Pearson Mbalekwa, the only visible member of the United People’s Movement, said Emmerson Mnangagwa was quietly behind the group but would not comment on plans for Mnangagwa’s association to be publicly disclosed.
He said Tsholotsho legislator Jonathan Moyo and former Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front provincial chairman for Masvingo Daniel Shumba were in the party’s national executive.
Mbalekwa, a former Central Intelligence Organisation employee, said significant players in ZANU-PF and state apparatus such as the CIO were sympathetic to or aligned to the party but their association remained private.
Full cable:
Viewing cable 05HARARE1591, MBALEKWA ON UPM STRUCTURE, PLATFORM, STRATEGIES
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001591
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR B. NEULING
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE
AFR/SA FOR E. LOKEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010
SUBJECT: MBALEKWA ON UPM STRUCTURE, PLATFORM, STRATEGIES
REF: (A) HARARE 1420 (B) HARARE 982
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i., Eric T. Schultz under Section 1
——-
Summary
——-
¶1. (C) In a November 18 meeting with poloff, United People’s
Movement (UPM) principal Pearson Mbalekwa said the party was
concentrating on building organizational structures and a
platform that would make it competitive in local elections by
next year. He said that the movement continued to draw
strength from ruling party personnel and would aggressively
hammer wedge issues to further divide the ruling party. He
confirmed that the UPM was talking to but not actively
courting both MDC factions and had no plans to join in any
MDC-led mass action. Mbalekwa inquired about international
NGOs and other players that might be willing to help the
movement with training or travel needs. End Summary.
——————————
Developing Structure, Platform
——————————
¶2. (C) According to Mbalekwa, the UPM had formal structures
in all provinces save Mashonaland Central and Manicaland. A
“national executive” that included Mbalekwa, independent MP
Jonathan Moyo, and ex-ZANU-PF Masvingo Chairperson Daniel
Shumba among others met once every two weeks. He claimed
response in urban and rural areas was “tremendous” due to
wide disgust with ruling party mismanagement and public loss
of confidence in the MDC. Significant players in the ruling
party and state apparatuses, such as the CIO (Mbalekwa’s
former employer), remained sympathetic to or aligned with the
UPM, even if their association remained private. He claimed
Emmerson Mnangagwa was satisfied with the movement’s progress
and remained quietly behind the group but would not comment
on plans for Manangagwa’s association to be publicly
disclosed.
¶3. (C) Mbalekwa reported that the party was working on a
manifesto that would be released in the coming months and
that the party would begin to contest rural and urban council
elections in the coming year. He shared with poloff a
pamphlet (pouched to AF/S), which laid out party principles
and goals. The manifesto was focused on pro-democracy
rhetoric and on the need to address Zimbabwe’s economic
crisis. In particular, Mbalekwa said the GOZ’s conceptually
popular but ultimately failed land reform program was a
divisive issue ripe for UPM exploitation. The UPM’s plan was
to restore confidence in the agricultural sector by
compensating previous farm owners (largely with international
participation), conducting a comprehensive land audit, and
establishing a freehold title system.
—————————–
Overcoming ZANU-PF Advantages
—————————–
¶4. (C) Mbalekwa said the UPM planned to actively exploit
existing tensions in the ruling party. Reported GOZ plans to
amend the constitution to consolidate presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2010 and to permit a Vice
President to complete a President’s remaining term, for
example, were resented widely as a strategem to perpetuate
Zezuru dominance. According to Mbalekwa, Mugabe had
recognized the potential explosiveness of the issue and
squelched efforts to include the measure in the
constitutional amendment package adopted in September. To
exacerbate succession fissures and thwart the plan, the UPM
would foment calls outside and inside the party for elections
to be consolidated and held in advance of 2008.
¶5. (C) The ex-ZANU-PF Central Committee member acknowledged
that the ruling party’s patronage system presented an
obstacle but stressed that the UPM was equipped to overcome
it. The key was convincing people that the system made them
vulnerable not empowered. Mbalekwa claimed that the UPM
could succeed in this effort because, unlike the MDC, it had
?liberation? credentials and organizational skills.
Moreover, the government had proven afraid to pursue
politicized seizures of farms from UPM figures like himself
with “liberation” credentials and that had weakened the
patronage system?s deterrent effect on ruling party members
considering joining the UPM.
——————
Relations With MDC
——————
¶6. (C) Mbalekwa noted that the UPM had met with both MDC
factions but was inclined to let the dust settle on factional
conflict before it proceeded any further with potential
collaboration or alliances. Not wanting to inherit MDC
factional rifts or its foreign associations, the UPM would
want to take on MDC luminaries individually, rather than as
factions that would then operate as such within the UPM. He
noted that the masses were sick of ZANU-PF but were put off
by the MDC’s foreign associations and well-established
inability to deliver and predicted that the UPM would easily
displace the MDC as the main opposition to the government
before the next general elections.
¶7. (C) Mbalekwa criticized the interest of the MDC and some
in civil society in mass action. Zimbabweans were exhausted
and needed more education and organization before such
tactics would be productive, Mbalekwa concluded. The UPM
would eschew mass action for now, focusing instead on
recasting the national debate to the ruling party’s
disadvantage and on mobilizing people for coming elections.
He predicted that the experience, connections, stature, and
savvy of UPM principals would enable the party to overcome
ruling party intimidation and election-rigging measures,
unlike the na e and unprepared MDC.
—————
Party Financing
—————
¶8. (C) Mbalekwa said the UPM had adequate “seed money” and
was producing pamphlets, t-shirts, and rallies in order to
project itself. It was establishing networks in the
diaspora, where he claimed there was great interest. Party
principals hoped to travel to the South Africa, the U.K.,
Australia, and the United States next year to tap diaspora
coffers but needed to first build greater credibility at
home. In the meantime, the party was looking for funds to
support training and travel and Mbalekwa asked for Embassy
assistance in identifying NGOs and other players who could
help support its activities.
——-
Comment
——-
¶9. (C) The UPM?s most identifiable principals – Emmerson
Mnangagwa and Jonathan Moyo – each carry heavy liabilities
with both domestic and international audiences for their
association with past ruling party oppression. In addition,
like the opposition MDC, it lacks resources or a reliable
platform from which to deliver its message in an environment
where the ruling party directs the full power of the state to
its advantage. That said, Zimbabwe’s dysfunctional political
landscape and leadership vacuum suggest obvious opportunities
for a third force and the UPM is well-positioned, especially
in the event of a ruling party crack-up over Mugabe?s
succession, to take advantage of those opportunities.
SCHULTZ
(230 VIEWS)
