Father Fidelis Mukonori, a confidant of President Robert Mugabe, told United States embassy officials that the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front leadership around Mugabe lacked the political clout, intelligence, experience or vision to lift Zimbabwe out of the hole they had dug.
Ambition was their central motive and most of Zimbabwe’s misgovernance stemmed from their pursuit of individual interest at the complete expense of public interest.
The party’s elite were increasingly consumed with the presidential succession and many of them saw a possible president when they looked in the mirror.
Mukonori said Mugabe was digging in out of fear and mistrust and was at a loss over how to preserve his legacy.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 06HARARE42, MUGABE CONFIDANT FLOATS TRIAL BALLOON
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Reference ID |
Created |
Released |
Classification |
Origin |
VZCZCXRO9973
PP RUEHMR
DE RUEHSB #0042/01 0121540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121540Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9449
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1025
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0860
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1042
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0302
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0665
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1097
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3420
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0858
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1489
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1240
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-7//
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOOC/ECMO/CC/DAO/DOB/DOI//
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ23-CH/ECJ5M//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000042
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
SUBJECT: MUGABE CONFIDANT FLOATS TRIAL BALLOON
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) In a January 10 meeting with Ambassador, Father
Fidelis Mukonori, Zimbabwe’s senior Jesuit and a confidant of
Robert Mugabe, recommended western re-engagement, including a
secure “way out” for Mugabe. The Ambassador responded he
would be open to discussing with GOZ leaders the post-Mugabe
reforms needed for re-engagement — in confidence if they so
desired. He added that the presence of some of the current
leadership in a post-Mugabe government would make
re-engagement far more difficult. Mukonori agreed the
transition was underway, said the most objectionable ZANU-PF
leaders would not survive politically, and promised to
consider arranging private meetings. He also recounted his
successful efforts against the education bill and his efforts
to broker a GOZ-UN compromise over temporary shelter for the
victims of Operation Murambatsvina. End Summary.
————————
A Call for Re-engagement
————————
¶2. (C) In a discussion at the Embassy, Mukonori told the
Ambassador that the ZANU-PF leadership around Mugabe lacked
the political clout, intelligence, experience or vision to
lift Zimbabwe out of the hole they had dug. Ambition was
their central motive and most of Zimbabwe’s misgovernance
stemmed from their pursuit of individual interest at the
complete expense of public interest. Moreover, the party’s
elite were increasingly consumed with the presidential
succession and many of them saw a possible president when
they looked in the mirror. For his part, Mukonori said
Mugabe was digging in out of fear and mistrust and was at a
loss over how to preserve his legacy. This myopia and vacuum
of leadership would thwart any prospects for national
turnaround left to itself.
¶3. (C) Under the circumstances, Mukonori continued, Western
re-engagement offered the best prospect to break the logjam
of systemic misgovernance. He expressed concern that the
West might be drifting into its own myopia on Zimbabwe,
essentially abandoning the country over the venality of its
leadership despite the deepening need of its innocent people.
He likened the ruling party leadership and its public to a
hungry tiger with a baby in its clutches. He urged the West
not to shoot the tiger for fear of killing the baby.
Instead, throw the tiger some meat, enticing him to release
the baby. Mukonori asked whether the USG and the UK couldn’t
develop a “joint approach” to Zimbabwe, arguing that Mugabe
was serious last August when he said he would rather talk to
Tony Blair than Morgan Tsvangirai.
————————————
Ambassador on Price of Re-engagement
————————————
¶4. (C) In response, the Ambassador reiterated USG commitment
to Zimbabwe as exemplified by its generous humanitarian
assistance. The USG was prepared to do more, but not as long
as Zimbabwe’s leader uniformly rejected all international
overtures – a la UN U/S Egeland’s recent visit – as an
imperialist conspiracy. Moreover, the Ambassador said
Mugabe’s line on Tony Blair was little more than a diversion
from the real issues confronting Zimbabwe. What real value
could there possibly be in such a dialogue when Zimbabwe’s
real problems began at home and not in London, as Mugabe was
HARARE 00000042 002 OF 003
fond of asserting. Mukonori said he understood the point.
The Ambassador underscored the difficulty of even
establishing a common ground for engagement, given the ruling
party’s obsession with the past and refusal to countenance
discussion of Zimbabwe’s real problems.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador said that for the USG to engage more
deeply Mugabe-ism would have to go, including especially the
more violent of the current leadership. In addition, the
remaining leadership would have to acknowledge its
misgovernance, its need for international support, and begin
needed reforms. The Ambassador added that the transition to
a post-Mugabe era seemed already to have begun, as evidenced
by the growing succession struggle, and that as part of that
process we were open to meeting with members of the
leadership — in confidence if they so desired, as long as it
was understood from the outset that any potential
re-engagement would necessarily be conditioned on real
political and economic reform. He suggested that Mukonori
could use his good offices to arrange such meetings.
¶6. (C) Mukonori agreed with the Ambassador that Zimbabwe
already had a foot in the post-Mugabe era, rendering the
octogenarian leader increasingly irrelevant to the country’s
future. He added that the people would never acquiesce to
Mugabe’s replacement by any of the worst ZANU-PF aspirants
and he promised to give the matter further thought and get
back to the Ambassador on arranging confidential meetings
with elements of the leadership that might be pen to
discussing the future.
——————————————— ——–
Lobbying the GOZ on Education Bill, Temporary Shelter
——————————————— ——–
¶7. (C) Mukonori also related his successful lobbying efforts
in derailing a destructive education bill and his efforts to
counter GOZ intransigence on donor-provided emergency
temporary shelter. He said it had taken him five months to
defeat the education bill. He had avoided direct
confrontation with the bill,s author, Education Minister
Aeneas Chigwedere. Instead he had lined up parents,
teachers, MPs and other ministers and had then approached
Vice President Mujuru and convinced her the bill would be a
disaster.
¶8. (C) Mukonori said by the time he talked to the President
directly, reaction against the bill and Chigwedere had become
intense and Mugabe had already been of the view that the bill
was “crap”. Castigated at a cabinet meeting by Mugabe for
endorsing the bill’s submission to the parliament in the
first place, ministers sheepishly maintained Chigwedere had
not shared the bill’s details. In subsequent negotiations
with the GOZ over details, Mukonori held firm, resulting in
the eventual excision of provisions subjecting private school
personnel and fee matters to GOZ control.
¶9. (C) Mukonori said he was using similar tactics to try to
broker a compromise between the UN and the GOZ on temporary
shelter for the victims of Murambatsvina. He said Local
Government and Housing Minister Chombo had a personal stake
in the GOZ’s hostile approach given his central involvement
in the operation. In addition, Mugabe had concerns about the
type of shelter provided by donors. Mukonori suggested he
was making progress in getting the President to take a more
receptive view and had been able to outmaneuver Chombo on
several occasions, though the matter continued to be debated
within the GOZ.
——-
HARARE 00000042 003 OF 003
Comment
——-
¶10. (C) Mukonori’s advice on re-engagement may have been a
GOZ trial balloon of sorts, though probably not from Mugabe
himself. But he was more likely acting on his own and his
initial approach reflected a certain naivete in arguing for
an unconditional gesture of good will from the international
community to Mugabe and his cronies. The Jesuit is close to
Mugabe and also to the Mujurus and other senior GOZ
officials. We are skeptical that a more engaging posture on
our part would prompt Mugabe to confront the country’s deep
political and economic problems more sensibly. However,
post-Mugabe, real reform becomes possible, and this is the
time to begin laying out our position and conditions. In
that regard, Mukonori’s stature and connections make him a
potentially useful messenger to the GOZ elite on the price of
re-engagement.
DELL
(46 VIEWS)
