Roy Bennett, who was Member of Parliament for Chimanimani at the time, told United States embassy officials said that although the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front strategy was intimidation rather than elimination, certain hard-line elements within the party could be very unpredictable.
He was talking about his safety following a spate of arrests and intimidation of Movement for Democratic Change activists following the 2002 presidential elections which President Robert Mugabe had won but the MDC claimed he had stolen.
Fellow MP David Coltart said that although he had received threats, he did not think that he was in any clear danger; instead, he viewed the ZANU-PF threats as mind games.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 02HARARE1237, MAY 22 DISCUSSIONS WITH MDC MP DAVID COLTART
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001237
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF, AS KANSTEINER AND PDAS BELLAMY; ALSO FOR AF/S
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRAZER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2007
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAGR ECON PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: MAY 22 DISCUSSIONS WITH MDC MP DAVID COLTART
Classified By: DCM REWhitehead due to 1.5 (b) and (d).
¶1. (c) Summary: Ambassador and DCM met with MDC MP and
shadow justice minister David Coltart over breakfast on May
¶22. Coltart addressed his personal security and his upcoming
trip abroad, then described developments in the MDC’s legal
challenge of the results of the March 2002 presidential
election. Coltart also described his recent meetings with
commercial farmers and a dawning GOZ awareness of the
ramifications of its wayward agricultural policies. He noted
that certain, more radical elements of the MDC favor mass
action, but he expressed his belief that this would not
succeed and that attempts to impose quick fixes are
unrealistic. Coltart concluded with comments on outstanding
legal cases that pit the MDC against ZANU-PF. End Summary.
—————–
Security Concerns
—————–
¶2. (c) The Ambassador recounted to Coltart his recent
conversation with Congressman Royce in which the latter had
described credible death threats against Coltart relayed to
Royce by Orange County constituents of Zimbabwean origin.
The Ambassador observed that Royce felt that Coltart’s best
option was to leave Zimbabwe. Coltart replied that he did
not think that he was in any clear danger; instead, he viewed
the ZANU-PF threats as mind games. The Ambassador asked
Coltart about the whereabouts of his family and whether
threats had been directed toward them. Coltart responded
that they were at home in Bulawayo, and that there had been
only “indirect” threats.
———————-
Plans to Travel Abroad
———————-
¶3. (c) Coltart continued that while he had no intention to
“go hide overseas,” he did intend to leave on May 26 for a
month-long trip to the UK, USA, and Canada. He planned to be
in Washington between June 10 and 14 and hoped to meet with
Assistant Secretary Kansteiner, PDAS Bellamy, various human
rights groups, the American Bar Association, and the
International Bar Association. His goal was to recruit
outside observers to attend the upcoming MDC challenge before
the High Court of ZANU-PF’s victory in the March 2002
Presidential Election.
¶4. (c) He readily admitted that the MDC expected the GOZ to
steer the case to a High Court judge sympathetic to ZANU-PF
in order to shield the Supreme Court and Mugabe-appointed
Chief Justice Chidyausiku from dealing with the case. What
MDC sought was high-level international attention to the case
that would bring pressure to bear on the Zimbabwean
judiciary. To this end, the MDC was in contact with an
eminent South African lawyer named Gauntlet who had been
recommended to Coltart by the ANC. Coltart said that the
Rhodesian born Gauntlet had left Rhodesia as a young man
because of his father’s rejection of Ian Smith’s UDI regime.
A Rhodes scholar with offices in both Johannesburg and
London, Gauntlet was widely viewed in Southern Africa as one
of the finest trial lawyers on the scene. Coltart said that
he would meet with Gauntlet later in the day to discuss the
possibility of “Operation Gauntlet,” an MDC initiative to
turn the legal challenge into a media event that would
embarrass ZANU-PF and maintain an international focus on
Zimbabwe. He cautioned that scant MDC resources could be the
limiting factor in what looked to be an eight-week long trial,
¶5. (c) Coltart said that abundant evidence was pouring in,
so much that it would be necessary to do a legal triage to
avoid the abundance of facts from obscuring the central
themes. The MDC planned to forward constitutional arguments,
especially on Mugabe’s unconstitutional use of statutory
instruments. They would supplement this with irrefutable
technical arguments, such as the Registrar General’s failure
to produce the voters’ rolls. The MDC legal team would steer
clear of basing their case on pre-electoral violence, since
this could only produce a series of witnesses pitting one’s
word against the other’s.
—————
The Food Crisis
—————
¶6. (c) The Ambassador noted that Zimbabwe’s looming food
crisis would once again focus international attention on
Zimbabwe; should Coltart engage the press while abroad, he
should stress the rich contribution of errant GOZ
agricultural policies to the crisis, both in Zimbabwe and
regionally. Coltart said that it appeared that the enormity
of the crisis had finally begun to dawn on GOZ leadership.
In Chinhoyi, Mashonaland West Governor Chinetsa recently met
with war vets and police and instructed them to let
commercial farmers return to farming. Last weekend, Mugabe
and several of his ministers had toured farming areas and met
with several commercial farmers. Mugabe had urged them to
put in the winter wheat crop and — according to another
source — expressed surprise and then chastised his entourage
when a farmer informed him that he could not undertake
farming activities because he had received a Section Eight
acquisition notice and because all of his irrigation pipes
had been stolen.
¶7. (c) Coltart observed that the apparent ZANU-PF change of
heart was too late — the final date for putting in winter
wheat had already passed. In addition, necessary inputs are
not available. The government had approached the leading
irrigation equipment dealer from Bulawayo with open
pocketbook only to learn it would take him a minimum of two
months to import enough material to put irrigated commercial
agriculture back on its feet. Coltart said that his own
recent tour of the farming heartland around Gweru and Kwekwe
had revealed the low morale of the commercial farmers, many
of whom are planning to leave. He added that it was
difficult to say exactly how many farmers remained
countrywide on their farms. In Matebeleland South, only five
farmers had been evicted. In Marondera, 23 or 24 farmers had
vacated.
¶8. (c) Coltart charged that the Commercial Farmers’ Union
had not provided strong leadership. The MDC has sought to
champion the farmers’ cause by drafting a contract that sets
three basic pre-conditions: an all or nothing approach that
exempts all commercial farmers from harassment; the
unhindered access of farmers to their fields, and a
concomitant return to rural rule of law; and the removal of
Section Eight provisions. Coltart said that at this juncture
few farmers are willing to risk a Section Eight provision
that mandates two-years’ imprisonment for any farmer who
attempts to till his land after a Section Eight has been
served. He added that this amendment rammed through by
Justice Minister Chinamasa in the most recent rump session of
Parliament was doomed to be stricken down by the courts,
since once again Chinamasa had suspended procedural rules and
rammed the amendment through absent the legally constituted
Legal Committee of three that must review the law.
————————-
Prospects for Mass Action
————————-
¶9. (c) The Ambassador cited newspaper reports on calls for
mass action and asked Coltart if he thought this constituted
a viable option. Coltart replied that he did not believe
that it could work and that, in fact, it would probably play
to Mugabe’s strength. He mused that perhaps a two-day
stay-away might prove the point that the population is
unhappy. Coltart said that based on their most recent
conversation, Morgan Tsvangirai shared this view. However,
there is a minority of MDC hawks who favor muscular action
now. Coltart noted that almost all of these were Shona,
mostly from Harare. He felt that it was possible that some
of these might be agent provocateurs planted by ZANU-PF. The
Ambassador said that we are concerned about Tsvangirai’s
ability to control violent outbreaks that the GOZ could use
as a pretext to move against the MDC. Coltart responded that
there is no quick fix solution to Zimbabwe’s woes. However,
it is essential to hold out some minimal hope. This was one
reason why the MDC continued to pursue its legal challenge to
Mugabe’s election “victory.”
—————-
Legal Skirmishes
—————-
¶10. (c) Coltart described the ongoing legal tit for tat
between ZANU-PF and MDC. He observed that the GOZ has shown
no enthusiasm for pressing forward on the treason case
against Tsvangirai. The GOZ also continues to harass Coltart
and other Bulawayo based MDC leaders charged with either
weapons violations or the 2001 murder of ZANU-PF activist
Cain Nkala, but they have brought none of these cases to
trial. Coltart said that this may be partly due to the fact
that the courts have not yet acted on the disapperance case
of Coltart’s polling agent Patrick Nabanyama, who was
abducted by three men in front of his family in June 2000 and
then turned over to other ZANU-PF supporters who allegedly
murdered him. The body has never been found, and now the
prosecution has released the alleged killers and charged the
four kidnappers with murder, but not kidnapping. In the
absence of the body or any corroborating evidence, Coltart
said, the three men cannot be convicted, and everyone will go
free. Once the prosecutors have disposed of this case,
predicted Coltart, they will set their sights on the MDC
supporters accused of murdering Nkala.
——-
Comment
——-
¶11. (c) Coltart was surprisingly upbeat about the reigning
situation. He seems prepared to take a peaceful, tactical
approach that will prolong ZANU-PF’s international isolation
and wait for the inevitable results of GOZ policy
mismanagement, including the food crisis, to further weaken
ZANU-PF’s base of support. Coltart clearly appreciates that
failed mass action risks undermining the credibility of the
MDC, and fracturing its disparate base of support. On his
own safety, Coltart still believes that intimidation and not
elimination is the ZANU-PF strategy. Fellow MDC MP Roy
Bennett expressed the same views during a separate meeting
with DCM and Poloff on May 22, although he admitted that
certain hard-line elements of ZANU-PF can be very
unpredictable.
SULLIVAN
(35 VIEWS)
