbabwe, though Kingma admits that

much of the public ignores the issue. Kingma noted that it

was possible Mugabe would attempt to buy the support of rival

political parties in an attempt to create a coalition

government that will be acceptable to the West but which

Mugabe would still control. Although, in Kingma,s view, the

rest of the world may be underestimating the South Africans

in the Zimbabwe negotiations, he feels Mugabe is probably

just “”buying time”” with the negotiations process. The Dutch

continue to look at what sanctions will truly hurt the Mugabe

regime.

 

¶4. (C) In a July 17 discussion between Poloffs and Melle

Leemstra, MFA desk officer for Zimbabwe, and Wouter Plomp,

head of the middle and southern Africa division, the Dutch

reported the EU,s sanction plan (reftel B). The United

Kingdom will push for further measures, including an

investment ban, to be enacted in September. However, the

remaining foreign investments in Zimbabwe are British and

American, and pursuing an investment ban is difficult. The

Dutch wonder, “”Is the U.S. working with non-EUR states on

sanctions, or contemplating action by the Human Rights

Council?”” The Dutch urge creativity in pursuing additional

measures. For example, governments could use “”moral suasion””

rather than an investment ban, with press statements such as

“”it,s inconceivable to do business in Zimbabwe.”” Tesco, UK

has stopped buying from Zimbabwe, and Shell is also

considering a sale of assets in Zimbabwe.

 

¶5. (C) Plomp wondered if the negative votes from Russia,

China and South Africa on the UN sanctions were a surprise to

the United States. The Dutch noted the need for South Africa

to find a “”graceful way out”” for Mugabe, so perhaps it would

be better to ease the pressure on South Africa. Minister for

Development Cooperation Bert Koenders noted (in a

conversation with A/S Frazier) that there should be some

cooperation between the negotiations in South Africa and the

brandishing of international sanctions. The Dutch concede

that it will be difficult to coordinate the bureaucratic and

political sides on a timeline.

 

¶6. (C) Plomp took note of the need to consider the eventual

reconstruction of Zimbabwe, with recent South African

Development Community estimates running around two to three

billion dollars. The Dutch maintain that it will be key for

“”northern”” countries to coordinate.

 

Horn of Africa

————–

 

¶7. (C) Somali PM Nur Hassan Hussein visited the Netherlands

July 10. According to Kingma, the Dutch told him they were

ready to give aid to Somalia, especially for local police

forces. The Netherlands is actively working towards a

solution with neighboring countries to address the

lawlessness. The latest report by the International Crisis

Group was a disappointment as it just “”pulls out the latest

toolbox”” with proposals such as naming a special envoy, but

does not address the “”underlying issues.””

 

¶8. (C) Though an outspoken critic of the regime, the Dutch

have been directly speaking with Ethiopia this year since it

is willing to engage on critical issues such as Ogaden and

Somalia. Eritrea, however, will not discuss Somalia with the

Dutch. Norway,s FM Store told Dutch FM Verhagen that the

border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia was a key to

resolving the Somalia problem. Kingma thinks that is

“”bullshit,”” but the FM asked for a paper on the issue.

 

¶9. (C) Comment: Kingma,s frank talk did not provide any

surprises but reflected his four years, experience leading

Dutch Africa policy. It was also emblematic of the Dutch

penchant for blunt remarks to allies. For example, Kingma

suggested the way to deal with Lord,s Resistance Army leader

Joseph Kony would be for the United States to “”put a price

on”” his head and encourage local figures in the Congo to

“”take care”” of him. End Comment.

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